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This dissertation is an intellectual and legal history that traces the evolution of 
human rights concepts by focusing on American participants who were at the center of 
the Nuremberg Trial—Robert Jackson, Francis Biddle, and John Parker. It addresses 
questions such as: What impact did the Nuremberg Trial have on international human 
rights law in the postwar period? How did Jackson, Biddle, and Parker understand human 
rights, national sovereignty, international law, and international engagement before the 
Trial? Did their views change as a result of their Nuremberg experiences? What 
challenges, if any, did they face in upholding human rights when they returned home? 
The answers to these questions reveal a key paradox surrounding Nuremberg. A 
paradox seems to contradict generally received opinion yet is still true, which is an apt 
description of the Nuremberg Trial. It was a pivotal moment in the development of 
international human rights law, and of the U.S. commitment to internationalism. One way 
of measuring Nuremberg’s importance is through the impact it had on Jackson, Biddle, 
and Parker’s thinking after the Trial ended. These men had already endorsed the idea of 
“crimes against humanity” and the need for international trials before they received their 
appointments, which is part of the reason why they were chosen. At Nuremberg, they 
confronted atrocities of such an extreme nature that they devoted themselves to the 
Trial’s great purpose: that “never again” would the world allow this to happen. 
Aggressive war, genocide, racial and religious persecution were among the worst crimes 
that had to be eradicated. Paradoxically, though, while each participant demonstrated an 
enhanced commitment to human rights after the Trial, each one also faced his own 
challenges in applying these principles at home. Jackson faltered on anti-communism, 
and Parker on civil rights. Only Biddle out of the three went the furthest in consistently 
advocating human rights.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY
 
 
In the first paragraph of his opening statement at the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), better known as the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, Robert Jackson made 
a direct connection between this unprecedented event and the development of 
international human rights law. The former member of President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration had taken a leave of absence from the Supreme Court in order to prosecute 
high-ranking Germans and Nazi party officials suspected of committing war crimes, and 
his first words before the court set the tone for what became the Trial of the Century:  
 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so 
calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot 
tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being 
repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with 
injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive 
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes 
that Power has ever paid to Reason. 
 
 
The idea of holding a trial at all was controversial, as summary execution was a more 
popular option. Nuremberg’s critics reasoned that these men were already guilty so there 
was little to do except line up the accused in front of a firing squad. But Jackson believed 
vengeance was not the answer. He wanted to set a new precedent and send a message to 
the world that there would be consequences for any country that commits crimes against 
humanity to achieve its goals. The world must learn to submit to the rule of law if it 
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wanted to achieve peace, and the Nuremberg Trial reflected this attempt to legitimize 
international law above the absolute authority of a sovereign nation.  
To that end, the U.S. worked to ensure that the IMT would not be like a Moscow 
show trial where the defendants were already guilty before they walked into the 
courtroom to receive their sentences. Jackson, as the chief U.S. prosecutor, arranged for 
interpreters to translate the entire proceedings and all of the evidence into German, and 
he provided the German defendants—which included individuals responsible for some of 
the most notorious atrocities imaginable—with counsel so that they would have the 
opportunity to defend themselves in a court of law. In doing so, Jackson upheld the 
defendants’ rights to a fair trial, and thereby contributed to an emerging human rights 
framework. 
 Since Nuremberg was an international military trial, the prosecutors had to 
convince the judges from France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R, and the U.S. that the 
German defendants were guilty. On the American side, that meant Jackson and members 
of his team had to make their case before Francis Biddle, the man who had followed in 
Jackson’s footsteps twice in Roosevelt’s administration as solicitor general and then as 
attorney general, and John Parker, a progressive Republican from North Carolina and the 
senior judge of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Biddle was the senior member 
of the Tribunal and controlled the American vote in all of the judges’ decisions. Parker 
was his alternate and could only vote if Biddle was unable to perform his duties, but he 
still heard all of the same evidence as Biddle and participated in all of the judges’ 
deliberations. Their roles at Nuremberg are often overlooked, but their importance to the 
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development of international human rights law equaled Jackson’s. By promoting 
internationalism and individual freedom after the Trial was over, these men advanced the 
cause of human rights. 
This project is an intellectual and legal history that traces the evolution of human 
rights concepts by focusing on the American participants who were at the center of the 
Nuremberg Trial. It addresses questions such as: What impact did the Nuremberg Trial 
have on international human rights law in the postwar period? How did Jackson, Biddle, 
and Parker understand human rights, national sovereignty, international law, and 
international engagement before the Trial? Did their views change as a result of their 
Nuremberg experiences? What challenges, if any, did they face in upholding human 
rights when they returned home? 
The answers to these questions reveal a key paradox surrounding Nuremberg. I 
use the term paradox to mean something that seems to contradict generally received 
opinion yet is still true, which is an apt description of the Trial.1 The Nuremberg Trial 
was a pivotal moment in the development of international human rights law, and of the 
U.S. commitment to internationalism. One way of measuring Nuremberg’s importance is 
through the impact it had on Jackson, Biddle, and Parker’s thinking after the Trial ended. 
                                                 
1 Elizabeth Borgwardt mentions the idea of a Nuremberg paradox in “Re-examining Nuremberg as 
a New Deal Institution: Politics, Culture and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms,” 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2005), 454, and A New Deal for the World: America’s 
Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005), 240-1; Telford Taylor also referred to a 
Nuremberg paradox, but one that was quite different from what this project has outlined. He claimed that it 
was because there was such “intensity of feeling against the Nazi leaders” that there did not seem to be any 
need for a trial. “They appeared so hideously culpable,” Taylor wrote, “that their execution was regarded as 
a foregone conclusion, and to try them under such circumstances would be farcical.” Taylor, “The 
Nuremberg Trials,” Columbia Law Review 55, no. 4 (April 1955), 511. 
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These men had already endorsed the idea of “crimes against humanity” and the need for 
international trials before they received their appointments, which is part of the reason 
why they were chosen. At Nuremberg, they confronted atrocities of such an extreme 
nature that they devoted themselves to the Trial’s great purpose: that “never again” would 
the world allow this to happen. Aggressive war, genocide, racial and religious 
persecution were among the worst crimes that had to be eradicated. Paradoxically, 
though, while each participant demonstrated an enhanced commitment to human rights 
after the Trial, each one also faced his own challenges in applying these principles at 
home. Jackson faltered on anti-communism, and Parker on civil rights. Only Biddle out 
of the three went the furthest in consistently advocating human rights.  
The rise of human rights in the U.S. played into the anti-communist hysteria that 
swept over the country in the late 1940s and 1950s. Nuremberg’s critics viewed the 
notion of universal human rights as a communist idea that threatened American 
sovereignty, and as a result, the U.S. backed away from increased internationalism and 
multilateral engagement—ironic indeed considering that the U.S. had provided the most 
resources after the war to organize the world’s first international criminal trial. The 
Republican backlash against internationalism and the McCarthy Red Scare nearly 
upended the ideals of international human rights law, but these concepts survived the 
1950s—in part because of Jackson, Biddle, and Parker’s efforts—and reemerged in the 
1960s and 1970s. Thus, it is through the lives of these American participants that scholars 
can better understand and examine Nuremberg’s impact. 
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For the historian, the Nuremberg Trial represents a minefield of controversy and 
contradiction. Thousands of articles and books over the last seventy years have analyzed 
and reanalyzed the Trial’s significance, so it is important to understand why Nuremberg 
has come to mean so many different things to different people, and how the scholarship 
surrounding it has influenced this study.2 
Nuremberg scholarship has fallen into three thematic and chronological phases: 
legitimacy, Cold War, and human rights. The legitimacy phase examined the Trial’s 
lawfulness and began around the time of the Trial, as the Soviet, British, and American 
governments proclaimed their desires to try Germans in a court of law. This was an 
exceptional course of action. Prior to 1945, it would have been much more common 
within Europe either to hold a show trial, in which the suspects would have been judged 
guilty before they arrived in court, or to execute them outright. There had been attempts 
to try suspected German and Ottoman war criminals after World War I, but neither was 
international and both were a farce. The Germans tried at Leipzig either avoided 
prosecution or served little jail time, while the Turks at Malta returned home in exchange 
for British prisoners of war. The Nuremberg Trial thus set a new precedent in 
international law because it was an international trial, and it was this novelty that 
motivated scholars to debate its legitimacy. 
Most American legal scholars in the 1940s defended Nuremberg. They believed 
the Allies provided the Nazis with a fair trial and that the judges’ verdict was just. 
                                                 
2 The most recent bibliography of war crimes, war criminals, and war crimes trials contains 4,500 
entries, and that was nearly thirty years ago. Norman E. Tutorow, ed., War Crimes, War Criminals, and 
War Crimes Trials: An Annotated Bibliography and Source Book (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). 
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Articles with titles such as, “Nuremberg Eyewitness Says War Guilt Trial Handled 
Fairly,” were the norm.3 One of the best examples of a Nuremberg proponent came from 
Harvard law professor Sheldon Glueck, who argued that waging aggressive war—that is, 
violating another country’s territorial integrity for reasons other than self-defense—was 
already illegal when the Allies charged the Germans with that particular crime. In his 
view, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which the German government signed, outlawed 
aggressive war, so the Germans had committed a crime by invading Poland in 1939. 
Glueck also cited the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1929, all of which Germany signed, in order to demonstrate that 
Germany had violated international laws that existed long before the trial in 1945.4 
Glueck did not participate in the Trial, but he was an influential voice among the legal 
community throughout the 1940s. The lawyers who did participate in Nuremberg also 
defended the proceedings.5 Peter Calvocoressi, for example, was a British lawyer who 
worked with the Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg. Following Glueck’s example, he 
defended the trial and claimed the IMT did not create new laws but rather affirmed legal 
customs that the international community had already accepted. He compared this to 
                                                 
3 Herman Phleger, “Nuremberg Eyewitness Says War Guilt Trial Handled Fairly,” 
Commonwealth, Official Organ of the California Commonwealth Club 22 (April 22, 1946): 73-74, 77-78. 
4 Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 
26-28. 
5 Most of these accounts are narrative but provide an insider’s view of what took place at 
Nuremberg Peter Calvocoressi, Nuremberg: The Facts, the Law and the Consequences (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1948), Whitney Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Trial of the Major German War 
Criminals at the End of World War II at Nuremberg Germany, 1945-1946 (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1954), Robert Storey, The Final Judgment?: Pearl Harbor to Nuremberg (San Antonio: 
The Naylor Company, 1968), Drexel Sprecher’s Inside the Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor’s 
Comprehensive Account (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1999), and Telford Taylor, The 
Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial: A Personal Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992). 
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English Common Law, saying that “this sort of law is not to be sought in the first place in 
written instruments, nor does it depend on written instruments for its validity. This sort of 
law grows gradually…”6 
Nuremberg needed defenders because it had its share of critics. Opponents argued 
that the Trial was neither fair nor legitimate for three main reasons: 1) it charged the 
German defendants with crimes that had not previously existed in international law (ex 
post facto), 2) the Allies—notably the Soviet Union—were guilty of committing the same 
crimes as the defendants (tu quoque), and 3) no neutral parties were involved in the trial, 
only the nations that had won the war (victors’ justice). A few notable Americans, 
including U.S. Senator Robert A. Taft, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States (SCOTUS) William O. Douglas, and SCOTUS Chief Justice Harlan F. 
Stone, criticized Nuremberg for one or all of these reasons. Nuremberg’s European critics 
often claimed the Trial was an exercise in revenge, and the best example of this came 
from H. Montgomery Belgion’s Victors’ Justice: A Letter Intended to Have Been Sent To 
A Friend Recently in Germany (1949). Belgion was born in France but later became a 
British subject, served in both World Wars I and II, and wrote numerous books and 
articles.7 
                                                 
6 Calvocoressi, Nuremberg, 31. 
7 H. Montgomery Belgion’s Victors’ Justice: A Letter Intended to Have Been Sent To A Friend 
Recently in Germany (Hinsdale, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1949). A more complete biographical 
account is available at http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0014%2FBLGN. 
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The Cold War phase of Nuremberg scholarship began during the Vietnam War 
when the U.S. attempted to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.8 As one 
reviewer put it, “The Vietnam war re-ignited interest in individual rights under 
international law and morality.”9 Therefore, a few notable studies in the 1970s and 1980s 
offered a fresh perspective on the Trial. Telford Taylor, who was Jackson’s top aide at 
Nuremberg and later became the chief prosecutor for the subsequent Nuremberg trials, 
provided a comparative and controversial perspective in Nuremberg and Vietnam: An 
American Tragedy (1970). Taylor compared eyewitness accounts of Nazis killing Jews 
with accounts of American soldiers killing Vietnamese civilians in My Lai in 1969. He 
concluded that the similarities between the reports demonstrated that American soldiers 
could be just as cruel and inhumane as Nazis.10 
William J. Bosch’s Judgment on Nuremberg: American Attitudes toward the 
Major German War-Crimes Trial (1970) assessed American opinions of the Nuremberg 
Trial by looking at essays, speeches, and polling data from a wide range of 
perspectives.11 He categorized Americans into the following nine groups: the president 
and the policy makers around him, international lawyers, members of Congress, the 
                                                 
8 The American Historical Association even held a panel called “Nuremberg Trials: Victor’ 
Vengeance or Just Retribution” during its annual meeting in 1974. AHA, “Nuremberg Trials: Victor’ 
Vengeance or Just Retribution” panel no. 103 (Chicago, 1974), 
https://www.historians.org/Documents/Annual/1974.PDF; Bradley F. Smith also notes that interest in the 
Nuremberg Trial plummeted in the 1950s. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977), xiv-xv. 
9 Edward Morse, review of Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977), p. 902. 
10 Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (Chicago: Random House, 
1970). 
11 William J. Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg: American Attitudes toward the Major German 
War-Crime Trials (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1970). 
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American public, clergymen, domestic lawyers, historians and foreign affairs experts, 
members of the military, and behavioral scientists. Bosch did not state why he limited his 
study to these particular individuals, but he did say that the Trial caused all of these 
groups to debate “the legality of the trials, the composition of the court, the nature of the 
verdicts, and the consequence for the future.”12 For example, did the Allies have the 
authority to hold individuals responsible for crimes against humanity? Was the Trial fair, 
since only the Allies served as prosecutors and judges? Were the verdicts too harsh or too 
lenient? Would the Trial prevent aggressive war in the future? In the end, Bosch found 
that most Americans generally supported Nuremberg. Only historians and foreign affairs 
experts generally opposed it—although many historians at the time simply withheld 
judgment—based on the grounds of victors’ justice.13 His chapter on military personnel 
argued that the Nuremberg Trial may have created a potentially dangerous precedent 
because the North Vietnamese captured American soldiers and threatened to put 
prisoners of war on trial. As one historian put it, “…there was an uneasy feeling that 
American leaders might be found guilty if the law used to judge the leaders of Nazi 
Germany a quarter century before were applied to ourselves.”14 
The majority of Cold War-era scholarship provided mostly narrative accounts of 
the Trial, but there were some exceptions.15 Robert E. Conot noted, almost as an 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 19. 
13 Ibid., 163-5. 
14 Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 
1977), xv. 
15 Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), Ann and 
John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (New York: Antheneum, 1983), and Joseph E. Persico, Nuremberg: 
Infamy on Trial (New York: Viking, 1994). 
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afterthought, that the Nuremberg Trial “pitted human rights and the liberty of the 
individual against the collectivism and the impersonal tyranny of the state….”16 Bradley 
F. Smith authored books on Nuremberg that examined how the judges arrived at their 
verdict for each defendant and why the U.S. became involved in the Trial in the first 
place.17 His Road to Nuremberg is noteworthy in part because he claimed the “the 
Nuremberg trial system was created almost exclusively in Washington by a group of 
American government officials.”18 More recent scholarship from Francine Hirsh has 
demonstrated that this was actually not true, that the Soviets pushed hard for a trial—they 
thought the IMT would only last for a few days and not nearly a year—but given the 
Cold War context, it is not surprising that Smith credited the U.S.19 Other scholars in the 
1980s and 1990s—many from outside the academy—continued to revisit debates 
surrounding the Trial’s legitimacy (i.e., victors’ justice) that the earliest Nuremberg 
scholars had examined. The most accessible popular account was Joseph E. Persico’s 
Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (1994), which a television studio adapted into a miniseries 
in 2000. Persico’s work attempted to humanize the defendants, particularly the lesser-
known Germans, by exploring their motivations for joining the Nazi regime. He 
concluded that while the Nuremberg Trial was ultimately beneficial, it was significantly 
                                                 
16 Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, 484. 
17 Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (1976), The Road to Nuremberg (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1981), and The American Road to Nuremberg (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1982), the latter of which was a companion book of primary documents. 
18 Smith, Road to Nuremberg, 4.  
19 Francine Hirsch, “The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of 
the Postwar Order,” American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 701-730. 
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flawed because of its focus on the charge of conspiracy and the fact that the victors stood 
in judgment over the vanquished.20  
Interest in international human rights law has exploded since the 1990s. This 
development came about for a variety of reasons. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 ended the Cold War, allowing the United Nations (U.N.) to increase its role in 
world affairs by arbitrating peace agreements, supervising elections, and influencing 
global economics and social development.21 Suddenly, it was “as if the world had turned 
back the clock to the hopes of 1945.”22 In 1993, 171 countries met in Vienna for a 
conference on strengthening human rights around the world. Then in 1993 and 1994, the 
U.N. Security Council established international criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, marking only the third and fourth time ad hoc international trials had ever taken 
place (the second time occurred in Tokyo in 1946). These trials revived interest in 
creating a permanent forum for prosecuting the most egregious violators of human rights, 
something that the International Law Commission (ILC) had proposed in 1954. Thus, in 
1998, the Rome Statute finally established the International Criminal Court (ICC), which 
came into force in 2002. Whereas the IMT was an ad hoc court that the Allied Powers 
pieced together after World War II, the ICC is the first permanent international criminal 
court designed to prosecute war crimes, aggression, genocide, and other crimes against 
humanity. In fact, once the ICC came into force, scholars began drawing similarities 
                                                 
20 Persico, Nuremberg; Nuremberg, film, directed by Yves Simoneau (2000). 
21 For more on the U.N.’s peacekeeping missions before the Soviet Union’s collapse, see Paul M. 
Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: 
Random House, 2006). 
22 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1-2. 
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between the IMT and the ICC, crediting the former with laying the foundation for the 
latter. Philippe Sands’ edited volume, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future of 
International Criminal Justice (2003) appeared in print just one year after the ICC came 
into existence, and the opening chapter, “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the 
Making,” made a clear connection between 1945 and 2002.  
As scholars began historicizing human rights following the end of the Cold War, a 
popular historical subfield emerged, prompting one intellectual to remark, “We are all 
historians of human rights.”23 An academic debate concerning when an international 
agreement in favor of protecting human rights then began. Elizabeth Borgwardt, for 
instance, is the first scholar to argue that the modern concept of international human 
rights was born in the 1940s as a projection of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
She depicts the Nuremberg Trial as an international extension of Roosevelt’s domestic 
policy, and, referencing the Atlantic Charter, believes Nuremberg attempted to establish 
“a wider and permanent system of general security” by creating a peace “which will 
afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
fear and want.”24 In contrast to the Treaty of Versailles, which blamed the entire German 
nation for causing World War I and imposed draconian punishments on the country’s 
economy and military, the Nuremberg Trial satisfied the need for justice by holding 
individual Germans responsible for war crimes. 
                                                 
23 Linda K. Kerber, “We Are All Historians of Human Rights,” Perspectives: Newsmagazine of 
the American Historical Association 44, no. 7 (Oct. 2006): 3-4. 
24 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005), 4; Borgwardt is currently working on a new book project 
entitled The Nuremberg Idea: Crimes against Humanity in History, Law & Politics and treats the 
Nuremberg Trial as the fulcrum of human rights. 
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Samuel Moyn disagrees with Borgwardt and contends that while Nuremberg was 
an important historical moment, the birthplace of the modern human rights movement did 
not come until at least the 1970s, if not later: 
 
After the 1970s and especially after the Cold War, however, it became 
usual to regard World War II as a campaign for universal justice, with 
the shock of the discovery of the camps prompting unprecedented 
commitment to a humane international order….It is true that 
commitment to human rights crystallized as a result of Holocaust 
memory, but only decades later, as human rights were called upon to 
serve brand new purposes. What mattered most of all about the human 
rights moment of the 1940s, in truth, is not that it happened, but that—
like the even deeper past—it had to be reinvented, not merely retrieved, 
after the fact.25 
 
 
In Moyn’s view, the myth of the Nuremberg Trial, rather than the reality of it, has 
confused our understanding of human rights in the postwar period. Human rights were 
neither international nor universal, he believes, and the only significant human rights 
development of that decade was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 
1948, which he laments was “less the annunciation of a new age than a funeral wreath 
laid on the grave of wartime hopes.”26 
                                                 
25 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 
2010), 83. Moyn also agrees with Bloxham’s point that the Nuremberg Trial “contributed to the ignorance 
of the specific plight of the Jews” during World War II. Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History 
(London: Verso, 2014), 78; Barbara Keys echoes Moyn’s argument in Reclaiming American Virtue: The 
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Press, 2014), 1. 
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(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), xi. 
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Mark Philip Bradley instead argues that human rights concepts developed 
throughout the twentieth century. His most recent work focuses on the ways empathy 
influenced the development of human rights in both decades. His views are supported by 
the work of Sarah B. Snyder who says human rights did not fade away during the Cold 
War but instead surged in decolonized areas and Eastern Europe as activists sustained the 
movement. Mark Mazower disagrees with both of them and says a human rights 
movement could have flourished with the establishment of the U.N. in 1945, but it took a 
backseat to the Cold War and emerged instead nearly fifty years later. Carol Anderson 
asserts that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
attempted to internationalize African Americans’ struggle for equality by appealing to the 
U.N.’s UDHR, but these attempts were largely unsuccessful and the Association retreated 
from making civil rights a human rights issue.27 
Other scholars look deeper into the past for the genesis of human rights. Lynn 
Hunt traces their origins to the French Revolution in the eighteenth century but claims 
that the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century pushed human rights into the 
background until after World War II. The abolitionist movement and human rights 
activists in the nineteenth century feature prominently in the works of Amy Dru Stanley, 
                                                 
27 Mark Philip Bradley, The World Reimagined: Americans and Human Rights in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge University Press, 2016);  Bradley, “American Vernaculars: The United States and the 
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Mark Elliott,  and Jenny Martinez, the latter of whom claims that the first “crime against 
humanity” was the transatlantic slave trade and that the world’s first international trials 
concerned the abolition of this practice in the 1800s. Still others, such as Micheline Ishay 
and Paul Gordon Lauren, go back even further and have argued for the conceptual roots 
of human rights in ancient Greece and Rome.28 
In more recent years, scholars of international law and human rights have begun 
mining the documentary records of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(UNWCC), an organization founded in Great Britain in 1943, prior to the formal creation 
of the U.N., to investigate the alleged war crimes of Nazi Germany. Dan Plesch has 
detailed the commission’s work and argues that its efforts, which preceded Nuremberg, 
helped establish “international criminal justice practices concerning sexual violence, head 
of state immunity, [and] conspiracy….” Since his book sheds light on criminal trials that 
the academic community have often overlooked, he does not focus as much on the 
                                                 
28Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 
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Nuremberg Trial, and he makes only brief references to American participants like 
Jackson. However, the book’s publication reveals the renewed scholarly interest in the 
connection between war crimes trials and human rights.29 
Looking back from the perspective of the early twenty-first century, it seems 
obvious that the Nuremberg Trial contributed to the ascent and legitimation of 
international law and human rights institutions through the Nuremberg Principles, the 
UDHR, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(CPPCG, or Genocide Convention), the European Court of Human Rights, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
However, this is a point of contention among scholars. This dissertation thus adds to the 
conversation by focusing on the American participants’ views of human rights before, 
during, and after Nuremberg. 
One of the significant elements of my argument’s focus on Jackson, Biddle, and 
Parker is that they came from varied backgrounds. Jackson grew up in Jamestown, New 
York, began his legal career as an apprentice, branded himself a “country lawyer,” and 
became a staunch New Dealer in Roosevelt’s administration—becoming one of the 
President’s most trusted friends and advisers. Biddle came from a wealthy and powerful 
Pennsylvania family. His father was a law professor, and young Biddle followed in his 
                                                 
29 Dan Plesch, Human Rights after Hitler: The Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War Crimes 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 1; Elizabeth Borgwardt has also expressed 
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Crimes Against Humanity in History, Law & Politics,” February 17, 2016, available at 
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footsteps, earning his undergraduate and law degrees from Harvard University. He had 
been a supporter of Bull Moose and Progressive Party candidates before becoming a 
supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal and serving in the administration. Unlike Jackson, 
though, Biddle never enjoyed a positive relationship with the President. John Parker, as a 
Republican in North Carolina, was a curiosity in a post-Reconstruction South dominated 
by Democrats. He earned his undergraduate and law degrees from the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) before running for governor in 1920 and losing. He 
joined the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1925, and was nominated for the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1930, but lost Senate confirmation by one vote. When he joined the 
IMT, he had more judicial experience than anyone else on the bench.  
Jackson tends to be the focal point of Nuremberg studies, and understandably so. 
He was the chief American prosecutor and the face of the Trial. He had been one of 
Nuremberg’s primary architects at the London Conference in the summer of 1945, and 
his opening statement on November 21, 1945, has become something of legend as he 
spent nearly four hours explaining the significance and historic nature of the world’s first 
international criminal trial. He relished the spotlight while in Europe, holding press 
conferences when court was not in session and inviting his fellow participants to 
numerous balls and galas. This was his chance to shine in the global spotlight, and he 
mostly succeeded. 
18 
By contrast, Biddle and Parker remain relatively unknown. No scholarly 
biographies exist of either individual.30 The world would know almost nothing about 
Biddle if he had not published his memoirs in the early 1960s.31 The only book-length 
studies of Parker come from political scientist William C. Burris, whose 1964 doctoral 
dissertation focused on how Parker’s judicial decisions related to Supreme Court 
precedent, and Kenneth Goings’s analysis of the Senate’s failure to confirm Parker to the 
Supreme Court in 1930.32 Despite the lack of historical literature on these two men, their 
roles at Nuremberg should not be overlooked. As the two American judges, they were the 
first to hear all the graphic evidence of the Germans’ crimes and then deliberate behind 
closed doors on the relative guilt or innocence of each defendant. If the Trial had a 
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substantive impact on the human rights views of anyone in the courtroom, then it would 
have been on these men. 
Since all three of these individuals were lawyers, they left behind copious legal 
opinions and published commentaries, which informed the bulk of this project. Having 
access to Jackson’s and Parker’s opinions on the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit 
respectively, as well as the journal articles they published in the ABA Journal among 
others, made it possible to analyze the evolution of their legal thinking and views on 
human rights. The many books Biddle published after Nuremberg, especially his two-
volume autobiography, were also invaluable in revealing his attitudes toward 
internationalism in the postwar era and beyond. While Jackson, Biddle, and Parker were 
at Nuremberg, I focused on various conference notes and meeting minutes—most of 
which are located in the Biddle collection at Syracuse University, and I took advantage of 
the Trial transcripts, which are available in digital form—and thus easily searchable—
through Yale Law School’s Avalon Project. These sources that are intended for public 
consumption provide each man’s official response to human rights issues before, during, 
and after Nuremberg. 
I also relied heavily on Jackson, Biddle, and Parker’s private letters to family, 
friends, and coworkers in an attempt to understand them at a more personal level beyond 
their professional personas. In Jackson’s case, that meant looking at his letters to his son, 
William, at the Library of Congress, the oral history he participated in at Columbia 
University mere weeks before his death, and the many articles John Q. Barrett has 
published on the late jurist. For Biddle, I perused his personal correspondence at the 
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special collections archives at Syracuse University, Georgetown University, and the FDR 
Library, especially the letters to and from his wife, Katherine, which reveal the strength 
of their love for one another—even though Biddle was not always faithful. Regarding 
Parker, nearly all of his papers are located at the Southern Historical Collection in Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina—his alma mater—and I had the wonderful opportunity of speaking 
with his grandchildren and nephew, all of whom provided a unique view of their ancestor 
that would not have been possible had I relied only on extant documents. Parker’s letters, 
particularly those to his brother, Sam, reveal his unfiltered views on current events, 
political issues, and legal matters. These private sources round out these men beyond the 
ways they wanted the public to perceive them, making them more human and fallible. 
One of the key issues facing historians is that the term “human rights” rarely 
appears in Nuremberg’s official documentation. The trial transcripts, for instance, only 
mention “human rights” four times.33 Furthermore, the Americans who participated in the 
Trial seldom referred to “human rights” in their records. Thus, the historian must search 
for concepts of human rights rather than the exact term. In order to do that, it is necessary 
to break down the term into its constituent parts.  
At its core, the term “human rights” refers to a belief in the basic dignity of every 
person and, therefore, a set of entitlements belonging to all people because they are 
human that governments must respect. Most importantly, human rights are universal, 
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even if that means superseding the domestic laws of a sovereign nation. With these basic 
outlines in place, it is then possible to identify human rights concepts in the legal 
opinions, speeches, articles, and private letters of Jackson, Biddle, and Parker to see how 
they understood them before the Trial, and how their experiences at Nuremberg affected 
their views when they returned to the U.S. On rare occasions, these individuals used the 
term “human rights,” but more often they instead discussed “individual rights” (or the 
“rights of man,” “natural rights,” “basic elementary rights,” or some other variation of the 
term), internationalism, and national sovereignty. By doing so, this project expands 
historians’ understanding of human rights in the postwar period through the unique lens 
of the people primarily involved in the proceedings. 
This project also traces the ideological origins of “crimes against humanity” to 
demonstrate the prevalence of human rights concepts before and during the Nuremberg 
Trial. “Crimes against humanity” was not a new phrase in 1945—the Allies had used it in 
1915 in reference to the Armenian Genocide—but it was a new criminal charge under 
international law. This dissertation illustrates that the term originated from the phrase 
“laws of humanity” that had existed for decades prior to Nuremberg, and that the Allies 
articulated violations of these laws as the legal charge of “Crimes against Humanity” at 
the Trial. 
Focusing on “crimes against humanity” also allows this work to address the 
connection between the Nuremberg Trial and the Holocaust, since the term included the 
worst atrocities that took place under the Nazi regime. Scholars of the Holocaust have 
been quick to rebut the notion that Nuremberg raised awareness of the Nazis’ Final 
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Solution. Donald Bloxham, for example, argues that the Nuremberg Trial provided only a 
limited understanding of the Holocaust. He believes all of the Nuremberg trials, including 
the subsequent ones from 1946 to 1949, oversimplified the Final Solution. American and 
British prosecutors failed to differentiate between concentration and extermination 
camps, highlight the Nazis’ anti-Semitism, or include eyewitness testimony—relying 
almost entirely on written documentation. He also says the prosecution focused more on 
the criminal charges of conspiracy and waging aggressive war.34 They did not, for 
example, emphasize genocide, which would have demonstrated a clear connection 
between the Trial and the Holocaust.35 Political scientist Gary Jonathan Bass, whose 
work examines Nuremberg within a broader context of war crimes trials, agrees with this 
summation:  
 
One of the great ironies of Nuremberg’s legacy is that the tribunal is 
remembered as a product of Allied horror at the Holocaust, when in fact 
America and Britain, the two liberal countries that played major roles in 
deciding what Nuremberg would be, actually focused far more on the 
criminality of Nazi aggression than on the Holocaust. Nuremberg was 
self-serving in ways that are usually forgotten today.36 
 
 
David Crowe, on the other hand, states that because the Nazis kept 
meticulous records, the Trial created the first documentary record of the Final 
                                                 
34 Judith Shklar agrees with this assessment. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), 170. 
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Solution and “established important legal precedents that are still cited by 
various international tribunals today.”37  
By looking at the impact “Crimes against Humanity” had on Nuremberg’s 
American participants, I conclude that the Trial served as a connection between the 
Holocaust and human rights. Nuremberg created an awareness of the Holocaust, and this 
is evident in the direct impact the Trial had on Parker and his advocacy of human rights 
in the postwar period. As a result, he continued to fight for U.S. engagement in 
international institutions for the rest of his life. 
This project is made up of three parts and is organized in a mostly chronological 
fashion. Part I includes Chapters III, IV, and V, and it looks at my historical actors 
before the Nuremberg Trial. Each chapter provides a general biographical overview of 
Jackson, Biddle, and Parker in the decades leading up to 1945. Chapter III covers 
Jackson’s youth in Jamestown, New York, his legal training at Albany Law School, the 
beginning of his collaborations with Franklin Roosevelt, and his decision to become a 
New Dealer. It shows how his time in Washington, D.C., from solicitor general to 
attorney general to associate justice of the Supreme Court, and close proximity to 
Roosevelt shaped his conceptions of human rights. It concludes with his views on 
international law and his efforts to organize the IMT.  
Chapter IV examines Biddle’s early years in Pennsylvania, his time at Groton 
boarding school where he first met Roosevelt, his elite education at Harvard, and his 
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unforgettable year clerking for the honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. It then details 
his reluctance to support Roosevelt and the New Deal, the tensions that arose between the 
two men when Biddle was his attorney general, and the controversies that ensued when 
the President wanted the justice department to crack down on seditious activities and later 
intern Japanese Americans. It concludes with President Truman’s decision to appoint 
Biddle the American judge of the IMT. 
Chapter V focuses on Parker’s time growing up in North Carolina, earning his 
degrees from UNC, and failing multiple times to enter politics as a Republican. It spends 
considerable time looking at his judicial career, which began in 1925 with the U.S. 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and almost led to a seat on the Supreme Court in 1930 
had his failed gubernatorial campaign not come back to haunt him. It addresses Parker’s 
civil rights record before 1945, and concludes with his reluctance to accept Truman’s 
appointment to serve as the alternate American judge at Nuremberg. 
Part II contains Chapters VII and VIII, and focuses on Jackson, Biddle, and 
Parker from the Trial’s organization in the summer of 1945 until the proceedings 
concluded in the fall of 1946. Chapter VII is mostly a philosophical discussion of 
international law and human rights concepts, and it traces the evolution of both leading 
up to the Nuremberg Trial. It also includes a narrative account of the American 
participants’ efforts to begin the IMT by November 20, 1945, which almost did not 
happen. 
Chapter VIII centers on human rights issues during the Nuremberg Trial 
proceedings. It looks at Jackson’s arguments in favor of “Crimes against Humanity,” as 
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well as the judges’ deliberations to find defendants guilty of this charge. It also 
emphasizes how Jackson’s decision to rely on documentary evidence laid the foundation 
for Holocaust studies decades later by providing scholars with the primary sources they 
needed to get started. It also includes an analysis of the cross-examination between 
Jackson and the most notorious Nazi on trial, Hermann Göring. From a personal point of 
view, this chapter also highlights the mental strain Biddle and Parker experienced 
throughout the proceedings, as well as the disparate ways they coped with their feelings 
of loneliness, and it touches on a feud that developed between Jackson and one of his 
Supreme Court colleagues while the justices were 4,000 miles apart. 
Part III is made up of Chapters X, XI, and XII, and follows Jackson, Biddle, 
and Parker when they returned to the U.S., defended the legitimacy of the Nuremberg 
Trial, and began advocating for American involvement in international institutions to 
safeguard human rights. These men knew the Trial had to serve some greater purpose, so 
the chapters in this part address how they responded to their Nuremberg experiences. 
Chapter X examines the challenges Jackson faced when he went back to the Supreme 
Court, including the feud that began months earlier, as well as the impact his Nuremberg 
experiences had on his judicial decisions. It argues that Jackson was impelled to overturn 
public school segregation because of his time as the Chief U.S. Prosecutor, but it also 
posits that those same experiences led him to deny basic human rights to American 
citizens who were members of the Communist Party. 
Chapter XI hones in on Parker as he returned home and went on the lecture 
circuit defending the IMT against Nuremberg’s critics. It also discusses the wave of anti-
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communist hysteria that swept over the country in the 1940s and 1950s, in particular the 
Bricker Amendment that was designed to limit the President’s ability to enter into treaties 
and issue executive agreements. It details Parker’s opposition to Bricker and his fervent 
support of international human rights institutions, like the U.N. and the UDHR. It 
concludes with Parker’s controversial stance on school integration in the South. 
Chapter XII looks at Biddle, who lived far longer than Jackson or Parker, as he 
returned to the U.S. without a government job for the first time in more than a decade. It 
analyzes the opposition Biddle faced when he attempted to represent the U.S. on the U.N. 
It then focuses on Biddle’s work as a lobbyist and an author, during which time he 
penned his clearest positions on human rights, internationalism, national sovereignty, and 
American exceptionalism. The chapter further complicates the narrative arc of Biddle’s 
life by revealing his involvement in the 1960s with important human rights organizations, 
such as Amnesty International, as well as his efforts to secure the release of a Nuremberg 
defendant serving a life sentence in a German prison. 
The Nuremberg Trial represented a significant step forward in the development of 
human rights, even though the American participants were not the best paragons of 
human rights virtue. Ever since the Trial, though, American leaders have had to grapple 
with just how involved the U.S. should be in world affairs. Should the country embrace 
the kind of internationalism that Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt advocated, or 
should it adopt a nationalist policy that was prevalent throughout the interwar and 
postwar periods? 
More than seventy years later, the country still has not reached a consensus. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PART I: HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE NUREMBERG 
 
 
The war in Europe was over, the Allies had defeated the Nazis, and the world 
longed for peace. The only question that remained was what would the Allies do with the 
German war criminals in their custody. Would the Allied leaders execute them—which 
seemed to be their initial plan—let them go, or put them on trial? President Harry S. 
Truman, who had just taken the oath of office on April 12, 1945, wanted to continue 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s plans for a trial. He set to work assembling a team to 
prosecute and judge individual Germans suspected of war crimes. 
On May 2, Truman appointed Robert H. Jackson to be the Chief U.S. Prosecutor 
at the International Military Tribunal (IMT). Jackson had a distinguished legal career in 
New York and Washington, D.C., having served as solicitor general and attorney general 
during President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration before joining the U.S. Supreme 
Court as an associate justice. Jackson was a dedicated “New Dealer” who believed 
institutions were the best way to reshape the world and establish lasting peace. He 
accepted Truman’s appointment with alacrity, knowing full well that this unprecedented 
event would have a lasting impact on him and his legacy. 
After selecting Jackson, President Truman named Francis B. Biddle to be the 
American judge at Nuremberg. Biddle’s credentials were as solid as Jackson’s, having 
followed in Jackson’s footsteps twice, from solicitor general to attorney general in 
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Roosevelt’s and Truman’s administrations. When Truman became president, he asked 
Biddle to resign from his post so that he could name his own attorney general, and Biddle 
happily stepped aside. As a reward for his loyalty, Truman appointed him to serve at 
Nuremberg. Biddle was honored, just as Jackson had been, and was eager to participate 
in an international legal event that had never taken place before. 
Finally, the President needed an alternate judge who could fill in for Biddle 
should the latter become sick or otherwise unable to fulfill his duties. Truman chose John 
J. Parker, Senior Judge of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.38 Parker was a 
progressive Republican from North Carolina who had twenty years of judicial 
experience, more than either Jackson or Biddle. He had actually been nominated for the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1930, but the Senate never confirmed him, so he remained a 
federal appellate judge for the rest of his life. Serving as the alternate at Nuremberg was a 
prestigious honor, but unlike Jackson and Biddle, Parker was reluctant to go. He did not 
want to leave behind his family, his home, or his job. However, after his Nuremberg 
experiences, he became the most fervent supporter of international institutions and human 
rights law. 
The main threads connecting these men from New York, Pennsylvania, and North 
Carolina were their ages and their legal training. Jackson, Biddle, and Parker were part of 
the same generation—born between 1885 and 1892—and had gone to law school 
between 1908 and 1912. This was around the time of the 1907 Hague Conventions, when 
world leaders were actively attempting to protect human dignity with the rise of total war 
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and the prevalence of war crimes. These men were all in their twenties when World War 
I broke out, and although only Biddle served in the war—as a military intelligence 
officer—all three were undoubtedly affected by the global conflict. They climbed the 
ranks of the legal profession and became well-established leaders in the legal community 
and in public service in the 1930s and 1940s. Each one served the American public in 
some way and had experience on the bench, though Parker had by far the most (from 
1925 to 1945), while Biddle had served as a judge for less than one year (March 1939 to 
January 1940), and Jackson had only been confirmed to the Supreme Court in 1941.  
Part I examines significant events in the lives of Jackson, Biddle, and Parker 
prior to 1945 in order to understand their legal philosophies and their views on individual 
rights, international law, and national sovereignty before the Trial. Jackson and Biddle, 
for instance, were both New Dealers in Roosevelt’s administration, so they were 
generally more inclined to support human rights before the Trial because of their 
proximity to the President. One event that tested their belief in individual rights and 
constitutionally-protected freedoms was Japanese internment. Biddle was U.S. attorney 
general under Roosevelt when the camps went into effect, while Jackson was an associate 
justice on the Supreme Court in 1944 when it heard arguments in Korematsu v. United 
States concerning the constitutionality of the Japanese internment camps. Biddle did not 
support the camps but failed to prevent their creation, while Jackson dissented in the 
Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision stating that the camps were legal. How these men 
responded to this constitutional crisis reveals their views on human rights before 
Nuremberg so that we can determine how influential the Trial was on their thinking.  
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Parker’s pre-Nuremberg experiences are perhaps the most intriguing of the three 
men at the center of this study. He was not a proponent of human rights or international 
engagement before Nuremberg. In fact, he supported segregation when he ran for North 
Carolina governor in 1920 and argued that blacks should not be allowed to vote. 
However, throughout his judicial career, he became more progressive, and by the end of 
his life he was a fervent supporter of both human rights and international institutions like 
the United Nations (U.N.). Nuremberg thus served as the catalyst for his advocacy of 
human rights. 
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CHAPTER III 
ROBERT H. JACKSON - THE COUNTRY LAWYER
 
Robert H. Jackson was born in Spring Creek, Pennsylvania in 1892, but spent his 
youth about thirty miles north in Jamestown, New York. According to John Q. Barrett, 
the foremost expert on Jackson’s life and career, Jackson was a voracious reader who 
knew from a young age that he wanted to be a lawyer.39 He graduated from Frewsburg 
High School in 1909, then attended another high school in Jamestown where two 
mentors, Mary Willard and Milton Fletcher, encouraged him to pursue a career in law.40 
Willard left such an indelible impression on Jackson that he eulogized her years later in a 
special tribute.41 Jackson’s father did not hold a high opinion of lawyers, as a general 
rule, and would not provide any financial assistance to his son. This did not deter 
Jackson, so despite his father’s disapproval, he became a law apprentice under his 
mother’s step-cousin, Frank Henry Mott, in the fall of 1910. Jackson worked closely for a 
year with Mott and his law partner, Benjamin Simeon Dean—who was far more scholarly 
and intellectual than Mott—before pursuing a formal law degree from Albany Law 
School in 1911. Albany allowed students to earn a law degree after two years of study, so 
since Jackson already had a year of apprenticeship experience, he only needed to 
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complete one year of coursework to earn his degree.42 By all accounts, Jackson excelled 
academically and was poised to graduate near the top of his class. Unfortunately, the law 
school had an obscure rule that required students to be twenty-one years of age to earn 
their degree, and Jackson was only twenty when he was set to graduate in 1912. As a 
result, Albany Law could only award him a “diploma of graduation,” and Jackson 
became the last lawyer to achieve career success through an apprenticeship rather than a 
law degree.43  
Jackson’s time in Albany was formative both personally and professionally. From 
a personal standpoint, he met his future wife, Irene Gerhardt, while ice skating at 
Washington Park Lake, and he grew comfortable being hundreds of miles from home. 
This would no doubt serve him well later in life when he moved to Washington, D.C. and 
then spent nearly an entire year in Germany for the Nuremberg Trial. From a professional 
standpoint, though, going to Albany was a watershed moment for Jackson. As he put it,  
 
…I decided on the Albany Law School for two reasons: some of the 
leading lawyers had been Albany Law School men and it was the seat of 
government. The Court of Appeals sat there, the Appellate Division sat 
there, the Supreme Court, the legislature and the whole state 
government. I thought I would learn more that was not in the books at 
Albany than in any other place, and that it would be useful to me in the 
practice of law in my community.44  
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Albany is also where Jackson first met state senator Franklin D. Roosevelt, who went by 
“Frank” in those days. In 1911, the twenty-nine-year-old Democrat had won the senate 
race for New York’s 26th district, which had historically gone to Republicans. Jackson’s 
Albany Law classes were across the street from the New York State Capitol and close to 
where the Roosevelts lived with their young children.45 The two would enjoy a political 
friendship that spanned the next three decades.  
Jackson returned to Jamestown, continued his apprenticeship under Mott, and 
passed the bar exam on November 24, 1913. He considered running for elected office but 
decided against it, believing he could not win running as a Democrat in a heavily 
Republican area—and unlike his friend, Frank Roosevelt, he did not have a famous name 
to help him win votes. Instead, Jackson pursued private practice, where he established a 
formidable reputation over the next twenty years. During that time, he married Irene on 
April 24, 1916, and he was baptized into the Episcopal Church on June 4, 1929. Jackson 
had never been particularly religious, at least from an organized standpoint, though he 
recalled how his family often read the Bible to him when he was younger and frequently 
referenced scripture.46 
Public service was Jackson’s religion of choice, and in 1929, the same year he 
was baptized, he became an adviser to Roosevelt, who was governor of New York. 
Jackson served on a commission to investigate the administration of justice in New York 
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and made recommendations for improving the state courts.47 Jackson might have been 
able to improve the state courts from within had he decided to run for a seat on the New 
York State Court of Appeals in 1934, but he instead joined Roosevelt in Washington, 
D.C. as an assistant general counsel in the Department of Treasury’s Bureau of Revenue. 
It was during this period, while arguing a case for the government, that the opposing 
attorney, Frank Hogan of New York, disparagingly referred to Jackson as a “country 
lawyer.” Jackson was not offended and proudly wore the epithet as a badge of honor for 
the rest of his life.48 
Jackson was a committed “New Dealer” who loyally served in Roosevelt’s 
administration. He quickly became one of the most liked and trusted members of 
Roosevelt’s coterie, attending numerous parties at the President’s request and staying up 
late losing at poker—Jackson was apparently no good at bluffing.49 The two men became 
quite close as Jackson rose through the ranks, serving initially in the Treasury 
Department’s Bureau of Internal Revenue (what is now known as the Internal Revenue 
Service), then joining the Department of Justice’s Tax Division and later its Antitrust 
Division. Roosevelt often invited Jackson to his room for breakfast or lunch to discuss 
serious issues: “You might say that Roosevelt was never closed for business,” Jackson 
commented.50 
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Jackson had opportunities to leave the White House to pursue political positions, 
but he never did. He could have run for governor of New York in the 1938 election—
Roosevelt’s successor, Herbert Lehman, had announced he would not seek reelection—
but Jackson was unenthused. He had no interest in trading one public office for another. 
He had actually gone to Roosevelt in November 1937 to express his desire to resign so 
that he could return home, breathe new life into his dwindling law practice, and earn the 
financial stability necessary to send his children to college. Roosevelt refused to let 
Jackson quit and began pushing hard for Jackson’s potential gubernatorial candidacy by 
arranging public speaking engagements for one of his favorite administration officials. 
However, other Democrats, including the incumbent Governor Lehman, disapproved of 
Roosevelt’s meddling. Lehman subsequently reneged on his decision and instead ran for, 
and won, reelection in 1938. Jackson remembered years later that there never was “a 
moment of real disappointment about it. There might have been annoyance or disgust at 
some particular individual, but it was all part of the game.”51  
Roosevelt made Jackson his U.S. Solicitor General in 1938, where he excelled as 
the federal government’s attorney in charge of arguing cases before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Justice Louis Brandeis was so impressed with Jackson’s advocacy that he 
commented, “Jackson should be Solicitor General for life.”52 Jackson only occupied the 
position for twenty-two months, though, before becoming U.S. Attorney General on 
January 4, 1940. That year proved especially significant because Roosevelt’s second term 
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was nearly over, and the President confided in Jackson that he planned to retire to Hyde 
Park and begin work on his presidential library. The time was nearing to choose a 
successor, and Roosevelt wanted Jackson to succeed him as the Democratic Party’s 
presidential candidate in the 1940 election. Again, though, Jackson eschewed political 
power in favor of the law, even though, as Harry Truman later remarked when he 
occupied the Oval Office, Jackson had the “experience and talents … to make him 
presidential timber.” 53 Instead, Jackson successfully persuaded Roosevelt to pursue a 
third term, especially given the state of things in Europe.54 Germany had annexed Austria 
(the Anschluss) and the northern region of Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland) in 1938, 
invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and plunged the globe into a second world war. 
Jackson felt it would be best not to “swap horses while crossing the river,” so Roosevelt 
ran for president again, easily defeated his Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, and 
won an unprecedented third term in office. In doing so, Jackson solidified his place 
among the President’s inner circle.55  
Jackson graciously offered to resign as attorney general in case Roosevelt wanted 
to appoint someone else to begin his new term, but the President advised him to “stay 
put.”56 This gave Jackson an opportunity in January 1941 to provide an official account 
of the administration’s struggles with the Supreme Court and to defend the president’s 
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1937 Court-packing plan.  In The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in 
American Power Politics, Jackson argued that the justices blocked New Deal legislation 
because they failed to recognize the changing realities of American society.57 As one 
historian paraphrased it, they were “applying horse-and-buggy law in the age of the 
automobile.”58 Jackson believed the justices should show more restraint and defer to the 
legislature on economic matters, rather than impeding New Deal policies. He would have 
his chance to test his conviction later that same year when Roosevelt rewarded Jackson 
for his dedication and loyalty and appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court, where he 
remained for the rest of his life. When Jackson reflected on this moment years later, he 
recalled, “I am infinitely more happy that it turned out just as it did….I had my 
profession [and] I was in a good professional position.”59 
The New Dealer 
In order to understand Jackson’s views on human rights before the Nuremberg 
Trial, it is necessary to recognize how Jackson’s service in the Roosevelt administration 
exposed him to human rights internationalism. Jackson rarely employed the term “human 
rights” in his public speeches and private letters, but he did address the rights of the 
individual when he was attorney general. One of his earliest statements on this topic 
came in the form of praise for a Catholic publication.  
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In 1939, the Committee of Catholics for Human Rights began publishing The 
Voice for Human Rights, a periodical that initially set out “to combat the growing error of 
racism,” particularly antisemitism. In fact, the group’s initial name was the Committee of 
Catholics to Fight Anti-Semitism, but as the group explained in its second issue, it felt a 
broader name better emphasized “the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God” 
that applies “to all races and peoples, to the multitude of humanity itself…”60 The 
periodical emerged in reaction to the antisemitic views of a Catholic priest, Father 
Charles Coughlin, whose weekly radio program and newspaper, Social Justice, railed 
against Jewish people. Francis Biddle, who succeeded Jackson as attorney general and 
used his position in the administration to stop Social Justice, mentioned Coughlin in his 
memoir during a discussion of American bigots and other “purveyors of hate.”61 
Antisemitic sentiments ran high toward the end of the 1930s, as a 1938 poll found that 60 
percent of Americans viewed Jewish people as “’greedy,’ ‘dishonest’ and ‘pushy.’”62  
The Voice for Human Rights only appeared in print from 1939 to 1940, but that 
was long enough to catch the attention of prominent members of American society, 
including President and Mrs. Roosevelt, Republican presidential candidate Wendell 
Willkie, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., New York Governor Herbert 
Lehman, and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson. They praised the organization for a 
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variety of reasons, such as its emphasis on brotherhood, justice, and equality. Jackson’s 
full remarks are worth noting: 
 
Religious and racial bigotry have always been repugnant to American 
ideals. Now we must recognize that the fomenting of race-hatred and 
religious intolerance is one of the chief weapons to be used against us by 
the anti-democratic systems. Indeed, no phase of our national defense 
program is more important than the fight against un-Christian and 
undemocratic doctrines. The splendid work of the Committee of 
Catholics for Human Rights in this field has won wide recognition and 
deserves the enthusiastic support of all Americans.63 
 
 
As attorney general, Jackson provided legal advice to the U.S. government and served as 
the top law enforcement officer in the country, so it was his job to ensure equal justice for 
all Americans. His remarks reflected that commitment, as he condemned discriminatory 
and intolerant behavior, while simultaneously emphasizing democratic ideals. President 
Roosevelt would have expected nothing less given his use of human rights rhetoric, 
especially during World War II. 
Roosevelt, more than any other man, had the greatest influence on Jackson’s 
views of human rights and international law. The President began referring to human 
rights as early as 1933, when he released a statement to the nations of the world calling 
for “World Peace by Disarmament and for Relief from Economic Chaos,” in which he 
argued that it was up to the governments of the world to preserve “individual human 
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rights.”64 On twenty separate occasions from 1933 to 1945, Roosevelt used the term 
“human rights” in addresses and speeches.65 One of the most notable times came on 
January 6, 1941, when the President gave his famous “Four Freedoms” address to 
Congress, calling for a new kind of world order “founded upon four essential human 
freedoms”: 
 
1. “…freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world” 
2. “…freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in 
the world” 
3. “…freedom from want—which…means economic understandings which will 
secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere 
in the world” 
4. “…freedom from fear—which…means a world-wide reduction of 
armaments…[so] that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of 
physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world” 
 
 
The President concluded his address by saying that “freedom means the supremacy of 
human rights everywhere.”66 One of his closest advisors, Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes, did not want the President to include the phrase “everywhere in the world.” “That 
covers an awful lot of territory,” Ickes said. “I don’t know how interested Americans are 
going to be in the people of Java.” The President responded that the American people 
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would have to be interested in them at some point since “the world is getting so small that 
even the people in Java are getting to be our neighbors now.”67  
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms thus became the foundation of his human rights 
ideology. He first referenced them the previous summer during press conferences in June 
and July 1940—initially calling for a fifth freedom, freedom of information—but he had 
been thinking about human rights issues since the Great Depression when he first came 
into office.68 The world had never experienced social and economic hardship on such a 
grand scale up to that point, and Roosevelt believed the Depression was the “root cause” 
of World War II. Rather than blame the “imperfections in the Peace of Versailles,” 
Roosevelt argued that the failed policies of appeasement allowed tyranny to spread 
throughout Europe, and that these tyrants then deprived individuals of their human rights. 
It was up to the U.S., Roosevelt believed, to defeat totalitarianism; to protect democracy; 
to create a world of equal opportunities, of jobs, and of civil liberties for all, while at the 
same time eliminating “special privilege[s] for the few;” and to restore the rights of all 
human beings.69 Only through “democratic processes” can these “glorious ideals” exist, 
                                                 
67 Sam Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper, 1952), 263-4. 
68 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 48; Laura Crowell, “The Building of the ‘Four 
Freedoms’ Speech,” Speech Monographs 22, no. 5 (1955): 266-283; Josh Zeitz, “How FDR Created the 
Four Freedoms,” Politico, available from (http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/roosevelt-four-
freedoms-119728), accessed on July 20, 2017; Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 263; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Press Conferences, No. 649-A (June 5, 1940), available from the FDR Library at 
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/pc/pc0101.pdf, accessed on July 8, 2017; Roosevelt, 
Press Conferences, No. 658 (July 5, 1940), available online at 
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/pc/pc0104.pdf, accessed on July 8, 2017. 
69 “Franklin D. Roosevelt Annual Message to Congress, January 6, 1941,” Records of the United 
States Senate, SEN 77A-H1, Record Group 46, National Archives, available online at 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=70. In order to achieve these goals, Roosevelt announced the 
 
42 
he later averred, but “if democracy is superseded by slavery,” then these freedoms would 
cease to be.70 
Seven months later on August 14, 1941, Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms became 
enshrined internationally in the development of human rights when the President secretly 
met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland to 
sign the Atlantic Charter. With this “Joint Declaration,” the two countries agreed that the 
world should be free from fear and want—borrowing language from Roosevelt’s “Four 
Freedoms” speech—that people should have the right of self-determination—a reference 
to the Wilsonian internationalism of the First World War—and that neither country 
would seek territorial gains as a result of the current conflict. 
Throughout these events, Jackson was listening. He, along with U.S. Senator 
Harry S. Truman, had been sitting in the front row of the House of Representatives 
during Roosevelt’s 1941 address to Congress, and Jackson would remember the 
President’s words four years later when he traveled to London to develop the Nuremberg 
Charter, establishing the Nuremberg Trial’s institutional authority (see Chapter IV).71 As 
Elizabeth Borgwardt has argued, “The architects of Nuremberg saw themselves as 
contributing to a new, integrated idea of ‘security,’ encompassing all four of President 
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Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.”72 The Four Freedoms, in turn, influenced the development 
of the Atlantic Charter, which represented Roosevelt’s first formal attempt to spread his 
human rights vision—based on the New Deal—throughout the world at an institutional 
level. The Atlantic Charter then led to the “Declaration by United Nations,” a brief 
statement on January 1, 1942, from twenty-six nations fighting against the Axis Powers. 
These nations specifically cited the Atlantic Charter when they declared they were 
fighting to “defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve 
human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands….”73 The Atlantic 
Charter also paved the way for the formal creation of the United Nations in San Francisco 
in June 1945, as all of the countries invited to participate had declared war on both 
Germany and Japan and had signed the Declaration by United Nations. 
After Roosevelt, the person who most influenced Jackson’s views on human 
rights and international law was Quincy Wright, a political scientist specializing in 
international law who became an adviser to Jackson, and Francis Biddle, during the 
Nuremberg Trial. Wright had supported the idea of an international criminal trial as early 
as 1919, following the actions of the German Kaiser in World War I.74 He continued to 
write about issues of international law throughout the interwar period, even offering a 
definition of aggressive war in reaction to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1935:  
 
                                                 
72 Borgwardt, New Deal, 204. 
73 “The Declaration by United Nations,” January 1, 1942, available from The Avalon Project: 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp, accessed on July 10, 2017. 
74 Quincy Wright, “The Legal Liability of the Kaiser,” American Political Science Review 13, no. 
1 (Feb. 1919): 120-128. 
44 
A state which is under an obligation not to resort to force, which is 
employing force against another state, and which refuses to accept an 
armistice proposed in accordance with a procedure which it has accepted 
to implement its no-force obligation, is an aggressor, and may be 
subjected to preventive, deterrent or remedial measures by other states 
bound by that obligation.75 
 
 
Wright’s fascination with the impact of war culminated in a 1,500-page, two-volume 
magnum opus in 1942 called A Study of War.76 Throughout the 1940s, Wright was active 
in an ongoing human rights discourse. In 1941, he took part in a conference organized by 
the World Citizens Association in Chicago called, “The World’s Destiny and the United 
States,” in which he flatly told the assembled diplomats, journalists, academics, and 
judges, “I don’t think a world organization can command loyalty anywhere unless people 
feel that it is based upon a fundamental concern for human rights.”77  
Wright’s biggest contribution to the study of human rights, though, came in 1943, 
when he authored a report called, “Human Rights and the World Order,” that addressed 
the following four questions: 
1. What commitments have the United Nations made for securing human rights? 
2. Is it important that the world order concern itself with human rights? 
3. What specific human rights should be recognized by the world order? 
4. How can the world order protect human rights? 
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Wright broke down human rights into four different categories (civil, economic, political, 
and social) and showed how these concepts stemmed from the Atlantic Charter and the 
Four Freedoms, state constitutions and their various bills of rights, international 
agreements protecting minorities’ rights, and theorists of natural rights, in particular John 
Locke.78 He argued that an international organization, like the United Nations, was 
necessary in order to secure peace by placing limits on national sovereignty and 
upholding the fundamental rights of all human beings.79 As he put it, “under modern 
conditions certain human freedoms are incompatible with unlimited national freedom and 
can only be secured through international institutions….”80 The rise of nationalism and 
global interaction throughout the 1800s had led to a crisis in international law: should it 
concern itself only with states, as had traditionally been the case, or should its purview 
include the individual? Wright believed that while it was more convenient for 
international law to deal only with states, it could not ignore the individual, especially 
with regard to refugees (who have no state), or places where states fail to protect the 
human rights of the people within their borders.81 Thus, he concluded that diplomacy, 
national legislation, an international court, and international institutions represented the 
best means of enforcing human rights.82  
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Wright’s advocacy of an international institution to enforce human rights came to 
fruition at Nuremberg, where Jackson relied upon his expertise in creating the world’s 
first international criminal court. Wright became one of Nuremberg’s earliest defenders, 
too, writing in 1946 and 1947 that the Trial was fair and was based on existing 
international law. Clearly, Jackson’s proximity to both Roosevelt and Wright provided 
him with a conception of human rights and affected his perspective on the role of 
international law and international institutions in maintaining order. As a pivotal New 
Dealer in the 1930s and 1940s, Jackson also had a lasting impact on the next generation 
of leaders, including Telford Taylor who succeeded Jackson by becoming the chief U.S. 
prosecutor for the subsequent Nuremberg trials from 1946 to 1949.83  
Jackson continued to demonstrate his commitment to the rights of the individual 
after he became an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court on July 11, 1941. Japan’s 
attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, led the 
Roosevelt administration to quickly begin targeting Japanese Americans as a threat to 
national security. The fear was that such individuals, even those who were American 
citizens, would be loyal to Japan rather than to the U.S. Apparently, Roosevelt had been 
concerned with the loyalties of people of Japanese ancestry since at least 1940, when the 
State Department commissioned Detroit businessman Curtis Munson to determine 
whether Japanese people on the West Coast represented a legitimate threat to national 
security. Munson spoke with U.S. Army intelligence officers, city officials, and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). His “Report on the Japanese on the West Coast of 
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the United States,” often referred to simply as the Munson Report, concluded that the 
Japanese people were extremely loyal to the U.S. and did not pose a threat: “There is no 
Japanese ‘problem’ on the [West] Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese.” 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson sent the Munson Report to the President on January 9, 
1942, but on February 19, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, allowing the Secretary 
of War to create military zones where minority groups could be detained, which was the 
first step toward what would later become Japanese internment camps.84 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court began hearing cases that questioned the 
constitutionality of Executive Order 9066. The first was Hirabayashi v. United States, 
which focused specifically on the government’s use of curfews against minority groups. 
The Court ruled on June 21, 1943, that curfews against Japanese, German, or Italian 
Americans were constitutional since the country was at war with Japan, Germany, and 
Italy. This case is largely overshadowed, though, by Korematsu v. United States, which 
the court decided the following year on December 18, 1944. In a 6-3 decision, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order 9066 was constitutional. Whereas the court 
had only addressed the constitutionality of curfews in the Hirabayashi case the year 
before, Korematsu had broader implications. The ruling meant that Japanese internment 
camps were legal and that the plaintiff, Fred Korematsu—an American citizen—could be 
detained. Roosevelt’s executive order had been upheld by a clear majority, but among the 
dissenting judges included his former attorney general, Robert Jackson. 
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Jackson began his dissent with a poignant observation: “Korematsu was born on 
our soil, of parents born in Japan. The Constitution makes him a citizen of the United 
States by nativity, and a citizen of California by residence. No claim is made that he is 
not loyal to this country. There is no suggestion that … he is not law-abiding and well 
disposed.” Korematsu had done nothing wrong, except violate a military order, which 
Jackson deemed unconstitutional. While Jackson recognized that it was occasionally 
necessary in times of war for the military to issue orders that might not “conform to 
conventional tests of constitutionality,” he found that this particular order was racially 
discriminatory, and that the Court, by ruling against Korematsu, was sanctioning it. “A 
military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident,” 
Jackson stated. “But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the 
doctrine of the Constitution,” he warned, giving it “a generative power of its own….” 
Even though the U.S. was at war with Japan and an anti-Japanese fervor was spreading 
throughout the country, Jackson rose above these sentiments and concluded that the 
military’s use of force to detain Korematsu was a threat to individual liberty.85 
An International New Dealer  
Jackson’s stance against antisemitism and racial discrimination within the U.S. 
was both admirable and dutiful, given his roles as attorney general and a member of the 
Supreme Court, but that did not necessarily make him a human rights advocate. He also 
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needed to display respect and reverence for international law, an attitude that was not 
especially common in the early 1940s, given how rampant American isolationism was 
after the First World War. Once the fighting in Europe began in 1939, Americans were 
even less interested in international engagement. A Gallup Poll from January 10, 1941, 
found that 88 percent of Americans wanted to stay out of the war, while only 12 percent 
want to go in, and these numbers never changed significantly throughout the year.86 That 
all changed, of course, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 
but even though Americans supported the war effort by that point, they did not 
automatically embrace international law specifically or internationalism generally.  
President Woodrow Wilson had articulated an internationalist outlook nearly 
twenty years earlier that the U.S. needed to embrace international agreements, 
international institutions, and international law in order to maintain peace. Jackson 
admitted in a 1927 speech that he “worshipped” Wilson’s liberalism but “denounced” his 
decision to plunge the U.S. into a war that he felt would not “solve any European and 
certainly no American problems.” Jackson had campaigned for Wilson during the 1916 
presidential election on the platform “He kept us out of war.” However, the young lawyer 
became so disillusioned with the Democratic Party in the post-WWI era that he voted for 
Republican candidate Warren Harding in the 1920 election.87 He quickly went back to 
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voting for Democratic candidates, though, and he wholeheartedly supported Wilsonian 
internationalism once he joined Roosevelt’s New Deal administration. 
On March 27, 1941, when Jackson was still attorney general, he articulated his 
commitment to international law in an address for the First Conference of the Inter-
American Bar Association (IABA) in Havana, Cuba.88 Roosevelt initially wanted Jackson 
to give the speech in person and had even arranged for a plane to pick him up from the 
presidential yacht. Unfortunately, “on the night before the scheduled speech, the sea 
became very rough….The old yacht was rolling so much in the heavy sea that some of 
the navy men aboard questioned its seaworthiness.” As a result, Jackson had to remain 
aboard, but copies of his speech had been forwarded to the Havana newspapers.89  
The IABA had just come into existence the previous year, signifying a shift 
toward international engagement in the 1940s, as much of North and South America 
realized that isolationism was not going to prevent global conflict. President Roosevelt 
recognized this as well, and on March 11 signed into law “An Act to Promote the 
Defense of the United States,” also known as the Lend-Lease policy, which loaned food, 
oil, weapons, ships, and planes to the British with the expectation that they would pay 
back these debts after the war was over. This policy allowed the U.S. to contribute to the 
war effort without officially joining it, a move that most Americans supported.90 
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Nevertheless, Jackson still felt impelled to defend the Lend-Lease policy at the IABA 
conference, insisting that the U.S. could remain neutral during the war while still 
providing aid to one of her allies. He argued that World War I had changed the 
international community. Whereas heads of state in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries operated under the assumptions that they had no legal duty to one 
another and that wars were perfectly legal, Jackson believed such attitudes no longer 
applied in the twentieth century, as the world had become increasingly connected and 
interdependent. Any war of aggression between two world powers would inevitably have 
a ripple effect on the rest of the globe, which is why the international community 
outlawed such behavior with the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, renouncing war as an 
instrument of national policy. Therefore, Germany’s war against Great Britain was 
illegal, and in Jackson’s mind, that provided legal justification for the Lend-Lease policy. 
For Jackson, sovereign nations that violated laws designed to maintain order and stability 
by committing acts of aggression were waging “civil wars against the international 
community.”  As a result, the nations of the world had the legal right both to discriminate 
against the aggressor for violating its obligations to the international community and to 
provide aid to those nations defending themselves.91  
It is clear from this address that Jackson believed international law was necessary 
for maintaining peace. Jackson opposed wars of aggression (a theme that would come up 
again during the Nuremberg Trial) and supported the rule of law. In his view, when 
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Germany signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it had vowed not to resort to war. By invading 
Poland on September 1, 1939, Germany had broken its word, and it was up to the nations 
of the world to step in and restore order. Otherwise, international law had no meaning. 
Jackson even emphasized this point at the end of his address by quoting something 
Wilson had said after World War I: “If we can now give to international law the kind of 
vitality which it can have only if it is a real expression of our moral judgment, we shall 
have complete in some sense the work which this war was intended to emphasize.”92 Just 
as individuals must obey the laws of their nation, so, too, must nations obey the laws of 
their world.  
Jackson reiterated his commitment to international law in a speech he gave on 
October 2, 1941, at the Annual Dinner of the American Bar Association (ABA).93 
Entitled “The Challenge of International Lawlessness,” Jackson argued that even in the 
midst of the current war, there actually did exist “a relatively stable body of customary 
and conventional international law as a foundation on which the future may build.” The 
world might not follow every international agreement—as evidenced by Germany’s 
violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact—but he believed international law was gaining 
legitimacy.94 Prisoners of war and the sick and wounded received better treatment 
because of the Geneva Conventions, international lawyers found gainful employment 
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among government agencies, and countries around the world resolved disputes peacefully 
through burgeoning foreign relations departments.  
In addition, Jackson noted that new international laws were coming into 
existence, and international sanctions were an effective means of deterring aggressive 
behavior. He gave credit to the League of Nations for finally giving the world an 
institution with the potential to create lasting peace. Obviously, the League did not 
prevent the Second World War, but in Jackson’s mind that did not negate the fact that the 
League’s Covenant “created new obligations of good conduct” that “departed sharply 
from the older doctrine that … sovereign states were above both the discipline and the 
judgments of any law, and that their acts of war were to be accepted as legal and just.” 
The League failed, he concluded, because it required unanimous support among all of its 
member nations in order to do anything. This meant that lasting peace could not be 
possible because it could not “escape from the weight of the status quo….” Jackson 
lamented that the international system was imperfect, but averred that the world could not 
“await a perfect international tribunal or legislature before proscribing resort to 
violence….” He expressed disappointment that the U.S. had refused to join the League 
following the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and he hoped the country would learn 
from that mistake once World War II was over. Jackson also emphasized the Atlantic 
Charter, believing it could create “a wider and permanent system of general security” by 
increasing the legitimacy of international law and giving it the vitality it needed to 
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prevent violence among nations.95 He concluded that the U.S. only had two options to 
protect itself from conflict: either support international institutions and international law 
completely, or construct the most powerful military force the world had ever seen.96 
The War Crimes Prosecutor 
On April 13, 1945, mere hours after eulogizing the late President Roosevelt at a 
memorial service, Jackson gave a speech before the American Society of International 
Law (ASIL) denouncing the criminal behavior of the Nazis and calling for trials.97 Little 
did the Supreme Court justice realize that his address would garner the attention of 
members of Roosevelt’s administration.  
Secretary of War Henry Stimson had been calling for months for a war crimes 
trial. Once he convinced Roosevelt to support this position, the President sent his senior 
adviser, Judge Samuel Rosenman, to London to discuss this issue further with the Allies. 
Rosenman had to return hastily, though, after Roosevelt’s unexpected death just before 
the San Francisco Conference to organize the U.N. As a result, members of the White 
House feverishly negotiated with the Allied Powers about the possibility of holding an 
international trial. Great Britain and France agreed, and it seemed likely that the Soviet 
Union would, too.  As the trial was coming to fruition, the War Department sent a 
memorandum to Rosenman to say that there was an “imperative need of having counsel 
designated immediately” in order to “prepare the United States’ side of the main war 
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criminals case.” The memo also included a list of possible candidates, and Jackson’s 
name was among them. The Supreme Court justice had served for years in the Roosevelt 
administration, so he was well-known among Rosenman, Stimson, and other members of 
the War Department. He had also established himself as a leading supporter of 
international law and justice.98 
Thus, two weeks after Jackson’s ASIL speech, Rosenman contacted Jackson on 
Truman’s behalf to ask if the Supreme Court justice would be interested in serving as the 
head prosecutor against suspected German war criminals. In Jackson’s words, President 
Truman wanted him to be “the trial attorney for the entire United Nations.” Jackson was 
intrigued by the offer and immediately responded. In a letter to President Truman, 
Jackson noted that it might not be wise for him to represent the entire U.N. but only the 
U.S., and that other Allied Powers could participate as they saw fit. He also emphasized 
that “time is of the essence” to prosecute the war criminals quickly, or else people may 
take the law into their own hands, resulting in “anarchy and civil bloodshed.” Any delay 
could also reflect poorly on the U.S. and the President, so Jackson would rather “sacrifice 
perfection to expedition.”99 In the end, he agreed to serve, and the President, who could 
not have been happier with his decision, announced Jackson as the Chief U.S. Prosecutor 
on May 2, 1945. 
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Jackson was eager to get away from Washington for a while and take part in the 
first international criminal trial. He was not getting along well at all with his fellow 
associate justice, Hugo Black, describing the situation on the Supreme Court as 
“unpleasant.” Jackson and Black had both been appointed to the court by President 
Roosevelt, but the two men held disparate legal views. For instance, Black had written 
the majority opinion in Korematsu, declaring that Japanese internment was constitutional, 
while Jackson had been one of three judges who dissented. In addition, Black supported 
total incorporation theory, a legal philosophy which held that the Bill of Rights should 
apply to state governments and not just to the federal government. The Supreme Court 
had originally ruled in Barron v. Baltimore (1833) that the Constitution’s first ten 
amendments only had to be upheld at the federal level. It then ruled in United States v. 
Cruikshank (1876) that the First and Second Amendments did not apply to state 
governments. However, the Court began reconsidering this view in the 1920s, so by the 
time Black joined in 1937, he was increasingly exposed to incorporation and came to 
favor it. By the mid-1940s, Black emerged as the Court’s most vocal proponent of total 
incorporation.  
Jackson, on the other hand, advocated federalism, a sharing of power between 
federal and state governments, and did not believe federal standards should apply to the 
states. He articulated his clearest opposition to incorporation in Beauharnais v. Illinois 
(1952), in which he stated it would be inappropriate to have “a single standard for 
restricting State and Nation” since the two have different “functions and duties in relation 
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to [the First Amendment].”100 Lawyer and author William Domnarski argues that Jackson 
objected to incorporation because he feared “states would lose their chance to experiment 
in the administration of criminal justice if federal standards for various criminal 
procedure provisions were imposed on the states by way of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”101 Jackson supported the Constitutional separation of powers, not just 
among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but also between governing 
authorities at the federal and state levels. Thus, he was diametrically opposed to any form 
of incorporation, especially total incorporation, and the differences in judicial philosophy 
between Jackson and Black increased tensions on the Court, leading Jackson to seriously 
consider “going back to private practice and getting off the court.” He admitted near the 
end of his life that the IMT provided a convenient break from the strain of the Court, “I 
didn’t know but that the Nuremberg adventure would be a good exit.”102  
Jackson’s advocacy of states’ rights over expanding the application of the Bill of 
Rights seems odd. Had he supported incorporation, he could have elevated individual 
rights throughout the country, thereby reinforcing the notion that these rights transcend 
governmental powers that would threaten to violate them. Instead, he clung to this idea of 
states’ rights, which most proponents use to limit the jurisdiction of outside courts. 
Jackson supported individual rights, but he did not want the federal government, or a 
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federal court, to overreach and violate a state’s jurisdiction. Jackson’s lack of support for 
incorporation was a blind spot in his advocacy of human rights. 
The American road to Nuremberg, as historian Bradley Smith put it, was 
complicated.103 Holding a trial was a departure from the historical norm, as war criminals 
in the past usually faced either exile or execution. The Allies attempted to put the German 
Kaiser on trial after World War I, but the American delegation strongly opposed the idea 
of forcing state leaders into a courtroom to face punishment since there was no legal 
precedent to do so (see Chapter VII). Although more than two decades had passed since 
the Paris Peace Conference and the failed attempt to put the Kaiser on trial, American 
opinion had not changed much, especially among government leaders. However, by 
1942, a few governmental officials in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, most notably 
the foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, began pushing for a trial.104 When Winston 
Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin met in Moscow on November 1, 1943, 
and then in Tehran the following month, though, it was clear that Churchill did not 
support holding an international trial, and only Stalin seemed enthusiastic about the 
idea—but what he had in mind more closely resembled a Moscow “show” trial of the 
1930s in which the defendants were guilty before they ever entered the courtroom. Stalin, 
Churchill, and Roosevelt left the door open for an international trial in their “Moscow 
Declaration,” which stated that “…the major criminals whose offences have no particular 
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geographical location … will be punished by a joint decision of the Governments of the 
Allies.”105 But even the more liberal Roosevelt opposed a very public trial with 
newspaper reporters and photographers, so he simply avoided taking a stand on the issue 
at the time.106 By the following year, however, members of his own administration were 
hard at work devising plans to deal with Germany and the suspected war criminals. 
 “The Morgenthau Plan,” named for Secretary of the treasury, Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr., was the most infamous of these plans. Written on September 5, 1944, Morgenthau 
called for the complete dismantling of German industry, the summary execution of the 
highest offenders in the Nazi party hierarchy, and military trials only for lower level party 
members. His plan would be considered cruel today, but not so much at the time. It is 
also easier to understand Morgenthau’s motivations when one considers his father’s 
government service thirty years earlier. Morgenthau, Sr. had been the U.S. ambassador to 
the Ottoman Empire during World War I and was one of the first Americans to raise 
awareness about the Young Turks’ massacring of Armenians in 1915. Morgenthau, Sr. 
raised the alarm on these crimes against humanity, but he was unable to convince 
Woodrow Wilson’s administration to stop them. Morgenthau, Jr. was well aware of this 
failure, and as draconian and inhumane as his plan seems today, Roosevelt initially 
favored it. 
However, just four days later on September 9, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson 
wrote a memo to Roosevelt opposing Morgenthau’s plan. His arguments were measured 
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and reasonable, based on the rule of law and the “laws of humanity” that had been 
percolating in the Western consciousness since at least the Hague Conventions of 1907. 
He insisted that the U.S. had to prosecute suspected war criminals under “at least the 
rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, notification to the accused of the 
charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his 
defense.” He said that to do otherwise would not be consistent with the advances toward 
“civilization” and the “laws of the Rule of War” that the world had been making over the 
past several decades. And if the U.S. did put these men on trial in a fair and dignified 
way, then that would have a stronger and more positive effect on posterity than simply 
executing them. Even though the German leaders had not “committed wanton and 
unnecessary cruelties” against the U.S., Stimson believed America’s “moral position is 
better if we take our share in their conviction.”107 Therefore, the U.S. had a moral and 
legal obligation to treat the Nazi war criminals with dignity by trying them in a court of 
law.  
Nearly five months later on January 22, 1945, Stimson teamed up with Secretary 
of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. and Attorney General Francis Biddle—who had filled 
Jackson’s vacancy in the administration and who later became the presiding American 
judge at Nuremberg—to author another memo for the President, what came to be known 
as the Yalta Memo (see Chapter IV). They reiterated the need for a trial and said that 
executing Nazi criminals “would be violative of the most fundamental principles of 
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justice, common to all the United Nations.”108 Their plan emphasized Nazi conspiracy 
and included charging specific organizations like the Gestapo and the Storm Troopers 
(SA) with criminal activity. The memo stated that these American officials favored 
“…the trial of the prime leaders by an international military commission or military 
court, established by Executive Agreement of the heads of State of the interested United 
Nations.”109 The points of view of Stimson, Stettinius, and Biddle represented a complete 
about-face from the arguments the American delegation had made after World War I 
opposing an international trial for the Kaiser.  
Once Roosevelt’s cabinet officials were onboard with holding a trial, the 
American people still needed convincing. An American Institute of Public Opinion poll 
on May 15, 1945, revealed that 67 percent of Americans believed the U.S. should kill 
Hermann Goering, the top surviving Nazi. Only 4 percent responded that he should be 
tried. In that same poll, 39 percent of respondents said the U.S. should kill members of 
the Gestapo and the SA, while 15 percent wanted the U.S. to put them on trial. Numerous 
public opinion polls taken from March 1942 to May 1945 revealed that more Americans 
always preferred killing the Nazi leaders over trying them.110 A majority of Americans 
never supported a trial, so Jackson felt it was up to him to convince his fellow citizens 
why this moment called for a different course of action.  
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On June 7, 1945, Jackson wrote a report to President Truman, which The New 
York Times published. Jackson believed the Allies had to put the Nazis on trial since 
letting them go would “mock the dead and make cynics of the living,” and executing 
them outright “would not set easily on the American conscience or be remembered by our 
children with pride.”111 He wrote that the U.S. wanted to punish the Germans for actions 
that “every civilized code” had recognized as criminal “since the time of Cain.”112 In his 
mind, the Nazis’ crimes were self-evident and did not need to be proven based on 
existing international law, but he insisted that it was necessary to show how they had 
violated international order. 
Jackson’s report struck a chord with the American public when it appeared in 
print.113 He received letters of support from several ordinary citizens, including a 
handwritten note from Delord R. Mabry. Mabry began his letter on a personal note, 
saying he was initially interested in following in his father’s footsteps and becoming a 
lawyer, but he was not comfortable pursuing a career that he felt was incompatible with 
his Christian beliefs. He served during World War II because, in his words, “that was the 
‘patriotic’ thing to do,” but he felt American involvement in the war was far from noble. 
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When he read Jackson’s report, he said it “changed my outlook on humanity as well as 
my hope in it.” He continued, 
 
To be patriotic now goes beyond national boundaries and extends over 
the world. It is a patriotism that is accountable to humanity rather than to 
a nation. With laws integrated into a world code, not into several 
conflicting codes each one justified by ‘lawful’ wars, there seems to be 
hope.114 
 
 
Although Mabry’s note expressed the sentiments of one person, it reflected a broader 
American support for multilateralism. Jackson’s report convinced Americans that the 
U.S. had to take the lead in this unprecedented international trial, which would pave the 
way for future advancements in international cooperation, intervention, and law.  
The Chief U.S. Prosecutor then travelled to London to hammer out the Charter 
that would give the IMT its authority. He had already left his mark on the American 
stage, and now he was stepping into the global spotlight. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FRANCIS B. BIDDLE - THE SILVER SPOON
 
With Robert Jackson on board, Truman turned to Francis Biddle to serve as the 
presiding American judge. Biddle had been attorney general in the Roosevelt 
administration but stepped down at Truman’s request on July 1, 1945, so that the new 
president could appoint Tom C. Clark.115 Biddle actually had very little experience on the 
bench, having served for only one year on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals from 1939 
to 1940 before following in Jackson’s footsteps to become solicitor general (January 22, 
1940 to August 25, 1941) and then attorney general (August 26, 1941 to June 26, 1945). 
Truman offered this unique opportunity as consolation for forcing Biddle to resign.116 
Biddle was excited with the appointment and hoped the unprecedented trial would add to 
his already successful career. 
The word that best describes Francis Beverly Biddle would be “privileged,” 
though Biddle himself disliked this perception that “all Biddles were wealthy society 
playboys, with an exciting, adventurous, and not unimportant past….”117 Biddle came 
from a long line of statesmen, including Edmund Jennings Randolph, the first U.S. 
attorney general, and Nicholas Biddle, head of the Second Bank of the U.S. before 
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President Andrew Jackson quashed it. Biddle’s father was a law professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania and was living in Paris when Biddle’s mother gave birth to 
him in 1886. The young Biddle lived in Switzerland for two years while he was growing 
up, attended the prestigious Groton boarding school in Massachusetts—where he first 
met Franklin Roosevelt, a twelfth-grade student when Biddle was an eighth-grader—
enjoyed gymnastics and boxing, and, upon graduation, attended Harvard University.  
Throughout his time at Harvard, the 5’11” college student with brown hair and 
hazel eyes mostly socialized, partied, and lived a life “where one wandered, as a puppy 
might, where his nose led him.”118 Biddle later questioned the quality of education he 
received: “In college marks counted for little. If one did a certain amount of superficial 
reading, got a ‘feel’ of the subject, studied the professor’s preferences and flattered them 
in the examination, it was not hard to obtain good grades.”119 He held a particularly dim 
view of many of his Harvard instructors who only seemed interested in showing off how 
much specialized knowledge they had acquired. He opined that “little of what we learned 
from them remained in the background of my mind.”120 This emphasis on specialization 
frustrated Biddle, who felt it was “foolish” to ignore the “humane and liberal studies.”121 
He was far more interested in cultivating a love of literature, poetry, theatre, and 
philosophy than he was in pre-law courses. He wrote fondly of his course on 
metaphysics, which was taught by Professor William James, the leading American 
philosopher of his time and the founder of pragmatism. Biddle knew he would go on to 
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law school, so after graduating cum laude in 1909, he remained at Harvard to continue 
his studies. Years later, when Biddle became a lawyer, he was fortunate to work in a law 
office where everybody did a little bit of everything, so he never became overly 
specialized in one field of law.122 
Whereas Biddle enjoyed the freedom and looseness he experienced as an 
undergraduate at Harvard, his law school years were far more “regular, rigid, 
concentrated….”123 Towards the end of his studies, he grew tired of the routine and 
wanted to move on with his life. He found the work of the lawyer rewarding because it 
“smacked of the world…” and “was the real thing in an imperative and pragmatic 
sense.”124 If the option had been available to him, he probably would have followed 
Robert Jackson’s example and become a lawyer through the practical experience of an 
apprenticeship. But Biddle was part of the American elite, not a “country lawyer,” as 
Jackson later described himself, so gaining his degree through Harvard’s prestigious 
program was the path he was expected to follow.  
Harvard established the nation’s first law school in 1817 and quickly set the 
standard that other programs wanted to follow.125 Most American law schools began to 
professionalize in the 1870s, around the same time that American universities started 
offering the Ph.D. (Doctor of Philosophy), the highest possible research degree. Before 
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the 1870s, law schools were rarely connected to colleges, and those that were often 
failed—Harvard being a notable exception on both counts.126 There simply was not 
enough demand for lawyers, or for law professors to teach law in a school setting, so 
nearly all aspiring lawyers apprenticed in law offices, as Jackson had done. By World 
War I, only Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania required its law students to have 
an undergraduate degree before they could matriculate, so Biddle had an elite education. 
Biddle attended Harvard law from Fall 1909 to 1911, along with his older brother, 
George, who later became a famous painter and even reported on the Nuremberg Trial. 
While Francis Biddle was in law school, he took the standard set of courses, which 
included domestic relations, executors and administrators, sheriffs and gaolers (jailers), 
contracts, torts, evidence, pleading, equity, criminal law, and real property.127 For many 
decades, Harvard did not require international law in its law school curriculum, viewing 
it negatively as a “nonprofessional” course. It would not be until after World War II that 
the subject became more common and expected, with Harvard creating the Institute of 
International Legal Studies in 1950.128 However, Harvard did occasionally offer 
international law as an elective, and by the time Biddle matriculated, the course had 
become required for all Third Year students. According to the 1909/1910 Harvard Law 
school catalogue, the required textbook for international law was James Brown Scott’s 
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Cases on International Law: Selected from Decisions of English and American Courts, 
which had just been updated for its second edition in 1908.129  
Biddle’s early exposure to James Brown Scott’s perspective on international 
peace and justice gave him an even more cosmopolitan view of international law. Scott 
often does not receive the attention he deserves today, but by the middle of the twentieth 
century, he had become the most significant American advocate of international law. 
Scott had received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Harvard University in 1890 
and 1891, two decades before Biddle, where he focused on international law.130 After 
Harvard, Scott went to California to practice law before becoming the founding dean of 
the University of Southern California’s law school in 1896. He abruptly left the law 
school to serve in the War of 1898, but soon returned to the classroom to teach law at the 
University of Illinois, Columbia University—where one of his students included Franklin 
D. Roosevelt—and George Washington University.131 He then became an American 
diplomat, helped establish the American Society of International Law in 1906, and the 
following year became the editor-in-chief of the Society’s publication, the American 
Journal of International Law. Afterward, he became Trustee and Secretary of the 
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and then in 1907, served as an American 
diplomat to the Second Hague Conference.  
Scott served under Secretary of State Elihu Root and had gone to the Second 
Hague Conference with instructions to convince the other delegates to strengthen the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and make it into a legitimate world court that 
would place international law on equal footing with domestic law. Scott had been 
unhappy with the way the 1899 Hague Conference constructed the PCA because it was 
neither permanent nor made up of actual judges. He wanted to see it become an 
international tribunal of full-time judges who would settle cases brought to them by 
national governments. This never happened, though, as the delegates could not agree on 
the process of selecting judges for this new world court, but the other delegations largely 
agreed with Scott’s vision. The international community might have been able to create a 
permanent world court during the next scheduled Hague Conference in 1915, thirty years 
before Nuremberg, but the outbreak of World War I made that impossible.132 
Scott was one of the most experienced and credentialed international lawyers and 
diplomats that the U.S. had ever seen up to that point, so it is not surprising that he wrote 
the book on international law—literally.133 He opened his preface with the following 
claim: 
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The idea underlying this volume is that international law is part of 
English common law; that as such it passed with the English colonists to 
America; that when, in consequence of a successful rebellion, they were 
admitted to the family of nations, the new republic recognized 
international law as completely as international law recognized the new 
republic.134 
 
 
Scott’s point was that international law was not a new branch of law, and he quoted Sir 
William Blackstone—the revered eighteenth-century English jurist and author of the 
frequently-cited Commentaries on the Laws of England—to prove that it was “adopted in 
its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”135 Thus, 
international law (or what was sometimes known as the “law of nations”) had significant 
influence on the American colonies before the U.S. existed. Unfortunately, America’s 
law schools often failed to train its students in this vital area, so Scott’s text was designed 
to fill in that gap. It was part of the American Casebook Series, which reflected a 
pedagogical shift toward the case method of legal training. To that end, Scott included 
numerous excerpts from cases, judges’ opinions, and international agreements. For 
instance, when Biddle opened up Scott’s textbook to Chapter VI on “Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes,” he found excerpts from the First Hague Peace Conference in 
1899. The entire chapter was only four pages long—demonstrating the novelty at the time 
of seeking alternatives to war in international conflict—and Scott organized it into four 
sections: “Maintenance of General Peace,” “Good Offices and Mediation,” “International 
Commissions of Inquiry,” and “International Arbitration.” These passages revealed that, 
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as early as 1899, the international community had agreed to “use their best efforts to 
insure the pacific settlement of international differences,” and to rely on neutral powers to 
arbitrate disputes.136  
 Chapter IV of Scott’s text, concerning the Jurisdiction of States and the issue of 
immunity for heads of state, is particularly relevant to issues that Biddle would later face 
as the American judge at Nuremberg. Scott cited an 1851 British case, De Haber v. The 
Queen of Portugal, in which the plaintiff left money in the hands of a Portuguese banker, 
presumably for deposit, but the banker instead gave the sum over to the Portuguese 
government. The plaintiff thus filed suit in the Court of London against the Queen of 
Portugal. The English court ruled, though, that it did not have jurisdiction in the case, and 
that “to cite a foreign potentate in a municipal court…is contrary to the law of nations, 
and an insult which he is entitled to resent.”137 The judgment further stated that 
international law did not allow for the arrest or seizure of property of any ambassador or 
official public servant of a foreign government.138 This was the precedent that had existed 
before World War II, but Nuremberg broke with tradition by putting top government 
officials on trial—albeit for far more serious criminal offenses. Biddle had been exposed 
to these international legal principles during his formative law school years and would 
apply them in his own way more than three decades later. 
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Following law school, from which Biddle also graduated cum laude, Biddle 
clerked under Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., from 1911 to 1912. It 
was one of the most amazing and memorable years of his life. As he later described it, 
 
[My time with Holmes] roused and stimulated me more than anything I 
had experienced since the first exciting plunge into common law at the 
Harvard Law School. I moved into a realm of speculation and the 
exchange of ideas that I hardly knew existed, and some of my schoolboy 
limitations fell away. It was a period of breathlessness and growth.139 
 
 
Even more importantly, Biddle’s year in Washington gave him a taste for politics and 
made him realize that he should be part of the solution to America’s problems. Biddle 
had been raised a conservative, but this pivotal year in D.C., when Progressives 
convinced former president Teddy Roosevelt to run against his handpicked successor, 
William Howard Taft, turned him into a Bull Moose Party supporter. He admitted in his 
memoirs that he “burst into tears” when Roosevelt lost, but he later realized that “it was 
better for the world that Mr. Wilson had been chosen.”140 Holmes was skeptical of 
Biddle’s support of Teddy Roosevelt, writing to his young and impressionable law clerk 
on July 17, 1912, that Roosevelt was not the paragon of morality that Biddle and other 
supporters made him out to be. Holmes characterized Roosevelt “as unscrupulous as any 
one [sic] else when his interests were concerned…”141 Despite Holmes’s criticism, 
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though, Biddle remained loyal to the Bull Moose party and served as a delegate to the 
Progressive Party convention in Chicago in 1916.142  
Biddle returned to Pennsylvania following his one-year clerkship with Holmes 
and began practicing law in Philadelphia, but he never appreciated the City of Brotherly 
Love in the same way that he had Washington, D.C.143 Professionally, Biddle gained 
valuable legal experience serving as a special assistant in the U.S. District Attorney’s 
office, joining the Philadelphia Bar Association, and being part of a state commission to 
investigate the working conditions of Pennsylvania’s coal and steel miners.144 His 
reputation grew, and he enjoyed the camaraderie he found in the legal world, but as he 
recalled years later, “…cases came and went [and] I wondered where I was going, and 
why.”145 Personally, Biddle became a family man while living in Philadelphia, marrying 
Katherine Garrison Chapin—who went on to become a world-renowned poet—on April 
27, 1918. In his memoir, Biddle recounted how Katherine had been engaged to one of his 
old Harvard classmates, which only further motivated him to win her heart. The couple 
then had two sons.146 Life was good, but never as exciting or purposeful as Biddle had 
hoped.  
To quench his thirst for adventure, Biddle decided to join the Military Intelligence 
Branch of the Army in mid-1918 (see Figure 1). Both Justice Holmes and Harvard 
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University President A. Lawrence Lowell wrote letters of recommendation to the Army 
Intelligence headquarters in Washington, D.C. to support the young lawyer’s application 
for a commission.147 Biddle never made a big deal of his military service, though, barely 
making a passing reference to it in his memoir when he was discharged from Camp 
Zachary Taylor, which only existed from 1917 until 1920 in Louisville, Kentucky.148 
Unfortunately for Biddle, the fighting ended in November with the signing of the 
Armistice agreement, so he never had the chance to serve abroad. Neither Robert Jackson 
nor John Parker ever served in the armed forces, so of the three Americans at the center 
of this study, only Biddle knew what it was like to want to serve his country overseas but 
not being able to. This was part of the reason why Biddle was so eager to travel to 
Nuremberg nearly thirty years later, to finally serve his country overseas. 
 
Figure 1. Katherine and Francis Biddle in 1918 
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The New Dealer 
Twenty years in Philadelphia had been more than enough for Biddle, so in 1934, 
he returned to the nation’s capital to become chairman of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB). “The political and public world that I was to know during the next ten 
years,” Biddle declared, “would be based on more stimulating relationship and more 
human values than those of practicing law.”149 After Biddle joined Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration, he was involved with the Tennessee Valley Authority, sat briefly on the 
bench for the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, became U.S. Solicitor General, and 
finally served as U.S. Attorney General.150 He had followed in Robert Jackson’s footsteps 
for the latter two appointments, and it was actually Justice Jackson who administered the 
Oath of Office to the incoming attorney general on September 5, 1941, prompting 
President Roosevelt to comment that this would be the first swearing-in “ever delivered 
by the new, I might almost say ‘baby’ Member of the Supreme Court.”151  
Biddle did not initially support Roosevelt, personally or professionally.152 The 
two had been students together at Groton, but since they were four grades apart, 
Roosevelt often teased the younger Biddle, a trend that continued even once Biddle was 
in his administration. And although Biddle’s political views more closely aligned with 
the Democratic Party, which he had joined in 1932, he only voted for Roosevelt in the 
presidential election that year because he could not bring himself to support the 
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incumbent President Herbert Hoover for another term.153 However, the New Deal 
intrigued Biddle, and he was excited about the possibility of helping his country through 
such challenging economic times. He decided to give Roosevelt a chance, and while the 
two became friendly in the White House, they were never particularly close, at least not 
in the way that the President had been with Robert Jackson. Once the Second World War 
began and the U.S. joined the fight, tensions between the two men grew, as Biddle’s 
nuanced views on civil rights, especially Americans’ freedom of speech, often clashed 
with Roosevelt’s desire to stamp out seditious activities throughout the country. 
Biddle served faithfully in the Roosevelt administration in some form for eleven 
years, from 1934 to 1945, until the President died unexpectedly. During that time, the last 
five years provide the most insight into Biddle’s views on individual rights and the 
government’s responsibility to protect them. As one might expect, the evidence is 
complicated, revealing the nuanced behavior of a man serving in a wartime 
administration, desperately trying to find the proper balance between his moral compass 
and his government duty. Thus, Biddle at times appears heroic, the attorney general who 
stopped President Roosevelt from overstepping his bounds and silencing critics accused 
of seditious activities. Other times, though, he seems idle, the attorney general who stood 
by as the President issued Executive Order 9066, paving the way for Japanese internment 
camps. Although it is difficult to conclude that he was a human rights advocate before he 
travelled to Germany for the Nuremberg Trial in 1945, one thing is clear: by the end of 
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Biddle’s life, he had become one of the most ardent American supporters of increased 
internationalism and human rights. 
Two examples from Biddle’s pre-Nuremberg time of service illustrate the internal 
conflicts with which he struggled: the Smith Act’s targeting of seditious activities, and 
the creation of Japanese internment camps.  
Sedition 
Congress passed the Smith Act in 1940, making it a crime for anyone to advocate 
or teach “overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the 
government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof…” Criminal offenses 
included printing and circulating materials that encouraged the overthrow of the 
government, as well as being a member—or even an affiliate—of a group advocating 
such behavior. Offenders could face fines and imprisonment up to twenty years, and they 
would not be eligible for government employment of any kind for at least five years. The 
Smith Act was not the first, nor would it be the last, piece of legislation designed to keep 
America safe at the expense of the Bill of Rights, especially the freedom of speech. It 
built off of the Hatch Act in 1939, which, among other things, forbade federal employees 
from belonging to a political organization that advocated overthrowing the U.S. 
government. It also originated from a long line of immigration laws passed between 1917 
and 1920 aimed at preventing “criminal syndicalism” and “sedition.”154 It was common 
in the first half of the twentieth century for government leaders to attempt to limit the 
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types of organizations Americans could join, particularly as the Communist Party grew 
worldwide following the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. It would not be 
until 1958 that the Supreme Court would affirm Americans’ freedom of association in 
NAACP v. Alabama, ruling that the freedom of association is an integral part of the First 
Amendment and the freedom of speech. 
Biddle understood why it was sometimes necessary to circumscribe free speech. 
Writing in June 1941, near the end of his tenure as solicitor general, Biddle explained that 
even though the Constitution grants Americans certain individual rights, the government 
can still place reasonable limitations on those rights during “times of stress” in order to 
protect society as a whole. His explanation sounded like something his mentor, Justice 
Holmes, wrote in Schenck v. United States (1919), that the government can limit freedom 
of speech when there is a “clear and present danger.”155 Biddle often quoted Holmes to 
make this point, and soon after he became attorney general, he reiterated Holmes’s 
assertion that “when a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be ensured….”156 Even though 
Biddle only worked for Holmes for one year, he had clearly internalized his mentor’s 
point of view and believed that the war in Europe represented a legitimate threat against 
American democracy. To that end, he felt the federal government had a duty to safeguard 
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the nation, even at the expense of “liberals” who refused limitations on their 
constitutional rights. 
However, just as Biddle relied on Holmes to argue that “no liberty can be 
absolute,” he also referenced the prestigious jurist to affirm that “we do not lose our right 
to condemn either measures or men because the Country is at war.”157 A fine line existed 
between liberty and license, especially once the U.S. entered the war, and Biddle was 
keenly aware that as attorney general, it was his responsibility to uphold free speech 
unless he could prove that it was detrimental to the war effort. Biddle believed “the duty 
of the law is to draw the line between the individual’s rights and the protection of 
society,” and sometimes that line “must necessarily vary as the needs of the one or the 
other seem at any particular time to be more imperative.”158  
While this nuanced position may have been satisfactory to Biddle’s supporters, it 
was not to his boss. Biddle recalled in his memoir just how frustrated Roosevelt had 
become by February 1942: 
 
The President began to send me brief memoranda to which were 
attached some of the scurrilous attacks on his leadership, with a 
notation: “What about this?” or “What are you doing to stop this?” I 
explained to him my view of the unwisdom of bringing indictment for 
sedition except where there was evidence that recruitment was 
substantially being interfered with, or there was some connection 
between the speech and propaganda centers in Germany.159 
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It was clear that Roosevelt thought Biddle was “soft,” a concern he had expressed the 
year before when he asked the former attorney general, Robert Jackson, if he thought 
Biddle would be tough enough for the position.160 The irony here, though, is that when 
Jackson had been attorney general, he opposed the President’s plans for unlimited 
wiretapping, seeing it as a violation of the Constitution, but his defiance did not seem to 
have a detrimental effect on his relation with Roosevelt.161 Clearly, the President did not 
hold Biddle in the same high regard as he did Jackson. The President decided to ramp up 
the pressure on Biddle. During cabinet meetings, it was Roosevelt’s custom to go around 
the room and ask each appointee, in his usual affable way, for a report, but when he came 
to Biddle, he became noticeably ungenial. “His faced pulled tightly together,” Biddle 
remembered, and the President would ask, “When are you going to indict the 
seditionists?”162 This made Biddle uncomfortable, so much so that he responded by 
informing the Justice Department to begin issuing more sedition indictments. Every 
administration since Teddy Roosevelt’s in 1903 had kept track of organizations that 
threatened American democracy—what is often referred to as the Attorney General’s List 
of Subversive Organizations (AGLOSO)—and, with the help of FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover, Biddle began pursuing legal action against the most egregious ones, including 
Father Charles Coughlin, who had previously been a thorn in Jackson’s side.163  
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One of the most significant, and often overlooked, sedition cases Biddle’s Justice 
Department pursued involved eight German spies. On June 27, 1942, Biddle and his wife, 
Katherine, were having dinner with Constantin Fotitch, the Yugoslav ambassador, and his 
wife, when J. Edgar Hoover telephoned. The FBI director informed the attorney general 
that the FBI had successfully captured a group of German saboteurs, all of whom had 
spent considerable time living in the U.S. Just two weeks prior, these Germans had 
landed in the U.S. in two groups, one in New York, the other in Florida, complete with 
plans of key railway centers, power plants, and bridges. Ever since Germany declared 
war on the U.S., these men had been training at a sabotage school near Berlin. They 
arrived in the U.S. with forged documents, enough TNT to cause unimaginable damage, 
and $175,000. A quick-thinking U.S. coast guardsman surprised the group of saboteurs 
on Long Island, who responded by trying to buy the young man off with a $350 bribe. 
The saboteurs escaped, but the guard reported the whole incident to his superior, and the 
FBI took over the case. Fortunately, the leader of this group of Germans, George John 
Dasch, double-crossed his accomplices, travelled to Washington, D.C., and revealed the 
entire plan to the FBI. Dasch hated the Nazis and had spent seventeen months in a 
concentration camp. Nothing would have pleased him more than to sabotage Adolf 
Hitler’s plans.  
When Biddle reported back to the President to let him know that the FBI had all 
eight German spies in custody, Roosevelt responded in his own humorous way, “Let’s 
make some real money out of them. Sell the rights to Barnum and Bailey for a million 
and a half—the rights to take them around the country in lion cages at so much a head.” 
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As Biddle recalled, this was a typical reaction from the President, who “had a smack of 
Old Testament retributive justice about him—a tooth for a tooth….”164 
The next step concerned what to do with these captured Germans. They had not 
actually committed any acts of sabotage. Biddle was not even sure that he could try them 
in a civil court for attempted espionage, given the fact that both groups landed by boat in 
locations that were too far away from their intended targets. As Biddle put it, “If a man 
buys a pistol, intending murder, that is not an attempt at murder.” He could have tried 
them under a broader federal law concerning conspiracy, but the men would only serve 
three years in prison at most. What Biddle wanted to do was try them before a military 
court, on charges of penetrating U.S. defenses “for the purpose of waging war by 
destruction of life and property, for which under the law of war the death penalty could 
be inflicted.”165 
This seemed the best course of action, but it raised a legal challenge: two of the 
Germans were American citizens, and it was illegal to try U.S. civilians in a military 
court. The Supreme Court had ruled in Ex parte Milligan nearly eighty years earlier in 
1866 that the law of war “can never be applied to citizens where the courts are open and 
their process unobstructed.”166 As far as Biddle was concerned, though, Milligan did not 
apply in this case, as these men were not prisoners of war, but instead spies, and such 
individuals “had always been subject to the swift penalty of military trial.” The President 
agreed, and in a memo to Biddle stated that the two American citizens in captivity were 
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clearly guilty of high treason, while the remaining six Germans had been sent by the 
German government in a submarine and had been captured wearing civilian clothing. 
Surely that would be enough to try them as spies in a military court. Then, in a 
paradoxical way typical of Roosevelt, the President—who just a year earlier had argued 
for human rights at home and abroad—told Biddle, “I want one thing clearly understood, 
Francis: I won’t give them up...I won’t hand them over to any United States marshal 
armed with a writ of habeas corpus. Understand?”167 
Biddle successfully lobbied both to try the German saboteurs in a special military 
commission and to lead the prosecution, which was highly unusual given the fact that he 
was a civilian. It would have been more appropriate for the the Judge Advocate General 
for the Army, Major General Myron Cramer, to serve as the chief prosecutor, but he had 
never argued a case before the Supreme Court. Biddle had done so for more than a year 
as solicitor general, and he was determined to represent the federal government. “We 
have to win in the Supreme Court,” Biddle told President Roosevelt, “ or there will be a 
hell of a mess.” “You’re damned right there will be, Mr. Attorney General,” Roosevelt 
replied.168 The trial lasted not even a month, from July 8 to August 3, and Biddle’s 
experience as solicitor general paid off. He focused on the concept of the law of war, 
arguing that it originated from a string of laws, military codes, and even the Hague 
Conventions. He said that an ancient law of war permitted governments to shoot enemy 
spies on sight, but he preferred to follow the U.S. Military Manual, which stated that 
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spies were entitled “to court-martial if not caught hot in the act but later arrested.”169 In 
fact, Biddle recalled that throughout this trial, he received numerous letters and telegrams 
from individuals who felt these German saboteurs did not deserve a trial at all. One 
correspondent, Senator Dennis Chavez (D-NM), suggested that “some of the strong-arm 
boys in the FBI should be allowed to sock the Germans around a little.”170 In the end, all 
eight men were found guilty and sentenced to death by electric chair, though Roosevelt 
commuted the sentences of two saboteurs who turned state’s evidence. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of this case and determined in 
Ex parte Quirin that it was indeed constitutional to try the captured Germans in a military 
court. Chief Justice Harlan Stone declared, “From the very beginning of its history, this 
Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including the status, rights and duties 
of enemy nations as well as individuals.” Stone’s statement was significant enough that, 
just a few years later, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg quoted it. 
The IMT sought to demonstrate that the law of war was concerned with individuals, who 
could be punished under international law, and the Quirin case affirmed this point.171 
While Biddle had won an important case for the federal government, Robert 
Jackson, who had just joined the Supreme Court the previous year, was grappling with 
human rights issues surrounding the Quirin ruling. He initially drafted a concurring 
opinion but never published it, deciding it would be better to allow Stone’s ruling to 
speak for the Court. An analysis of Jackson’s draft opinion reveals that his loyalties to 
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Roosevelt were still strong, as he believed the President was well within his authority as 
Commander-in-Chief “to create a non-statutory military tribunal of the sort here in 
question.”172 Essentially, Jackson questioned whether or not the Court had the authority 
to review the President’s actions, since this case concerned issues of national security and 
foreign policy that Jackson did not believe were part of the Court’s purview. As he put it, 
“…experience shows the judicial system is ill-adapted to deal with matters in which we 
must present a united front to a foreign foe.” Most significantly, Jackson declared that the 
U.S. should not concern itself with granting “individual rights to prisoners of war against 
military authorities,” since “our enemies would never reciprocate.”173 Even though 
Jackson never released this opinion to the public, his statement reveals a direct conflict 
with the idea of universal human rights, that everybody, everywhere is entitled to the 
same protections under the law. Jackson did not believe the U.S. should extend a 
magnanimous hand to those who would not extend the same in return. As he saw it, there 
was no reason to analyze the fairness or legality of this military trial since the U.S. was at 
war, so the same rule of law did not apply. Jackson’s attitude in this case, in light of the 
role he would play just three years later in developing and executing the Nuremberg 
Trial, was certainly ironic. 
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Japanese Internment 
The greatest test of Biddle’s ideals while serving as attorney general came after 
December 7, 1941. On that day, Biddle had been speaking at a Masonic Temple in 
Detroit to sell defense bonds when he heard the news that Japan had bombed Pearl 
Harbor. “I told my listeners that they would always remember the day they held a 
patriotic rally…because on that day even as I was speaking the Japs were bombing our 
country….”174 That same night, the President held an emergency cabinet meeting, and he 
shared that he would ask Congress to declare war the following day. As Biddle returned 
to his office, he discovered that arrangements had already been made to begin detaining 
Japanese immigrants. Within a few days, as both Germany and Italy declared war on the 
U.S., Biddle went to the President for his signature authorizing the attorney general to 
intern enemy aliens. “I was determined to avoid mass internment, and the persecution of 
aliens that had characterized the First World War,” Biddle wrote. But Roosevelt was 
determined to round up as many aliens as he felt necessary to strengthen American 
security. “I don’t care so much about the Italians,” Roosevelt declared, “they are a lot of 
opera singers, but the Germans are different, they may be dangerous.”175 According to 
Biddle, the first wave of internment included more than 5,000 immigrants, about half of 
whom were German. The attorney general visited an internment camp in Bismarck, North 
Dakota to speak with some of the internees and hear their grievances. Biddle noted that 
one man, a “Herr Professor-type,” complained that the internees did not receive as much 
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butter as the American troops, which, as he saw it, was a violation of the Geneva 
Convention pertaining to humane treatment of prisoners. Biddle dismissed his complaint 
as “wonderfully Teutonic.”176 
Although the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, Biddle reported that there was 
“little hysteria...until the West Coast suddenly discovered the Japanese were a menace.” 
Someone threw a rock through a store owned by an American man of Japanese ancestry, 
“an energetic idiot” in Washington chopped down Japanese cherry blossoms, and some 
employers began to let go of their Japanese workers. Biddle leapt to action to condemn 
these behaviors. “It was stupid,” Biddle insisted, “to exclude the great mass of skilled 
labor represented by the enemy alien population.” He appealed to the country’s governors 
for assistance in placating people’s fears, and they overwhelmingly supported him.177  
Public pressure was mounting, though, and by January, the Justice Department 
had taken steps to address alien enemies, mostly the Japanese, on the West Coast. In a 
memo on January 30, 1942, Biddle updated the President on the Department’s efforts. All 
disloyal aliens were immediately taken into custody and their weapons, cameras, and 
radios confiscated. Biddle noted that “American born Japanese, being citizens, cannot be 
apprehended or treated like alien enemies,” but in the same paragraph, emphasized that 
such individuals could probably be evacuated and that “the writ of habeas corpus could 
be suspended in case of an emergency.”178  
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The following month, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, making it possible 
for the U.S. Army to exclude people from “military areas.” This allowed Lieutenant 
General John L. DeWitt—commanding officer of the Pacific Coast—to designate the 
whole Pacific Coast a “military area,” exclude Japanese Americans from their homes in 
California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona, and relocate them to internment camps. 
Biddle was in charge of registering aliens during the war and supervising their relocation 
and internment. He did not support mass internment of Japanese Americans, calling the 
program “ill-advised,” “unnecessary,” and “cruel,” and he especially opposed the notion 
that the Nisei (children of Japanese immigrants born in the U.S., making them American 
citizens) should lose their rights, be “deprived of their normal way of living, set apart 
from other Americans, and forced into camps as potential enemies of their country.”179 
Biddle devoted an entire chapter in his memoirs to this tragic event in American history 
and placed most of the blame on the way the President and the War Department, 
including Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, 
and the aforementioned DeWitt, responded to Americans’ fears of Japanese 
immigrants.180 He essentially concluded that the whole episode was a response to public 
pressure. Stimson did not think relocation and internment was a good idea either, and 
anyone who had been on the ground on the West Coast knew that Japanese Americans 
were loyal to the U.S.181 Biddle lamented years later that he had not done more to stop 
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Japanese internment: “I was new to the Cabinet, and disinclined to insist on my view to 
an elder statesman [Stimson] whose wisdom and integrity I greatly respected.”182  
However, Biddle shares some of the responsibility for this ugly and 
unconstitutional episode. As historian Roger Daniels points out, even before Roosevelt’s 
executive order, Biddle had issued Justice Department regulations closing America’s 
borders with Canada and Mexico to all Japanese people, whether they were American 
citizens or aliens. Though Biddle’s department claimed there was a difference between 
Japanese people who had become American citizens and those who had not, this 
distinction only existed on paper.183 Then, nearly two years after Roosevelt’s executive 
order, Biddle paved the way for Japanese Americans to renounce their citizenship and be 
deported to Japan. By the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, thousands of Japanese 
internees felt the country had violated their due process rights, and even Biddle and other 
officials were confident that the courts would consider internment unconstitutional (this 
was before the Supreme Court had ruled on the Korematsu case). If this happened, then 
all the internees, including the “disloyal” ones who posed a threat to the country—
according to Biddle’s director of alien enemy control program, Edward J. Ennis—would 
be free. The Justice Department needed a way to detain these “militant disloyals” so that 
they could not pose a risk to the country or the general public.184 Thus, Biddle worked on 
the Renunciation (or Denationalization) Act of 1944, which allowed such individuals to 
renounce their American citizenship so that they could be deported. Under existing U.S. 
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law at the time, based on the Nationality Act of 1940, only convicted traitors could lose 
their citizenship and be deported. Biddle succeeded in convincing Congress to amend the 
Nationality Act as follows:   
 
making in the United States a formal written renunciation of nationality 
in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be 
designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall 
be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve such 
renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense.185 
 
 
The President signed the bill into law on July 1, 1944. No one could have predicted, 
though, that five months later the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of 
Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 and the Japanese internment camps in Korematsu v. 
United States. Among the Nisei, 5,589 individuals renounced their citizenship, though 
nearly all of them later argued that they had acted under duress, and as a result, the courts 
reversed these decisions.186  
Biddle hardly gave this program a second thought until more than a year later 
when he was in Nuremberg. In a letter to his wife, Katherine, on March 8, 1946, Biddle 
explained that one of his advisers, Herbert Wechsler, came by to see him that evening 
around 11 p.m. and stayed until midnight because he was “worried about an attack on the 
Japanese renunciation program” that he had run under Biddle’s close supervision. Biddle 
then made a casual remark in the next sentence that is striking, as he revealed to his most 
intimate confidant his true feelings on this issue: “How the pendulum swings! Perhaps in 
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a year the public will be saying those poor Nazi leaders that the Military Tribunal 
crucified!”187 Although at first glance it appears Biddle was comparing Japanese 
internees to Nazi leaders, the point he was trying to make concerned the fickle nature of 
public opinion. While Americans supported Japanese internment and the renunciation 
program Biddle instituted, the Supreme Court had ruled in Ex parte Endo on December 
18, 1944, that the federal government could not imprison loyal American citizens. 
Roosevelt’s administration had to rescind the exclusion order and allow Japanese 
Americans to return to the West Coast in January 1945. As the war was coming to an 
end, numerous news articles made the American public aware of the struggles Japanese 
Americans faced in finding homes and jobs.188 Wechsler, or “Wex” as Biddle often called 
him, was concerned that the plight of Japanese Americans would generate sympathy for 
them and turn public opinion against the renunciation program that he managed. Biddle 
irreverently speculated that something similar might happen with regard to the defendants 
on trial at Nuremberg.  
Biddle’s reaction reveals the conflict within him, which World War II only 
exacerbated. For instance, he opposed limitations on free speech, except when he felt 
pressure to restrict it during the war. He opposed Japanese internment but complied with 
the President’s order, even convincing Congress to pass the Renunciation Act. Biddle’s 
inconsistencies reveal how easy it is to violate human rights when it serves a larger 
agenda. This does not excuse Biddle’s role in violating individual freedom in the early to 
                                                 
187 Letter from Francis Biddle to Katherine Biddle, March 8, 1946, FBB Papers, Syracuse 
University, Box 19, Correspondence Transcripts.  
188 The New York Times ran several articles on this topic throughout 1945. 
92 
mid-1940s, but it shows that the development of human rights was complicated and 
messy, and while it would be easy to label Biddle a hypocrite, such a conclusion would 
only apply to a narrow aspect of his life. There was still time for the Pennsylvania 
patrician to redeem himself, and he did. 
Japanese internment stayed with Biddle for the rest of his life, influencing his 
decisions at Nuremberg and his vision for the U.S. in the postwar world. Never again 
would he allow the experience of others to prevail when he knew his view was the wiser 
course. This helps explain why Biddle was so determined to be the most influential voice 
among the judges at Nuremberg. As explained in Chapter VIII, Biddle initially lobbied 
hard to become president of the Tribunal, but once that failed, he made sure to sit next to 
the British judge who had been chosen as president. Throughout his correspondence and 
other personal writings at Nuremberg, Biddle often bragged that he was essentially in 
charge. In the postwar period, Biddle began advocating for increased U.S. involvement in 
world affairs, even writing a book on the subject depicting the U.S. as The World’s Best 
Hope (see Chapter XII). He also tried to join the U.N. as the U.S. representative on the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), an influential division that influenced human 
rights policy on a global scale. While Biddle’s role in Japanese internment haunted him, 
it also impelled him to pursue his life’s greatest work. 
The Yalta Memo 
Members of Roosevelt’s administration had been working since at least 1942 to 
make sure that anyone who had committed “barbaric crimes…against civilian 
populations in occupied countries, particularly on the continent of Europe…shall answer 
93 
for them before courts of law.”189 Part of that process included forming a war crimes 
commission to investigate suspected perpetrators. Thus, on March 30, 1943, the State 
Department asked Roosevelt if he “could spare the Attorney General” so that he could 
serve as Chairman of a newly-formed commission to investigate war crimes—which 
became the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC).190 The President then 
sent a two-sentence memorandum to Biddle asking, “Will you do it? It would be much 
the best choice.”191 Biddle declined, however, without offering a detailed explanation, 
saying only that he felt he “should not take the assignment.”192 
Even though Biddle did not participate in the UNWCC, he continued to work on a 
plan to punish captured war criminals. Working with Assistant Secretary of War John 
(Jack) McCloy, Colonel Murray C. Bernays of the Army General Staff, U.S. Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union Joseph Davies, and Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler, 
around the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, Biddle drafted a memo to the 
President, which became the Yalta Memorandum (or Communique), named after the 
Yalta Conference that was scheduled for February 4 through February 11, 1945. Biddle’s 
team intended for the President to use the memo “at the Big Three Conference for the 
punishment of War Criminals, which in substance provides for punishment by military 
tribunals….” It explained that the U.S. opposed summary execution of someone like 
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Adolf Hitler because “it would be violative of the most fundamental principles of justice, 
common to all the United Nations.” In addition, Biddle feared that killing these suspects 
would increase the chances that they would become martyrs. The memo suggested 
punishing convicted criminals with “imprisonment at hard labor,” and Biddle’s 
interlineation directly afterward reads “instead of  this Death penalty.”193 The memo also 
advocated holding a trial since “condemnation of these criminals after a trial, moreover, 
would command maximum public support in our own times and receive the respect of 
history.” In addition, a trial would create “an authentic record of Nazi crimes and 
criminality” that the entire world could study so that there would be no doubt as to the 
veracity of the German suspects’ crimes.194 
The President had been entertaining the idea of holding an international trial, but 
his Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., had initially gotten his attention 
with a plan to execute Nazi Germany’s leadership and completely dismantle German 
industry (see Chapter III). In an attempt to strengthen their case that the President 
should support a military trial, Biddle and his team drew up a list of “Famous Instances 
of the Use of Military Tribunals to Try Civilians,” which included examples from the 
Revolutionary War, War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and 
the Great War. Biddle claimed that such practices were quite common throughout 
America’s early history, pointing out that Andrew Jackson “made frequent use of the 
special type of court-martial during the War of 1812 while he was in command of the 
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American forces at New Orleans.” He also argued that as recently as the Great War, 
courts-martial tried German spies—to say nothing of Biddle’s involvement in the 
German saboteur case in 1942. Apparently, the Yalta Memo and Biddle’s accompanying 
documentation was enough to convince the President to support a trial, as he dispatched 
his close adviser, Judge Samuel Rosenman, to begin hammering out the details with other 
Allied nations.195 
The Yalta Memo is significant because it demonstrates that Biddle convinced the 
President to support a war crimes trial and was present at the birth of Nuremberg. As a 
result, Biddle played a key role in the development of international human rights law. 
Historian Michael Marrus claims that Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the primary 
author of the Yalta Memorandum, but an analysis of archival documents indicates that 
Biddle played a far more substantial role than has been previously understood.196 His 
involvement, however, became controversial when President Truman chose him to be the 
American judge at Nuremberg. 
America’s Judge  
 In one of Biddle’s last official acts as attorney general, he delivered a radio 
address on April 29, 1945, to respond to the historic gathering of delegates at the San 
Francisco Conference, where the U.N. would officially come into existence. He 
expressed his utmost confidence that the delegates would create an organization that 
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would secure “the law of peace” instead of “the law of force.” He spoke with pride that 
the nations of the world chose to “lay the foundations of international order” in the U.S., 
“a nation that has given scope to man’s insistent need for life and the pursuit of his own 
happiness.”197 It was an expected speech from the country’s highest-ranking lawyer, and 
it represented Biddle’s commitment to multilateralism and America’s new role in the 
world. Soon after delivering this speech, Biddle resigned. 
Biddle became the American judge at Nuremberg because President Truman felt 
sorry for him. As Jackson remembered years later, Truman confessed he wanted to 
appoint Biddle to “compensate for what he felt had been perhaps rather rough 
treatment.”198 The President had his secretary send a letter to Biddle to ask him to resign 
as attorney general. Biddle dutifully agreed, but he felt the President should have called 
for him and asked him in person for his resignation. Instead, Biddle had to set up a 
meeting with the President, who admitted he did not want to face Biddle. In Biddle’s 
view, the President’s handling of the matter seemed “abrupt and undignified,” and it 
affected Biddle’s spirits, especially since Truman confessed that he was not dissatisfied 
with Biddle’s record or performance as attorney general.199 He simply wanted to appoint 
his own man, Tom C. Clark. As a consolation prize, Biddle was given the opportunity to 
join the IMT. 
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Jackson did not want Biddle to serve as the American judge at Nuremberg. He 
wanted Owen J. Roberts, who had announced his retirement from the Supreme Court in 
the summer of 1945, instead. In a clear display of conflict of interest, Jackson met with 
the President to decide on the American member of the Tribunal and suggested Roberts. 
Roberts seemed interested in the position at first, but after talking the matter over with his 
wife, he declined, saying that “he had worked so hard and so long that he was entitled to 
a vacation.”200 According to Jackson, the President then said that Biddle was his next 
choice, and that he had already expressed interest in accepting: “The President said, of 
course, it was subject to my approval, but he desired to make the appointment.”201 
Clearly Truman was in over his head, having just recently taken the oath of office, since 
he apparently saw nothing wrong with allowing Jackson, the chief U.S. prosecutor, to 
have a say in choosing the judge who would represent the U.S. at Nuremberg.  
Instead of acceding to Truman’s wishes, Jackson suggested the next person on 
their list, hoping that he might still be able to sway the President. That individual 
happened to be North Carolina judge John J. Parker. Parker’s supporters hoped President 
Truman would nominate him for Justice Roberts’s vacant seat on the Supreme Court, 
especially since Parker had been nominated for the Court in 1930 but failed to receive 
Senate confirmation (see Chapter V). Jackson knew Parker professionally and 
apparently felt he was a serious contender for the appointment, reminding Truman that if 
he planned to nominate Parker for the Supreme Court, then it did not make sense to 
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choose him for the IMT. “The President flatly said he would not appoint Parker to the 
Supreme Court,” Jackson recalled, “but he saw no reason why he wouldn’t make a good 
member of the tribunal….” In the end, though, Jackson chose not to ruffle the President’s 
feathers: “I told him that I had no personal reasons to object to Biddle if it was the desire 
of the President to appoint him.” The matter was closed: Truman would ask Biddle to be 
the American judge and Parker to be his alternate.202 
Jackson was not pleased with the President’s selection. In a conversation with 
Biddle at his private residence, Jackson told him that he “would not consider him in a list 
that I would suggest [to the President], partly because of his political relations to the 
administration and partly because of his relations to the case.” What Jackson was 
referring to was the Yalta Memo that Biddle helped draft before February 1945 while he 
was attorney general. Jackson speculated that Biddle’s involvement in drafting the Yalta 
Memo may have disqualified him from participating at Nuremberg since that document 
recommended creating an international trial of the major war criminals and outlined an 
implementation strategy for collecting evidence to use against them. Jackson’s concerns 
were ironic since he, as the Chief U.S. prosecutor, could have been accused of similar 
conflicts of interest when he took part in the London Conference during the summer of 
1945, which created the Nuremberg Trial’s legal framework and gave it the authority to 
try the German war criminals. Despite Jackson ‘s concerns, though, Biddle argued that 
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the memo did not reflect a conflict of interest and that he was indeed eligible to serve as 
the American judge. Truman apparently agreed.203 
However, Biddle had personal qualms about participating in the Trial. In 
particular, he was concerned about being away from his wife for an extended period of 
time and asked Jackson if Mrs. Biddle could accompany him. Jackson adamantly refused:  
 
I told him that in my judgment that was a mistake, that Europe was full 
of young men who wanted to get home and others who wanted to get 
their wives or relatives to Europe, and that both groups were being 
turned down. I added that there was considerable feeling anyway against 
civilians who went in after the war. I also pointed out the inconvenience 
of life in Nuremberg and the lack of freedom. 
 
 
Jackson made his position clear and thought Biddle would drop the matter. He discovered 
later that Biddle had gone around him and asked the President for special permission to 
bring Katherine Biddle with him, which the President gladly gave. Only then did Biddle 
accept the President’s appointment, much to Jackson’s chagrin. 
 Most everyone on Jackson’s staff was disappointed with Biddle’s appointment, 
especially Jackson. Years later, he speculated that had he objected strongly enough, he 
could have successfully blocked Biddle’s appointment, but the President was limited in 
whom he could pick. Most judges were unwilling to leave their work to participate in an 
international trial, especially one that was unprecedented and would require a great deal 
of planning to execute. In addition, all of the other candidates Jackson and Truman 
considered for the Tribunal, such as John J. McCloy and Robert P. Pattinson, had been 
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part of Roosevelt’s administration and were just as connected to all of the war crimes trial 
planning as Biddle had been. “[I]t was hard to find anybody that would be better, all 
things considered,” Jackson lamented near the end of his life. 204 
With Biddle on board to serve as the American judge at Nuremberg, all that was 
left for President Truman to do was choose someone to serve as Biddle’s alternate. He 
turned to John J. Parker, whom both Jackson and Biddle recommended. 
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CHAPTER V 
JOHN J. PARKER - THE TAR HEEL
 
Born and raised in Monroe, North Carolina, in 1885, John Parker had a diverse 
family tree whose branches could not have been more different. On his father’s side, 
Parker came from a modest family that had resided in rural North Carolina since before 
the 1770s. On his mother’s side, Parker had several notable ancestors, including Samuel 
I. Johnston, Surveyor-General of the Carolina colony; Abner Nash, governor of North 
Carolina during the American Revolution; and James Iredell, an associate justice of the 
first Supreme Court of the United States in 1790. His father was an uneducated and not 
very successful town merchant, while his mother was a “highly intelligent, refined, and 
well educated woman who was much loved and respected in the community.”205 The 
family was not wealthy, and there was no money for college, so at the age of thirteen, 
Parker began working, first for his father and then for Belk’s clothing store. As political 
scientist William C. Burris put it,  
 
Thus, in terms of wealth, family name, immediate family connections, 
paternal occupation, and record of public service, the early life of Parker 
is characterized by few, if any, of the advantages which have contributed 
significantly to the careers of a majority of the men who have served in 
the federal judiciary.206  
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This makes Parker’s career accomplishments that much more impressive. As a boy, 
Parker “’never learned to play,’ and gave little or no attention to sports and the usual 
pastimes of his age group.”207 He cared more for academics than he did athletics and 
gained a reputation for being a great debater. He knew he wanted to be a lawyer, and he 
never wavered from that goal. 
Parker attended The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) where he 
studied the standard liberal arts courses in English, math, science, philosophy, and 
history, as well as Latin, Greek, and French. He had a knack for politics and served as 
president of his class during his freshman and senior years, president of the Student 
Council, and president of Phi Beta Kappa, the nation’s oldest and most prestigious honor 
society. He was also an active member of the university’s debating team and became 
known for his eloquence and logic. He loved his philosophy courses with Professor 
Horace Williams and stayed in touch with him once he became a judge. Parker continued 
to work at Belk’s while in college, and Henry Belk noted that Parker was kind to all 
customers, regardless of race. “When an old colored woman came along and stopped in 
front of the store,” Belk said, “John went out and helped her out of the buggy and held 
the umbrella over her until she got out of the rain.  It was a nice thing to do, and it was 
just like John to do a thing like that.”208 Even though segregation was becoming 
entrenched in North Carolina by this point—and Parker was not immune to this reality—
                                                 
207 Ibid., 20. 
208 Ibid., 22; LeGette Blythe, William Henry Belk:  Merchant of the South (Chapel Hill: UNC, 
1950), 48; Ed Ayers, Southern Crossing: A History of the American South, 1877-1906 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 90. 
103 
he could still be polite and gentlemanly. His days at Belk’s ended once he earned his 
bachelor’s degree in 1907 and remained at UNC to study law.  
During Parker’s time as a law student, UNC’s law school had not yet adopted the 
case method that Harvard and other law schools were using, though that would later 
change over Parker’s protests.209 Thus, Parker’s legal education was grounded in legal 
theory. He learned the law by studying William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England and by listening to his instructors’ lectures. The law school’s stated objectives 
were to “teach the principles of jurisprudence…to give the student a proper 
foundation…through the comprehension of theoretical principles and a development of 
his reasoning faculties in the logical application of these principles to practical statements 
of fact.”210  
Parker emerged from UNC with a strong foundation in natural law, which 
provided the framework upon which he later advocated for human rights. He believed 
that there were eternal principles of “justice and right” that originated from the natural 
world, and it was his responsibility to interpret them according to the particular 
circumstance “in order to serve the dignity and well being of man.”211 This is not to say 
that Parker was closed off to other legal philosophies, but none of them resonated with 
him in the same way that natural law did during these formative years. It was actually 
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while he was in Nuremberg in 1946 that Parker provided the clearest explanation of his 
legal philosophy: 
 
…it is hard for me to believe that the [legal] positivists have ever 
plumbed the real depths of legal thinking. Law is not something imposed 
from without, as the positivists like [John] Austin seem to think. It arises 
out of life; and the more I see of different legal systems the more I 
believe in the theory of natural law which finds the basis of law in the 
moral foundations of society.212 
 
 
Legal positivism was a popular legal theory in the 1800s and early 1900s based on the 
premises that humans create laws, laws are not connected to morals, and laws act as 
commands that people must follow. Positivism was a reaction against natural law, which 
held that legal principles came from eternal, immutable truths about the moral universe. 
By rationally studying human nature, proponents of natural law believed it was possible 
to create laws that reinforced moral behavior. Legal positivists disagreed, especially with 
the idea that law and morality were necessarily connected. Whereas a natural law theorist 
might argue that human beings within society should not kill one another because such 
actions violate a transcendent moral code, a legal positivist might counter that people 
should not commit murder because the law forbids it, and the law exists to maintain order 
and prevent chaos.  
Parker, like Francis Biddle, was also exposed to international law through his law 
school curriculum. Although Harvard’s law school was the most prestigious in the 
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country, UNC’s law program was respectable in its own right.213 International law 
appeared as an elective in the 1876-1877 catalog, and by the 1893-1894 academic year, it 
was a requirement for the LL.B. degree.214 While Parker was in law school from 1907 to 
1908, he took courses on international law from Kemp Plummer Battle and James 
MacRae. Battle’s course on Constitutional History and International Law included 
“lectures on the leading principles in International Law.”215 The course textbook for 
MacRae’s 1908 course was George B. Davis’ Outlines of International Law: With An 
Account of Its Origins and Sources and of its Historical Development. Davis had served 
in the U.S. military during the Civil War and the War of 1898, taught history and law at 
West Point, and represented the U.S. as a delegate to the Second Hague Conference in 
1907, just like James Brown Scott whom he references in the Preface to his Second 
Edition. Davis’ book first appeared in print in 1887, but the third edition came out in 
1908 to include the results of the Second Hague Conference.216 
It is significant that both Parker and Biddle received formal training in 
international law at a time when the field was rapidly changing, as the nations of the 
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world sought more peaceful ways to resolve conflict. Both law students were exposed to 
ideas on international law from the foremost American experts on the subject, men who 
had taken part in the Second Hague Conference and were actively involved in rewriting 
the protocols for foreign relations.  
Parker graduated from law school in 1908 and began practicing law in 
Greensboro, North Carolina. Two years later, on November 23, 1910, he married Maria 
Burgwin Maffitt of Wilmington. Over the next decade and a half, the couple had three 
children: Sara (“Suggie”), John, Jr., and Francis.  
Republican Politics 
While in Greensboro, Parker left the political party of his parents and became a 
Republican, a curious decision considering that it had almost no power or relevance in 
the state after the Democratic victories of the 1890s. Democrats worked to defeat the so-
called “Fusion Party” of Republicans and Populists throughout the decade, and in 1899, 
they successfully broke up this coalition by disfranchising thousands of blacks and poor 
whites through required poll taxes and literacy tests. This allowed Democratic candidate 
Charles B. Aycock to unseat the Republican governor, Daniel Russell, during the 1900 
gubernatorial race. Thus, Aycock was governor when Parker first went to college, and the 
Democratic Party controlled the governorship throughout his time at UNC. In fact, Parker 
would never live to see another Republican governor in the state of North Carolina. He 
died in 1958, fifteen years before a Republican again occupied the governor’s mansion.217  
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Parker’s reasons for joining the Republican Party are difficult to discern. Political 
scientist William Burris attempted to address this issue in his 1964 dissertation. He 
interviewed Parker’s brother, Sam, who claimed that, even in his youth, Parker had 
admired the National Republican Party for creating what he viewed as “tremendous 
business and industrial expansion” after the Civil War. Parker believed government 
should “create a climate in which business could flourish and that a healthy economy 
would best develop if government regulation remaind [sic] at a minimum.” Sam also 
noted that Parker’s political orientation had begun to shift while he was in college. Parker 
himself said he was proud that “God Almighty gave me the courage to do my duty as I 
saw it” and abandon the party of his father. He also made it clear that he would just as 
soon leave the Republican Party if he felt it did not agree with his principles.218 Years 
later, he admitted that he found “an element of truth in the positions of both” liberalism 
and conservatism, “and that the whole truth is to be found only in a [Hegelian] synthesis 
of their positions.”219 Thus, Burris declared, “In 1908, the Democratic Party no longer 
stood for the principles in which [Parker] believed and he could not in good conscious 
continue to support its leadership.” Parker, it seems, did not care if his party affiliation 
would sabotage his political aspirations in North Carolina; he had to remain true to his 
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principles, and Burris suggested that Parker hoped he could still pursue a political career 
by running for national office.220  
Although it would seem logical to conclude that Parker became a Republican 
because the party aligned more closely with his views on the role of government in 
promoting business, the historical record says otherwise. Parker initially sought to work 
for the Democratic Party. In 1908, just before joining the Republicans, Parker went to the 
local Democratic Party office in Greensboro and offered to campaign for the party for a 
fee, but the Democratic State Chairman refused.221 Burris says that Parker registered as a 
Republican soon thereafter and never regretted his decision, even though he undoubtedly 
would have been a more successful political candidate had he run as a Democrat. This 
suggests that pettiness, rather than principles, drove Parker away from the Democrats and 
into the arms of the Republicans. 
Another interpretation of Parker’s political affiliation came years later from 
someone who became one of Parker’s judicial colleagues, Harold Medina of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals. After Parker’s death in 1958, Medina eulogized Parker in the 
North Carolina Law Review and briefly touched on Parker’s politics. He stated that 
Parker joined with the Republicans “just to be different, although this might have been 
true without his realizing it, as he was above all an individualist and never ran with the 
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pack.”222 Parker was his own man and did not need to go along with everyone else, which 
is evident in his opposition toward fraternities while he was at UNC.223 
Scholars may never fully understand Parker’s reasons for joining the Republican 
Party, but the above analyses demonstrate the complexity of this issue. It is as if Parker 
faced a dilemma between being loyal to his parents (even though his father had passed 
away by that time and his mother was quite ill) or to his principles. He respected his 
ancestors’ political views, but college had exposed him to new ways of thinking and 
different methods of governing. He realized that Republican ideology was simply a better 
fit for him, but rather than immediately joining, he approached the Democratic State 
Chairman with a bizarre offer that he knew would be refused. This allowed Parker to 
claim that he attempted to join the Democrats but ultimately had to side with the 
opposition.  
As a member of the Republican Party, Parker unsuccessfully ran for three public 
offices: the U.S. seventh congressional district in 1910; North Carolina Attorney General 
in 1916; and, as previously mentioned, North Carolina governor in 1920, earning 42.8 
percent of the vote. It is unlikely that Parker would have gained enough support to run for 
governor had he been a Democrat, seeing as how he would have had to challenge 
Lieutenant Governor O. Max Gardner and Cameron Morrison in the primary. Since he 
was a Republican, though, a party that had no real power in the state, he was able to run 
without the same kind of political experience or contacts as his opponents. Even though 
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Parker lost to Morrison, there did not seem to be any hard feelings between the two, as 
Governor Morrison appointed Parker to chair a fundraising committee for a memorial to 
the late President Warren G. Harding.224  
The 1920 gubernatorial race is especially important toward understanding 
Parker’s early political views on race. North Carolina’s Republican Party did not hold 
any political capital in 1920 and suffered frequent criticism for supposedly being the 
party of blacks.225 Parker was well aware of this and aligned himself with the lily-white 
faction of the Republican Party, which sought to bring back white voters who had left the 
party because they did not want to be part of an organization that included blacks.226 
While in Greensboro to accept the Republican Party’s nomination, Parker made the 
following speech: 
 
The Negro as a class does not desire to enter politics. The Republican 
party of North Carolina does not desire him to do so. We recognize the 
fact that he has not yet reached the state in his development where he 
can share the burden and responsibility of government. This being true, 
and every intelligent man in North Carolina knows that it is true, the 
attempt of certain petty Democratic politicians to inject the race issue 
into every campaign is most reprehensible. I say it deliberately, there is 
no more dangerous or contemptible enemy of the state than the men who 
for personal or political advantage will attempt to kindle the flame of 
racial prejudice and hatred. 
 
 
Parker reiterated this position a few weeks before the election, writing that the 
“Republican Party of North Carolina is as much a white man’s party as the Democratic 
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Party,” and attacking his opponent for having sat in a Democratic Party convention next 
to a “negro delegate.” This was all part of Parker’s strategy to win the white vote, but it 
came at the expense of alienating black voters. The Monroe Journal reported that blacks 
felt like Republicans had “eliminated” them from the party, and the Journal’s editor 
concluded that black voters “are not going to vote for Mr. Parker.”227 In the end, Parker 
carried only 27 of the state’s 100 counties, and that did not even include Union County, 
home of his birthplace in Monroe. The failed campaign convinced Parker to abandon a 
career in politics, but the sting of defeat stayed with him the following year when he 
returned to his law practice. 
 In 1921, Parker represented a family of white cousins from Union County 
contesting the will of their late cousin, Maggie Ross, who had died the previous year. 
Maggie Ross was a well-to-do white woman who was friendly toward blacks, particularly 
Bob Ross and his daughter, Mittie Bell Ross Houston. Bob had been like a younger 
brother to Maggie—he was thirty-three years her junior—and Mittie was like a daughter 
to her. When Mittie married Tom Houston in 1907, Maggie thought of him as her son-in-
law. Later that same year, Maggie drew up a will bequeathing 800 acres of land, 
hundreds of dollars, and two gold watches to Bob and Mittie. When Maggie died and the 
majority of her wealth passed to two black people, Maggie’s white cousins were livid. 
They felt they were Maggie’s rightful heirs, even though they were not close to her. 
During the trial, Parker attacked Maggie’s mental health, claiming that she must not have 
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been in her right mind when she drew up her will, that she lacked moral character, and 
that her actions were “a blight upon the community in which she lived.” He further 
declared that it was intolerable to even think of a “white Southern woman sleeping with a 
negro” or “eating at a table with one.” His arguments, though, were not enough to 
convince the jury to invalidate Maggie’s will, and Bob and Mittie inherited the land.228 
 Gene Stowe, a native of Monroe, North Carolina, who spent twelve years as a 
reporter for the Charlotte Observer—where he came across the case of Maggie Ross’s 
will—provides a lengthy account of this event in his book, Inherit the Land: Jim Crow 
meets Miss Maggie’s Will. Stowe depicts Parker as a “vile racist” for the way he 
characterized Maggie Ross’s treatment of blacks, and for the role he later played in 
blocking school desegregation (see Chapter XI).229 Though Parker’s repugnant attack 
was made in defense of a client, there is no evidence it represented his view of the matter 
accurately. Fresh off his failed “lily-white” campaign, Parker needed to distance himself 
from any hint of supporting racial equality, so that may have played a role in his vigorous 
attack. This does not excuse the way Parker depicted Maggie Ross, but it does provide 
necessary context that is lacking in Stowe’s account. 
Even though Parker lost the Ross will case, his reputation did not diminish. He 
joined UNC’s Board of Trustees in 1921, where he remained until his death, and UNC’s 
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Carolina Magazine featured him as a distinguished alumnus.230 In 1922, he relocated to 
Charlotte to establish Parker, Stewart, McRae and Bobbitt, and the following year earned 
an appointment as a special assistant to the U.S. attorney general.231 He still campaigned 
for his state’s party and served as National Republican Committeeman in 1924, but his 
desire to seek public office had petered out. He instead concentrated on his wildly 
successful law practice. He was renowned as a criminal lawyer who had even argued 
cases before the Supreme Court, and his reputation had increased even more when it was 
rumored that he might become a judge.232 
Parker was content with his work, and had it not been for his closest friends and 
colleagues, he never would have become a judge. They felt he could put his talents to 
better use by becoming a district judge. Parker resisted the idea. He had not envisioned 
himself in this role. “I am temperamentally unfit for a judgeship,” he wrote, “and feel 
quite certain that I would not be a good trial judge.”233 However, when a judge on the 
U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals died in the summer of 1925, Parker wanted the seat 
badly.234 The Fourth Circuit is one of twelve federal courts that has the power to review 
decisions and change the outcomes of lower district courts. Each one has jurisdiction over 
a specific geographic region, and the Fourth Circuit includes Maryland, Virginia, West 
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Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. In 1925, three judges sat on the court (that 
number has since increased to fifteen). Two of its judges hailed from Maryland and 
Virginia, so Parker felt the third judge should come from the Carolinas, making him an 
ideal candidate. He also pointed out in a letter to one of his connections in Washington 
that North and South Carolina were the only civil law states in the Fourth Circuit, 
whereas the other three were common law states.235 All of this worked in Parker’s favor, 
as he rallied the full political support of North and South Carolina. Thus, on October 3, 
1925, after seventeen years of legal experience, President Calvin Coolidge appointed 
Parker to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Parker’s meteoric rise to the Fourth Circuit garnered widespread support and 
admiration. Even some of his former political opponents were pleased with his 
appointment, and following the 1928 presidential election, President Elect Herbert 
Hoover even considered Parker for solicitor general or attorney general.236 Parker was 
also respected for making the Fourth Circuit one of the most collegial courts in the 
nation. Once he became the Fourth Circuit’s senior judge in 1931, Parker arranged 
regular meetings with district judges in an attempt to foster greater cooperation. It 
worked, and to this day, the Fourth Circuit is known for its collegiality and civility, with 
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its judges coming down from the bench after oral arguments to shake hands with the 
lawyers, a tradition Parker helped institute.237 
The Supreme Court 
In 1930, Parker became a national figure when President Herbert Hoover 
nominated him for a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court. Supreme Court Justice Edward 
T. Sanford had died on March 8, and the President felt pressured to nominate another 
Southern Republican to fill his vacancy. Although Parker had only five years of 
experience on the bench at that time, his 1920 gubernatorial campaign had caught the 
Hoover administration’s attention for two reasons. First, even though Parker lost the 
election, he received “230,000 votes, which was 63,000 votes more than any candidate 
for Governor of either party had ever received prior to that time.”238 In addition, Parker 
ran a campaign that aligned with “Hoover’s New South, lily-white elite,” calling for the 
women’s right to vote; supporting public education, public roads, and a state income tax; 
and promoting industrial development and labor protections.239 And second, Hoover had 
carried North Carolina in the 1928 election, the first time the state had voted for a 
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Republican presidential candidate since Reconstruction. The President knew that 
choosing Parker could help him win other Southern states in the 1932 election.240 
Although Parker’s 1920 gubernatorial campaign had opened the door for his 
nomination to the Supreme Court, it also shut it. The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) opposed Parker’s nomination, arguing that 
his record, while progressive for a Southern Republican, demonstrated that he was “not a 
‘friend of the Negro’ … [and] slowed the cause of racial advancement.”241 The 
organization pointed to a statement Parker had made on the campaign trail regarding 
race: 
 
But what of the Negro question. Let me say this that I believe in a square 
deal for the Negro … Experience has demonstrated that the participation 
of the Negro in the political life of the South is harmful to him and to the 
community, and is a fruitful source of that racial prejudice which works to 
his injury. As a class he has learned his lesson. He no longer desires to 
participate in politics. The Republican party of North Carolina does not 
desire him to participate in the politics of the state.242 
 
While Parker’s position on race was a benefit to him in the South, it had the opposite 
effect at the national level, thanks in large part to the NAACP’s campaign.  
Parker responded to the NAACP’s accusations that he would not uphold the 
Constitutional rights of black people in a prepared statement he submitted to the Senate 
on April 24, 1930. He labeled the association’s fears “groundless” and proclaimed that he 
had and would always uphold the rights guaranteed in the Constitution to all people. He 
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then addressed “statements alleged to have been made” ten years ago when he was 
campaigning for governor of North Carolina: 
 
My effort then was to answer those who were seeking to inject the race 
issue into the campaign under a charge that the Republican Party of 
North Carolina intended to organized the colored people and restore the 
conditions of the reconstruction era. I knew the baneful effect of such a 
campaign and sought to avoid it. For years the best men of both races in 
the State had been seeking to create friendly sentiments and peaceful 
relation between the races; and I did not want their efforts to be 
sacrificed or the party whose nominee I was to be embarrassed by the 
raising of a false issue of this character….while I made it clear that my 
party was not seeking to organize the colored people of the State as a 
class, I at no time advocated denying them the right to participate in the 
election in cases where they were qualified to do so, nor did I advocate 
denying them any other of their rights under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States.243 
 
 
Several of Parker’s judicial colleagues, representatives of the University of North 
Carolina, and members of the American Bar Association (ABA) also wrote to Senator 
Lee S. Overman (D-NC) in support of the judge’s nomination. They all described him as 
fair, open-minded, and qualified to sit on the Supreme Court.244 North Carolina Governor 
O. Max Gardner, a Democrat, also wrote to Overman to support Parker’s nomination. 
Gardner and Parker had been peers at UNC, and Gardner, while noting that the two men 
did “not subscribe to the same political faith,” described Parker as possessing the highest 
“sense of righteousness and justice.” In the final sentence of his letter, Gardener made 
this endorsement: “I have never known any man whose concern for the upholding and 
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protection of what we know in a democracy as human rights, as distinguished from 
property rights, excelled Judge Parker’s.”245 
 Parker even received support from some of North Carolina’s African American 
leaders, including J.E. Shepard, President of Winston-Salem Teachers’ College, 
(Winston-Salem State University), C. M. Eppes of the North Carolina College for 
Negroes (NC Central University), and Joseph L. Peacock, President of Shaw 
University.246 A letter from M.K. Tyson, National Executive Secretary of the National 
Association of Negro Tailors, Designers, and Dressmakers, criticized the NAACP’s 
charges against Parker, saying that the organization did “not know much about the history 
of the Negro in politics in North Carolina” and that “there is no evidence in writing that 
Judge Parker ever flouted the [fourteenth and fifteenth] amendments.”247 Although 
Parker’s supporters were quick to jump to his defense against allegations of racism, 
Walter White, the head of the NAACP who was leading the campaign against his 
Supreme Court nomination, characterized such efforts as a failed campaign consisting of 
only “two ‘Negro leaders’” whose “endorsements were exceedingly temperate.”248 
 Political scientist John Anthony Maltese argues that Parker’s views on race were 
not discriminatory given the historical context surrounding North Carolina and the South 
in 1920. Race relations at that time were particularly bad, with riots breaking out in 
several cities in 1919 and the Ku Klux Klan reemerging as a powerful force for white 
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supremacy. During the gubernatorial campaign, North Carolina’s Democrats preyed on 
white Southerners’ racial fears by claiming that Parker “was not only courting black 
votes but actively supporting the political empowerment of African Americans.” Parker 
had no choice but to respond to these race-baiting tactics, which explains why he 
commented that the man who attempts to “kindle the flame of racial prejudice and 
hatred” for his own gain is a “contemptible enemy of the state.”249 It was the Democrats, 
not Parker, who were trying to make the election about race. 
In addition to attacks from the NAACP, organized labor did not support Parker 
because he had ruled against trade unions in United Mine Workers of America v. Red 
Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Co. (1927) In that case, Parker’s ruling upheld 
“yellow-dog” employment contracts that required coal mining employees to agree not to 
join a union.250 Parker explained in his remarks before the Senate that he was merely 
following Supreme Court precedent, which “is the duty of the judges of the lower Federal 
courts [and] any other course would result in chaos….I had no latitude or discretion in 
expressing any opinion or views of my own…”251 He became frustrated with Senators, 
most notably William Borah (R-ID), who criticized him for following the law.252 Borah 
frequently compared Parker’s decision in Red Jacket to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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the Dred Scott case seventy years earlier. He argued that Parker, by following Supreme 
Court precedent, had obstructed the rights of workers when instead he should have stood 
up for them. In that same vein, Borah contended the Supreme Court’s decision against 
Dred Scott was a horrible injustice, one with which Abraham Lincoln staunchly 
disagreed.253 Borah was a progressive Republican and feared that Parker was a 
reactionary who would stall social and economic progress. The irony was that Parker’s 
reputation within North Carolina was anything but conservative, and just as his 
supporters came to his defense concerning the NAACP’s accusations, so, too, did they 
aid him against the American Federation of Labor (AFL).254  
In the end, though, Parker was branded an enemy of labor and an enemy of 
blacks, and the Senate voted 41-39 against confirmation (16 members did not vote). One 
of the nay votes came from Senator Arthur Vandenburg (R-MI) who, despite Hoover’s 
entreaties, could not risk supporting Parker because of the potential backlash it would 
have caused in his home state.255 The chamber had not rejected a Supreme Court nominee 
since 1894 and would not again until 1969.256 Had Parker’s supporters been able to flip 
just one nay vote, Vice President Charles Curtis would have broken the tie in favor of 
confirmation.  
The sting of defeat remained with Parker for the rest of his life. Fifteen years after 
his rejection while preparing some brief biographical information for the Public Relations 
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Office at Nuremberg, Parker scratched through his own handwriting when describing this 
incident (see Figure 2): “Appointed Ju Nominated by President Hoover to Supreme 
Court of U.S. by President Hoover in 1930 but appo nomination not confirmed by Senate 
by a 41-39 vote as result of a political attack.” Twice in one sentence, Parker started to 
say that he had been “appointed” or had an “appointment” to the Supreme Court, but 
corrected himself.257 
Instead of Parker joining the Supreme Court, Owen J. Roberts became the next 
associate justice. The NAACP rejoiced that its members had successfully opposed 
Parker’s nomination, but their victory was short-lived. Justice Roberts did not support 
African American causes, writing the majority’s unanimous opinion five years later in 
Grovey v. Townsend (1935), declaring that it was constitutional to hold primaries in 
which only whites could participate. In another ironic twist just seven years later when 
Roosevelt nominated Hugo Black for a seat on the Supreme Court, White and the 
NAACP voiced no objections, even though it was public knowledge that Black had been 
a member of the Ku Klux Klan. 
 
  
                                                 
257 Biographical Information, n.d., John Johnston Parker Collection of Records of the Nuremberg 
Trial of Major German War Criminals, 1945-1946., Box 13, Folder 240 - Correspondence: Personal. 
122 
Figure 2. Biographical Information Submitted by John Parker at Nuremberg 
 
 
While Parker obviously did not attain the outcome he had been hoping for, he was 
not overly disappointed from a professional standpoint. He was only 45 years old at the 
time and believed he would eventually be confirmed to the Supreme Court.258 He even 
told one of his favorite college professors, Horace Williams, that simply receiving the 
nomination would no doubt garner him a certain level of prestige, causing his “opinions 
to be more carefully scrutinized than they would otherwise be.”259 His prediction turned 
out to be true, as Parker became the Fourth Circuit’s Senior Judge on April 9, 1931, and 
that same year, Governor Gardener appointed him to a special commission to revise the 
state’s constitution. Parker’s rising star did not appear to lose any momentum. 
Personally, though, Parker did not appreciate being labeled a racist or a 
reactionary. As Burris put it, “Opposition forces in the Senate charged him with blind 
adherence to precedent and flagrant disregard of justice and human rights.”260 Parker 
never commented on his defeat, but he never got over it either. He always wondered what 
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it might have been like to hold “the highest position to which human beings can 
aspire.”261 Every time an opening appeared over the next three decades, Parker’s 
supporters hoped he would be nominated again. For instance, when Justice James 
McReynolds retired in January 1941, Parker’s friend, UNC President Frank Porter 
Graham, launched a campaign to secure Parker’s nomination. While it appeared that 
Graham’s efforts had some effect on Roosevelt, it was not enough.262 The President 
appointed U.S. Senator James Byrnes (D-SC) instead, who received confirmation on June 
12, 1941. That same day, Roosevelt nominated Justice Harlan Stone to become the new 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and then to fill Stone’s seat, he named his very own 
attorney general: Robert Jackson. Parker wrote that he was pleased with Roosevelt’s 
nominations and called both Jackson and Byrnes “good men” who “will make 
satisfactory judges. I regard Jackson as a very able man indeed.” He further stated,  
 
I am not suffering any disappointment, as I really did not expect to be 
appointed at this time. Situation may arise, however, that would give me 
hope, but I am not indulging in either hope or disappointment. If the 
appointment ever comes to me, good and well; if not, good and well. 
While I would appreciate the honor, I realize that I am much happier in 
the position that I now occupy than I would be on the Supreme Court.263 
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Despite Parker’s claims that he was happier on the Fourth Circuit than he would have 
been on the Supreme Court, there is no doubt that he would have been overjoyed to work 
in D.C. and interpret the law at the highest level.  
Remaining in North Carolina, however, allowed Parker to tend to his son, John, 
Jr., who had been in a paralyzing car accident on October 30, 1939.264 Parker had once 
held high hopes for the son who bore his namesake. John Jr. had graduated from UNC in 
1938 and moved to Massachusetts to begin his studies at Harvard Law. His time there 
was short, though, as he earned poor grades and was removed from the program. Parker 
wrote to John Jr.’s law professors to advocate on his behalf in hopes that he would be 
able to return to the law school, but John Jr. opted to transfer to UNC Law instead.265 
John Jr.’s injury was a “source of grief to all of us,” Parker reported.266 By June 1941, 
when Roosevelt was announcing his nominations to the Supreme Court, John Jr.’s 
condition was critical: “John has not been so well recently,” Parker wrote to his brother, 
Sam. “His kidneys went bad while ‘Ria [Parker’s wife] and I were at Woodberry, and 
when we returned … we found him in a pretty bad way.” This episode made it difficult 
for Parker to travel too far away from home, and he admitted that he reluctantly travelled 
to Asheville for work later that week. Unfortunately, John Jr. “had such a bad day…that I 
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came home...and have been here ever since….I am afraid that it is just a question of time 
when an attack of this sort will prove fatal to him.” 267  
By July, John Jr. had died. 
Civil Rights 
The NAACP’s opposition to Parker’s Supreme Court nomination would seem to 
suggest Parker was just another Southern, white, racist judge. His 1920 campaign 
statement on keeping blacks out of politics certainly makes him appear that way, and 
after he failed to receive Senate confirmation, he wrote that “there can be no such thing 
as social equality or intercourse between the races…” and that “the participation by the 
Negro in politics is a source of evil and danger to both races and is not desired by wise 
men in either race.”268 Years later, following the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, Parker impeded school integration by saying that while the 
Constitution forbade segregation, it did not require integration (see Chapter XI). 
Although it would be easy to label Parker a white supremacist given these examples, his 
views on civil rights issues in the 1930s and 1940s reveal instances when he ruled against 
discrimination in favor of individual rights, even when it meant breaking with Supreme 
Court precedent. Thus, it would be more accurate to characterize Parker as a dynamic 
figure who was influenced by racial prejudice in his earlier years when he attempted to 
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enter politics but whose views evolved once he became a judge and later participated in 
the Nuremberg Trial. 
Two civil rights cases that Parker heard while on the Fourth Circuit contradict the 
perception that he was a white supremacist. For instance, in 1930, Parker heard 
arguments in City of Richmond v. Deans regarding the constitutionality of a racial zoning 
ordinance in Richmond, Virginia. These ordinances, which were designed to keep 
African Americans out of white neighborhoods, began appearing after the Supreme Court 
ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) that racial segregation was legal. Baltimore, Atlanta, 
Winton-Salem, Louisville, and Richmond all had laws that prevented African Americans 
from buying houses in areas where the majority of homeowners were white. The 
Supreme Court, however, declared such ordinances unconstitutional in Buchanon v. 
Warley (1917) and Harmon v. Tyler (1927) because they denied an individual the right to 
buy and sell substantial property under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Richmond tried to bypass the Supreme Court’s ruling by basing a new 
ordinance on the city’s 1924 antimiscegenation law. The new ordinance “prohibited 
anyone from moving onto a block where the majority of residences were occupied by 
persons whom they were prohibited from marrying.”269 When Parker heard this case at 
the beginning of 1930, before President Hoover nominated him to the Supreme Court, he 
ruled against the City of Richmond, writing that even though the city claimed it based the 
law on antimiscegenation—rather than racial discrimination—the marriage law was 
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“itself based on race, [so] the question here, in final analysis, is identical with that which 
the Supreme Court has twice decided….”270 When White learned of Parker’s ruling 
against the City of Richmond, he was initially pleased that President Hoover had 
nominated him, but his opinion changed once he discovered the aforementioned 
comments Parker made during the 1920 gubernatorial campaign.271  
Ten years after City of Richmond, Parker heard arguments in Alston v. Norfolk, 
another civil rights case. Melvin O. Alston was a black teacher in Norfolk, Virginia, who 
sued the school board in 1940 because he received less pay than his white coworkers, 
even though he possessed the same qualifications and experience. The school board 
argued Alston had signed a contract that clearly listed his scheduled salary, and by doing 
so, he had waived his right to complain of unconstitutional discrimination. A lower court 
ruled in favor of the Norfolk School Board, so Parker heard the case on appeal. The 
Fourth Circuit sided with Alston on all counts and reversed the lower court’s decision. In 
writing his opinion, Parker quoted from Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan—
the so-called “Great Dissenter” of the late 1800s who opposed racial discrimination and 
the court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson—who said that “all citizens are equal before the 
law,” and that the guarantees of “life, liberty, and property are for all persons…without 
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discrimination against any because of their race.”272 In addition, Parker cited a host of 
Supreme Court cases that demonstrated the unconstitutionality of racial discrimination.273 
After reading the verdict, Parker and the other members of the Fourth Circuit 
came down from the bench to shake hands with the attorneys, as was their tradition. 
There were no hard feelings between Parker and the NAACP, which had represented 
Alston during the proceedings. Parker smiled widely as he shook hands with an up-and-
coming thirty-one-year-old black attorney named Thurgood Marshall.274 The two men 
would meet again in 1947 in Elmore v. Rice, a case involving the legality of white 
primaries. 
In addition to the civil rights cases above involving blacks, another case involving 
white litigants reveals that Parker upheld individual rights even when it conflicted with 
his personal beliefs or with Supreme Court precedent. In Barnette v. West Virginia State 
Board of Education (1942), a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a sect of Christianity, argued 
against compulsory flag saluting in West Virginia’s public schools. They believed this 
practice was tantamount to worshipping idols, and they contended that requiring them to 
do so was a violation of their religious freedom under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Just two years earlier, though, the Supreme Court had ruled 8-1 in 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) that it was constitutional to require public 
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school students to salute the American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance.275 The 
Barnett family (a court clerk accidentally added the letter “e” to their surname) filed an 
injunction in district court against the West Virginia School Board’s policy requiring 
students to salute the flag. The law required that the district judge appoint a panel of three 
federal judges to hear the case, so Parker became part of this tribunal.276  
While he was reluctant to go against the Supreme Court, Parker was a responsible 
judge who saw how the earlier Gobitis decision had led to widespread discrimination 
against Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the U.S., a tragic situation that was also 
occurring in Nazi Germany at that same time. World War II had been raging in Europe 
for four years by that point, and after the U.S. joined the fight, Americans generally 
viewed flag saluting as a patriotic expression and support for the war effort. Parker was a 
patriotic American who supported the country’s wartime objectives and even made an 
appeal to national unity in a speech before the Federal Bar Association: “There is entirely 
too much dissension and discussion in our ranks. Napoleon once said, ‘wars have been 
won by good generals; wars have been won by bad generals; but no war has ever yet been 
won by a debating society.’”277 But while Parker may not have personally agreed with an 
individual’s decision to refuse to salute the flag or say the pledge, he believed requiring 
such practices went too far. Historian Sarah Barringer Gordon argues that it was the rise 
of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany that ultimately turned Americans against compulsory 
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flag saluting, and these contemporary events would have influenced Parker’s thinking as 
well.278 
Additionally, Parker also knew that three of the Supreme Court justices who had 
originally sided with the majority in Gobitis had since regretted it, meaning that the initial 
8-1 decision would have been 5-4 if the case had been decided in 1942. Robert Jackson, 
who had been attorney general during the Gobitis case but joined the Supreme Court in 
1941, also opposed the ruling.279 Thus, Parker believed the Supreme Court’s earlier 
opinion was nugatory: 
 
…believing, as we do, that the flag salute here required is violative of 
religious liberty when required of persons holding the religious views of 
plaintiffs, we feel that we would be recreant to our duty as judges, if 
through a blind following of a decision which the Supreme Court itself 
has thus impaired as an authority, we should deny protection to rights 
which we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by 
constitutional guaranties.280 
 
 
Parker went on to borrow a phrase from the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes by 
stating that “no clear and present danger will result to anyone if the children of this sect 
are allowed to refrain from saluting because of their conscientious scruples….” Parker 
granted the injunction. 
This was the first time Parker challenged the Supreme Court on a civil rights 
issue. West Virginia’s State Board of Education immediately filed an appeal, and it 
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would have been a professional embarrassment if the Supreme Court reversed Parker’s 
ruling. The Senior Circuit judge took a calculated risk, though, believing that the court’s 
more liberal wing would side with him. He was right. Justice Robert Jackson, writing for 
the majority in a 6-3 decision, overturned Minersville v. Gobitis and affirmed Parker’s 
decision.  
Even though Parker’s rulings in the above cases upheld individual rights—and he 
enthusiastically congratulated an African American lawyer’s arguments before the Fourth 
Circuit—historian Kenneth Goings still believes Parker was little more than an 
opportunist. The Southern jurist longed for a seat on the Supreme Court and often sided 
with judicial precedent (i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis – “to stand by things decided”) 
to increase his chances of attaining a seat on the highest court in the land. Political 
scientist William Burris, in his 1964 study of Parker’s judicial record, first noted that the 
North Carolina jurist usually erred on the side of caution in his early years on the Fourth 
Circuit by siding with the Supreme Court. He was committed to the rule of law, and he 
opposed the “fallacy that ‘the law is what the judge says it is.’”281 He believed his job 
was to interpret the laws fairly based on Supreme Court precedent and the Constitution. 
In the City of Richmond case, the Supreme Court had already weighed in on the legality 
of Richmond’s racial ordinance. In Alston, the Fourteenth Amendment made clear that 
“No state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
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law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”282 
Parker had a penchant for following the rules, so it is not surprising that in these cases he 
chose the rule of law over breaking precedent. 
Goings, however, takes Burris’s argument one step further by saying that part of 
the reason Parker adhered to stare decisis was to advance his career and eventually 
become a justice on the Supreme Court. The big exception to this, though, was the 
Barnette case, but Goings avers that Parker went against the Supreme Court in that case 
because he felt it was safe to do so. Members of the Court who had initially supported 
compulsory flag saluting had since regretted doing so, and with the Court becoming more 
liberal, Parker believed the justices would affirm his decision (which they did). Goings 
believes that Parker continued to side with the Supreme Court until 1953, when he was 
passed up again for a spot on the Supreme Court that eventually went to Earl Warren, a 
former governor of California who had no judicial experience. In Goings’s view, that was 
when Parker realized he would never leave the Fourth Circuit, so he decided “there was 
no need to temper himself on the race issue anymore….”283 Thus, Parker impeded the 
Brown decision in 1955 without worrying about how it might hurt his possible career 
advancement. Goings concludes that “Parker was unwilling to push for change. None of 
his opinions ever increased black civil rights; at best, they maintained the status quo.”284 
While it is true that Parker was not an activist judge, the cases examined above 
demonstrate that he did uphold the civil rights of African Americans. While stare decisis 
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may have played a role in his decisions, it should not negate the fact that he refused to 
deny rights to minorities that other Americans enjoyed. Parker once said that freedom of 
religion and freedom of speech, for example, two of the most basic human rights, must 
exist for everyone, not just those in the majority or those with whom the majority is most 
comfortable:  
 
It is easy enough to believe in freedom of religion for Episcopalians or 
Baptists or Presbyterians. The test is whether we believe in that freedom 
for Mormons or Mohammedans or atheists. It is easy enough to believe 
in freedom of speech for Republicans or Democrats. The rub comes 
when it is applied to communists or fascists and others whose teachings 
would subvert our institutions. We must never forget that unless speech 
is free for everybody it is free for nobody; that unless it is free for error 
it is not free for truth; and that the only limitations which may safely be 
placed upon it are those which forbid slander, obscenity and incitement 
to violence. 285 
 
 
Clearly, Parker was a thoughtful and learned judge who was committed to the U.S. 
Constitution. He was also widely respected, both inside and outside of legal circles. The 
ABA maintained for decades that Parker’s failed nomination was “one of the most 
regrettable combinations of error and injustice….”286 Even Walter White, the head of the 
NAACP who had led the campaign against his Supreme Court nomination, wrote in his 
1948 autobiography that Parker’s opinions since 1930 had been “above reproach in their 
strict adherence not only to the law but to the spirit of the Constitution.”287 White also 
privately admitted when Parker was being considered for another opening on the 
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Supreme Court in 1945, that he would not object to such an appointment, and the 
NAACP officially withdrew its opposition to Parker.288  
Part of this change in White’s and the Association’s position stemmed from a 
speech Parker gave on race relations in December 1944, which appeared in print in the 
Church School Herald Journal of the A.M.E. Zion Church. Parker expressed his desire to 
build a better civilization in the South by fostering a “spirt of understanding between the 
white and colored races,” a “spirt of justice,” and a “spirt of Christianity.” He admitted 
that discord between the races occasionally stirs up, but that overall, “the Southern White 
Man likes [the Colored Man] and wants him to stay here.” He believed that the South as a 
whole would benefit from creating better housing opportunities and granting greater 
access to higher education for black people, which was in keeping with his earlier court 
decision to equalize salaries between black and white teachers. In fact, this ruling did not 
go unnoticed by the editors of the Church School Herald-Journal, who described Parker 
in a footnote as a “great jurist and humanitarian.” Overall, though, Parker wanted to see 
Southerners love one another more, as his Christian faith taught him to do. Writing 
briefly about his failed Supreme Court nomination in 1930, Parker declared, “I have 
never allowed that to prejudice my mind against your people.” He continued to view 
black people as his neighbors and brothers. Black and white soldiers, for instance, were 
both facing common dangers in World War II, so he wanted to see the races work 
together “to solve the problems that confront us, to iron out any difficulties that may have 
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arisen and to go forward with the building of a finer civilization for our country in which 
all of us will have a part and in which we can all take pride.”289 
It is hard to believe that Judge Parker was simply an opportunist, determined to sit 
on the Supreme Court no matter the cost, even if it meant granting rights to minority 
groups he supposedly loathed. The evidence instead suggests that Parker was torn. As he 
made clear in 1920 and 1930, he did not believe that African Americans were ready for 
the responsibility of participating in the political process. While this is disappointing, it is 
not surprising given the fact that most white Southerners felt the same way at the time. 
What set Parker apart, though, was his remarkable ability to compartmentalize his 
personal and professional life. He was personally opposed to black involvement in 
politics, but as a judge, he refused to deny them their rights, thus allowing him to become 
one of the most progressive jurists in the South. Years later, when Parker was in 
Nuremberg, he wrote that he was quite perturbed that a news article in the Washington 
Star had depicted him as an “ultra conservative,” when he believed his record as a judge 
revealed that he was “distinctly to the contrary.”290 Historian Richard Watson concluded 
that Parker’s record since 1930 made one “wish that he had been confirmed [to the 
Supreme Court].”291 
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Internationalism and American Democracy  
Though Parker had been opposed to internationalism when he ran for governor of 
North Carolina in 1920, his position changed as a result of the Great Depression, 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, and the Second World War. 
Parker was not a “New Dealer” like Jackson and Biddle, but he recognized that President 
Hoover’s laissez-faire approach to the Great Depression had not worked, so he agreed 
with Roosevelt’s plan to “take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try 
another. But above all, try something.”292 In Parker’s view, the government has to 
respond to societal changes and, at times, has to act in such a way that it infringes upon 
individual rights in order to do what is best for society as a whole. This does not mean the 
government has license to ignore the U.S. Constitution when it is convenient, though, and 
Parker believed strongly that abandoning America’s constitutional principles in times of 
crisis was “destructive.”293 The main challenge Parker saw facing the nation was finding 
the right balance between preserving individual rights while permitting government 
intervention. He had faith that America’s democracy was strong and was on the verge of 
witnessing the “birth of a new civilization…of higher standards of righteousness and of 
greater opportunity for the expanding nature of man.”294 His arguments gave New Deal 
supporters ample evidence to justify their position in accordance with the spirit of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
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Therefore, when President Roosevelt suggested establishing a united nations that 
would be similar to the League of Nations but with greater enforcement powers, Parker 
offered his support.295 In 1943, he delivered an address before the American Society of 
International Law (ASIL) in which he advocated for an international government with the 
authority to enforce legal decisions and international laws, particularly those regarding 
global trade, travel, and communication. The lack of enforcement was one of the League 
of Nation’s principal flaws, and Parker did not want to repeat that mistake. However, he 
also believed that in order to attract members, this new international organization should 
have a more narrow jurisdiction over individual countries so as not to violate the 
principle of national sovereignty. Nor did he believe this international government should 
guarantee democracy for all peoples, since he felt that was unrealistic and would also 
deter nations from joining. He did, however, want an international commission to 
investigate the feasibility of creating an international bill of rights and declaring a 
universal set of fundamental rights that all member nations must abide by and protect, 
and he also began advocating for a “World Court.”296  
Parker had the chance to present these ideas two years later when members of the 
United Nations met in San Francisco on May 15, 1945, to formally create the 
international organization.297 Unfortunately, a copy of Parker’s speech has not yet been 
found, and the archival record does not explain why Parker was invited to the San 
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Francisco Conference. However, the fact that he was present at such a pivotal moment to 
talk about fundamental rights while at the same time Jackson’s team was busy organizing 
an international trial is significant. Parker did not realize at the time that he would be 
taking part in this unprecedented criminal trial that would shape international law for 
decades to come.  
In July 1945, Justice Owen Roberts, whom President Hoover nominated to the 
Supreme Court after the Senate rejected Parker, announced his retirement. Parker’s 
supporters were cautiously optimistic that this might be his chance to sit on the Supreme 
Court, but Parker had resigned himself to the fact that he would probably never sit on the 
highest court in the land. Writing to his brother and close confidante, Sam, Parker 
commented that the newspapers were all abuzz about the possibility of President Truman 
nominating him for the Supreme Court, but the North Carolinian noted with a sigh, “I 
don’t know whether I stand any chance or not. I am inclined to think that there is a 
possibility but not much probability.”298 Parker had been passed over for the Supreme 
Court several times since 1930, so he was not expecting a call from the President. He was 
surprised, then, when Truman did reach out to him, but not for the judicial appointment 
he thought. Truman wanted Parker to be Biddle’s alternate at Nuremberg.299 Parker’s 
colleague, Judge Armistead Dobie, wrote to Parker to say what an honor it was for the 
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President to appoint him as the alternate at Nuremberg, but a part of him suspected that 
this might be a consolation prize: “Of course this is a great honor but I hope this does not 
impair your chances of being appointed to the Supreme Court….”300 
The President never seriously considered Parker for the Supreme Court. He knew 
the North Carolinian was unpopular with labor, plus the two men did not know each other 
personally or professionally, which was part of the reason why Truman asked Biddle to 
step down as attorney general. However, public pressure to vindicate Parker’s failed 
nomination had grown considerably since 1930. Anyone with a shred of legal acumen 
knew Parker was qualified for the Supreme Court, and his name kept appearing on every 
short list for the Court. Parker’s supporters mounted another campaign to get him on the 
Supreme Court in the summer of 1945, even going so far as to prepare a nine-page 
memorandum listing his qualifications, including the fact that he had received the ABA’s 
highest award, the Medal for Distinguished Service in the Cause of American 
Jurisprudence, two years earlier.301 Truman had to do something. Fortunately for him, 
both Robert Jackson and Francis Biddle suggested Parker for the IMT.302 This allowed 
Truman to kill two birds with one stone. He could satisfy Parker’s supporters and 
vindicate Parker’s rejection at the same time. The IMT was an unprecedented legal trial 
that carried significant prestige. It was not the Supreme Court, but it was still something. 
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There was also the fact that Parker was a member of the Republican Party, which 
provided a nice balance to the Tribnal since Biddle was a Democrat. Truman asked 
Parker to be the alternate American judge at Nuremberg on September 11, 1945, and 
Parker felt he had no choice but to accept. 
Whereas Jackson and Biddle had agreed to serve at Nuremberg without hesitation, 
Parker was reluctant. On the one hand, he feared he would be a “voteless cipher,” 
someone who would be present for the proceedings and deliberations but not actively 
engaged in them.303 He provided a further explanation in a letter to his son-in-law:   
 
I did not seek the position on the International Military Commission and 
was very hesitant about accepting it; but the President put it up to me in 
such a way that I could not decline. I think there will be some interesting 
features connected with the work, and it is certainly a work of great 
importance; but it will be very unpleasant I am afraid.  At all events, I 
am in it and will do the best I can.304 
 
 
Ultimately, Parker felt it was his patriotic duty to serve at the request of the President, 
and that settled the matter. The irony, though, is that Parker had openly opposed 
internationalism and the League of Nations when he ran for governor twenty-five years 
earlier, claiming that the U.S. should not “surrender … American sovereignty to the 
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ideals of internationalism.”305 His views on international institutions and multilateralism 
had changed since 1920 when he was a young thirty-five-year-old running for political 
office, and he was ready to take on this unique challenge. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PART II: HUMAN RIGHTS AT NUREMBERG
 
 
The President was dead. After decades of battling the debilitating effects of polio 
and twelve years in the White House, Franklin Delano Roosevelt suffered a massive 
cerebral hemorrhage on April 11, 1945, and never regained consciousness. Most 
Americans had no idea he had been in such poor health, so his death came as quite a 
shock. “Not our President!” one lady exclaimed. “What’s going to happen to Humanity 
with him gone?” asked an African American police officer. Even a “fine Republican old 
lady sobbed, ‘Though I didn’t always agree with him I know we need so much what he 
had to give.’”306  
John Parker wrote to his brother, Sam, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army, that he 
was “greatly distressed…by the death of the President.” He was concerned that the 
country was without its leader, especially for the San Francisco Conference that had been 
scheduled to create the United Nations. Parker was traveling there in May to address a 
group of visiting attorneys over dinner: “I hope that we are going to get something done 
at the Conference,” Parker wrote, “but the chances would have been brighter if we had 
had the influence of the President.”307 
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As the country mourned, both Robert Jackson and Francis Biddle, men who had 
served faithfully in the late president’s administration, spoke at a memorial service in the 
Great Hall of the Department of Justice on April 13. Biddle, speaking first as the sitting 
attorney general, remarked that even though the country was grieving, Americans must 
look to the future and cling to Roosevelt’s dream of securing peace for the world. 
Jackson, as the former attorney general, echoed these sentiments by proclaiming that 
“Power was never an end to [Roosevelt], it was a means—a means to a better world 
where men might live their chosen lives, rear their families in decency and security, 
safely think and speak their thoughts, and better their material conditions.”308  
After both men spoke, the Department of Justice adopted a resolution in memory 
of Roosevelt, eulogizing him “as a constant reminder that the law has no finer purpose 
than to translate into reality our ideals of freedom from fear and freedom from want.” 
These ideals were part of Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms—along with freedom of speech and 
freedom of worship—and the Atlantic Charter, which was one of the earliest attempts to 
institutionalize human rights.309 Roosevelt did not live to see the Atlantic Charter’s goals 
come to fruition, but members of the Department of Justice would, as they emphasized 
their plans to “rededicate ourselves to the unyielding pursuit of…victory, liberation, and 
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enduring international cooperation – which, under [Roosevelt’s] leadership, we have set 
for ourselves in war and in peace.”310 One example of this “enduring international 
cooperation” was undoubtedly the United Nations, which finally came into existence in 
October 1945 after Roosevelt initially suggested creating the organization in 1941. 
Another example would be the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial. 
Nuremberg was historic, as four nations with different systems of jurisprudence 
came together to adjudicate the guilt of suspected war criminals. This is even more 
striking when one realizes that much of the world, including the American public, 
overwhelmingly favored summary execution of the captured Germans. By holding a trial, 
the Allies elevated the rule of law above older methods of meting out justice and 
preserved the human rights of the German defendants.311 This multilateralism provided a 
necessary spark to the emerging human rights movement and the development of 
international agreements and institutions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). 
The Trial also influenced how Jackson, Biddle, and Parker understood 
international law, international institutions, national sovereignty, human rights, and 
America’s role in the world in maintaining peace. For Jackson, Nuremberg showed that 
multilateral cooperation was both possible and preferable. It sent a message to the world 
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that nations would no longer tolerate aggressive war or allow individual aggressors to go 
unpunished. Most scholars contend that Jackson was more interested in outlawing 
aggressive war than he was in prosecuting human right violations. This is true, in part 
because the charge of “Crimes against Humanity” was not well-established, making it 
more controversial. Jackson played it safe and focused primarily on convicting the 
German defendants of conspiring to wage aggressive war. Nevertheless, he still went out 
of his way to highlight the defendants’ crimes against humanity, and he often used the 
latter charge to buttress his arguments for the former. In fact, part of the reason he was so 
determined to prevent future wars of aggression was because of the Jews’ horrific 
experiences, so it is important to understand the inherent connection between the two 
charges. 
For Biddle and Parker, Nuremberg opened their eyes to the atrocities that had 
taken place within the Third Reich, as the prosecution presented unimaginably horrific 
evidence against the defendants. The Nuremberg Trial created the first documentary 
record of life and death within Nazi Germany, making it possible decades later for the 
new academic field of Holocaust Studies to emerge. Biddle and Parker were there in the 
courtroom from 1945 to 1946 as the prosecution first unveiled the unimaginable crimes 
the Nazis had committed throughout Europe. As a result, they found guilty nearly all of 
the defendants who had been charged with “Crimes against Humanity.”  
Part II examines the Nuremberg era—the period surrounding the time of the war 
crimes trial—from the perspectives of Robert Jackson, Francis Biddle, and John Parker as 
they grappled with developments in international law and human rights, particularly 
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through the charge of “Crimes against Humanity.” This was not a new term in 1945, but 
it was the first time anyone had ever been prosecuted for violating the “laws of 
humanity,” which was an early term for human rights. Thus, it is necessary to examine 
the intellectual history of “Crimes against Humanity” in order to understand the 
connection between the Nuremberg Trial and the development of human rights as they 
were codified into law. Once it becomes clear that human rights played a central role at 
Nuremberg, it will be possible to demonstrate the Trial’s impact on Jackson, Biddle, and 
Parker, three individuals who were instrumental in shaping the IMT’s legacy in the 
postwar period. 
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CHAPTER VII  
THE AMERICAN ROADS TO NUREMBERG
 
The path to Nuremberg was winding. As Part I demonstrated, the trial was never 
inevitable, nor was U.S. involvement. However, once President Harry Truman fully 
committed the U.S. to the world’s first international criminal trial, the American 
participants had much to do to prepare for this unprecedented event.  
Robert Jackson, as the Chief U.S. Prosecutor, travelled to London in July 1945 to 
meet with other Allied representatives to hammer out the Charter that would organize the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT). Just a month before, delegates from around the 
world had travelled to San Francisco to draft the U.N. Charter, writing in the Preamble 
that they were determined “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small….”312 While it is true that many 
of the U.N. delegates were focused on ensuring collective security and upholding national 
sovereignty, their inclusion of human rights language in this international document is 
significant.313 Nuremberg’s framers continued in this human rights tradition by agreeing 
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to hold a trial at all, which, as political theorist Judith Shklar argued, demonstrates just 
how far the U.S. had come in wanting to use the law to protect future generations.314  
Jackson and his Allied counterparts took their lead from the pages of history, 
determined not to make the same mistakes as their predecessors. Following World War I, 
the Allies intended to try Kaiser Wilhelm II—even including provisions for it in Articles 
227 through 230 of the Treaty of Versailles—but it never happened. The eventual Leipzig 
trials that took place in 1921 were a farce for a number of reasons. First, the Allies 
allowed the German Imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht) to try the suspects, 
meaning that German judges tried German citizens. Then, of the more than 1,500 
Germans whom the Allies originally accused of being war criminals, only 10 ever 
appeared in court. Finally, only six suspects were found guilty, and most of them either 
received very short prison sentences or never served any jail time at all. The German 
people tended to hold a negative view of these proceedings, as well.315  
Although the Allies did not try the Kaiser, developments calling for his trial were 
significant. The November 1918 armistice had not addressed the issue of war crimes, so 
the Allies created a committee to handle it: the Commission of Responsibilities of the 
Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties. Chaired by U.S. Secretary of State 
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Robert Lansing and made up of fifteen distinguished international lawyers from the 
Allied Powers, the Commission released its majority report on March 29, 1919. It called 
for the prosecution of heads of state, including the “ex-Kaiser” who had abdicated before 
the armistice and fled to the Netherlands, and the formation of an international court in 
which to hold such trials. It also listed two types of culpable acts that could lead to 
prosecution: 
(a.) Acts which provoked the world war and accompanied its inception. 
(b.) Violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity.316 
The report explained in a footnote that the “laws of humanity,” a phrase that rarely 
appeared up to that point—as discussed below—included “murders, massacres, and 
‘systematic terrorism’; killing of hostages; torturing or deliberately starving civilians; 
rape; and ‘abduction of girls and women for enforced prostitution.”317  
This legal term, “laws of humanity,” is significant because, as international 
lawyer Ruti G. Teitel argues, it represents a shift in thinking from “an emphasis on state 
security—that is, security as defined by borders, statehood, territory, and so on—to a 
focus on human security: the security of persons and peoples.”318 Traditionally, scholars 
have argued that this shift took place after World War II with the promulgation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 or the end of the Cold War in 
the 1990s. As late as 1944, international law experts such as Manley Hudson and L.F.L. 
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Oppenheim continued to claim that the law of nations referred to agreements between 
states, not individuals.319 However, the presence of this phrase in this historical context 
indicates that a transformation was already underway. It had appeared in the 
aforementioned Commission of Responsibilities in 1919, and even twelve years before 
that in the Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention.320 The Martens Clause 
recognized that the “law of nations” derived from “civilized peoples” and the “laws of 
humanity.” Such verbiage connoted universal standards, legally and morally, that placed 
human security above all else. This seismic (though controversial) shift in legal thinking, 
though, is what made an institution like the Nuremberg Trial possible.321  
However, the inclusion of this term “laws of humanity” in the Commission’s 
majority report proved too much for the American representatives at the Paris Peace 
Conference, which included Lansing and James Brown Scott. They objected to the 
Commission’s majority report and said the U.S. did not support either the idea of an 
international trial or the trying of individuals—including heads of state—for war crimes 
because of a lack of legal precedent. President Woodrow Wilson himself opposed trying 
the Kaiser as the “author of the war” for this very reason, even though the American 
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public had accepted his rhetoric that Germany deserved punishment for war crimes, and 
members of the U.S. Congress pushed for a trial.322  
Scott’s opposition to such a trial is surprising given his advocacy of international 
law. The foremost expert on James Brown Scott, historian John Hepp, believes Scott 
sided against trying the Kaiser because to do so would have “violated the American 
dislike of ex post facto laws.” In addition, Hepp believes Scott had to follow the party 
line because Lansing and Wilson opposed a trial, saying that “Scott was comfortable with 
an expansive reading of internationalism and … would have supported the Nuremburg 
trials because there was at that time a ‘legal’ (as he and Lansing and others would have 
narrowly defined the word) basis for the trials: Germany had signed the Versailles 
treaty.”323 Scott, then, was not fundamentally opposed to holding individuals, even heads 
of state, responsible for war crimes. He simply had to respect the wishes of his superiors 
in this political matter. 
In its “Memorandum of Reservations to the Majority Report,” written five days 
later on April 4, 1919, the U.S. criticized the majority report for including the phrase 
“laws of humanity,” arguing that such laws “vary with the individual, which, if for no 
other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one 
charged with the administration of criminal law.” The U.S. memo went on to object that 
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“the laws and principles of humanity are not certain, varying with time, place, and 
circumstance, and according, it may be, to the conscience of the individual judge. There 
is no fixed and universal standard of humanity…”324 Essentially, the Americans wanted 
to maintain the longstanding tradition of national sovereignty, which allowed each nation 
to set its own laws and customs without fear of outside influence. Little did the 
Americans at the time realize that the objections they were raising after World War I 
would be the same criticisms facing the IMT more than twenty years later. Critics in 1945 
objected to the IMT because there was no legal precedent for it, so they argued that the 
Trial had no authority and was illegitimate, dismissing it as “victor’s justice.” 
During the London Conference, one of Jackson’s Allied counterparts, French 
Professor André Gros, was well aware of these events from 1919. His concern was that 
since American diplomats after the First World War did not believe high-ranking 
government officials and heads of state could be held responsible for aggressive wars, 
then the German defendants and their attorneys would argue that there was no legal basis 
to charge them with a crime for their actions during WWII. In essence, how could 
Jackson and the U.S. claim in 1945 that individual Germans were responsible for waging 
an illegal war when a generation earlier American representatives had taken the opposite 
position? Jackson’s response was that “sentiment in the United States and the better 
world opinion have greatly changed” regarding the issue of criminal responsibility, and 
that “I don’t think we can take the 1918 view on matters of war and peace.” As a way of 
illustrating how American opinion had changed, Jackson referenced the address he 
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prepared as U.S. attorney general for the First Conference of the Inter-American Bar 
Association in Havana, Cuba in 1941, in which he had argued that the Nazi government 
had waged an illegal war and that the individuals in charge of Germany must be held 
accountable. Jackson noted that Americans criticized his argument at the time but over 
the next four years, commentators declared his views sound international law.325 
On August 8, 1945, just two days after the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, Jackson and the other Allied representatives issued the London Charter. It 
declared that the Allies had the authority to try individual Germans who “have been 
responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes” that occurred in 
“no particular geographical location.”326 Most importantly, the Charter contained a list of 
criminal charges against the captured Germans, which Jackson and his peers expounded 
upon in the IMT Indictment (see Table 1).327  
The most significant charge for the purposes of this study is Count Four, “Crimes 
against Humanity.” How the Charter came to include this charge remains something of a 
mystery. International law scholars generally believe the person responsible was Hersch 
Lauterpacht, a widely-respected international lawyer from Cambridge University who 
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was in London at the time working with the U.N. War Crimes Commission (UNWCC).328  
The British government spearheaded the creation of the UNWCC in 1943, before the 
U.N. officially existed, in order to investigate the Axis powers’ war crimes. Jackson 
knew Lauterpacht for several reasons. Lauterpacht had served as an adviser to Jackson 
when the latter was U.S. attorney general, and Jackson frequently sought his advice while 
he was in London. When Jackson referenced L.F.L. Oppenheim’s International Law at 
the London Conference, he knew Lauterpacht had updated the seminal text for its sixth 
edition in 1944.329 According to one historian, Lauterpacht was familiar with the term 
“crimes against humanity” because the French, British, and Russians used it to describe 
the Ottoman government’s extermination of nearly 1.5 million Armenians on May 28, 
1915, and he wanted to codify the term in international law at Nuremberg.330 The 
available evidence, though circumstantial, is probable enough to conclude that 
Lauterpacht was the person who influenced Jackson’s decision to include “crimes against 
humanity” in the IMT Charter.331 Lauterpacht also contributed to the process of drafting 
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the UDHR after the Trial.332 Thus, by including this charge as a prosecutable offense at 
Nuremberg, the Trial advanced the development of international human rights law.333 
The Nuremberg Trial put into practice theories of natural law that had existed 
centuries before, particularly from the fathers of modern international law, Hugo Grotius 
and Emer de Vattel. Grotius formulated his natural rights theories before modern nation-
states came into existence with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Westphalian 
system was designed to protect territorial integrity, but it also gave birth to the idea of 
national sovereignty, that nations should be free to govern themselves without outside 
interference. Grotius never lived to see this system, though, as he died in 1645. Since 
Grotius never existed in a world of nation-states, it was easier for him to argue for 
universal rights that should extend to all people, regardless of the political system in 
which they resided. In that respect, his seventeenth-century views on natural rights were 
far more compatible with conceptions of human rights that emerged in the twentieth 
century and continue to take shape in the twenty-first. 
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Table 1. IMT Charges 
 
CHARGES STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE 
Count One: 
The Common Plan 
or Conspiracy 
“… the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, 
War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity…” 
Count Two: 
Crimes against 
Peace 
“…planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances….” 
Count Three: 
War Crimes 
“violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity;” 
Count Four: 
Crimes against 
Humanity 
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated.” 
 
 
Vattel built off of Grotius’s work to develop The Law of Nations, or the 
Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of 
Sovereigns, which appeared in print in 1758. Vattel was from Switzerland and had only 
ever lived in a post-Westphalian world, so he wanted to establish rules for this new global 
order, especially regarding justification for war. One of his main arguments was that 
rulers have responsibilities to take care of their people. If rulers become tyrants, oppress 
their own people, and “cause the Nation to rise, [then] any foreign power is entitled to 
help an oppressed people that has requested its assistance.”334 Vattel’s point was that 
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national sovereignty is not absolute, that there are times when it is necessary for one 
country to violate another country’s sovereignty in order to prevent suffering. Thus, this 
principle, which would be considered humanitarian intervention today, has existed for 
centuries and has influenced how nations interact with each other on a global scale. In 
that regard, the Allies were justified in violating Germany’s national sovereignty when 
they decided to try German individuals in an international criminal court.335 
Vattel’s influence on the U.S. development of the law of war and international 
relations was profound. Both George Washington and Benjamin Franklin had copies of 
Vattel’s The Law of Nations, and Franklin noted that members of the Second Continental 
Congress had been reading it on the eve of the War of Independence.336 More than a 
century later in 1916, James Brown Scott, as the general editor for a series on 
international law, included Vattel’s seminal work. Scott placed The Law of Nations on 
equal footing with William Blackstone’s Commentaries upon the Laws of England 
(1764-1769), another critical legal text, saying that “the statesmen of the American 
Colonies derived their knowledge of the common law of England” from Blackstone and 
utilized Vettel “in the war with Great Britain, which made us a nation.”337 Vattel’s 
influence continues to resonate, as the December 2016 edition of the U.S. Department of 
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Defense Law of War Manual cites Grotius, Vattel, and Lauterpacht as “the most highly 
qualified publicists” of “the rules of international law.”338  
The Law of Nations provided an international legal framework for nation-states, 
each with their own priorities and agendas, to coexist in an eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century world that was becoming increasingly interconnected. Globalization had brought 
with it a massive flow of goods, technologies, peoples, and ideas, and it was only logical 
for new experts in international law to rise up and create legal codes designed to maintain 
order. However, as countries began rapidly developing new military technologies and 
indiscriminate forms of warfare, the frequency and severity of war crimes increased at a 
horrific pace. Given this history, it is not surprising that such violations demanded a new 
name: crimes against humanity. 
Even though the phrase “crimes against humanity” had appeared before 1945, 
mostly in relation to the Armenian Genocide, according to Norman Geras, “it was the 
Nuremberg Trials which … inaugurated its effective, its practical, emergence into the 
world of law and the law of the world.”339 Of all the charges filed against the German 
defendants, “Crimes against Humanity” stands out the most. This crime had never existed 
before, but it was strikingly similar to violations of the “laws of humanity” as outlined in 
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the majority report of the Commission of Responsibilities in 1919 (see Table 2).340 Based 
on this comparison between 1919 and 1945, it is not hard to see that the “laws of 
humanity” was an early expression for human rights, and that Jackson was instrumental 
in taking this concept and codifying it into law at Nuremberg as “Crimes against 
Humanity.”  
 
Table 2. Comparing the Laws of Humanity with Crimes against Humanity 
 
Commission of Responsibilities 
Majority Report, violations of laws 
of humanity, 1919  
International Military Tribunal 
(IMT), definition of crimes against 
humanity, 1945 
Murder Murder 
Massacres Extermination 
Systematic terrorism 
Persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds 
Torture or deliberately starving 
civilians; rape 
Inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population 
Abduction of girls and women for 
enforced prostitution 
Deportation 
 
 
Using keyword searches for “laws of humanity,” “crimes against humanity,” and 
“human rights” in The New York Times, Washington Post, and Google Books, it becomes 
clear that a correlation exists between these terms and the decades surrounding WWI and 
WWII (see Figure 3, 4, 5). For instance, the appearance of the phrase “laws of humanity” 
peaked in the 1910s, particularly around the time of the Armenian Genocide in 1915.341 
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The term faded from usage in the two decades that followed, saw a brief resurgence in 
the 1940s, and dwindled afterward. The phrase “crimes against humanity” is also 
connected to the Armenian Genocide, as it first entered the mainstream American lexicon 
in the 1910s. The term appeared much more frequently leading up to 1945, though, as 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt used it in one of his fireside chats and in a statement he 
made against Adolf Hitler during WWII.342 The term’s usage continued to grow as a 
result of the Nuremberg Trial in 1945 and 1946. Finally, “human rights” appeared at a 
pretty consistent rate in the decades leading up to 1900 (an average of 106 occurrences 
per decade from the 1850s to the 1890s), but its usage in The New York Times more than 
doubled between the 1900s and the 1910s (from 132 to 292). It more than tripled from 
the 1920s to the 1930s (from 300 to 914), and it nearly tripled again from the 1930s to the 
1940s (from 914 to 2661). In fact, the biggest jump from one year to the next coincided 
with the Nuremberg Trial. From 1945 to 1946, the occurrence of “human rights” in The 
New York Times went from 209 to 440. This correlation cannot be a coincidence. 
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Figure 5. Google Books Chart of “laws of humanity” and “crimes against humanity” 
 
 
The evidence demonstrates continuity between conceptions of the laws of 
humanity, crimes against humanity, and human rights. Violations of the laws of humanity 
became crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, and the legal authority to protect these 
laws became human rights after the Trial. Before the Trial, Jackson used the phrase “laws 
of humanity” in his report to President Truman on June 6, 1945, citing the Fourth Hague 
Convention of 1907 that said international law stems from “’civilized peoples, from the 
laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.’”343 He also alluded to the 
concept in his opening statement when he said the German defendants enslaved millions 
and “took from the German people all those dignities and freedoms that we hold natural 
and inalienable rights in every human being,” and that the defendants knew they had 
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behaved illegally because “under the law of all civilized people, [it was] a crime for one 
man with his bare knuckles to assault another.”344 The term comes up only once in the 
IMT Indictment and then on just five separate occasions throughout the proceedings.345 
Not surprisingly, “crimes against humanity” appears numerous times throughout the IMT 
transcripts since it was one of the charges listed in the Indictment.346 “Human rights” 
shows up four times in the IMT transcripts, but both that term and “crimes against 
humanity” became more common in the years to follow. In 1946, for example, the 
UNWCC debated the IMT’s interpretation of “crimes against humanity” and its 
application in other courts (ultimately noting that the IMT’s definition was narrower than 
what the UNWCC preferred).347 In addition, during the subsequent Nuremberg Military 
Trials (NMT) that took place from 1946 to 1949, one of the American prosecutors 
explained the charge of crimes against humanity as “systematic violations of fundamental 
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human rights.”348 Those who claim that human rights was not central to the Nuremberg 
Trial or the postwar period overlook the fact that while the nomenclature changed, the 
ideas did not. 
Jackson was relieved when the London Conference was over. He was an able 
jurist, a clear communicator, and a dedicated public servant, but he was not a diplomat, 
and reaching consensus on the world’s first criminal trial required delicate diplomatic 
skill that Jackson simply did not have. Six weeks in London had taken a toll on him, and 
Jackson was so exasperated towards the end of the conference that he was prepared to 
abandon the whole venture: “I am getting very discouraged about the possibility of 
conducting an international trial …. we have very different viewpoints. I think the United 
States might well withdraw from this matter and turn our prisoners over to the European 
powers to try, or else agree on separate trials, or something of that sort.”349 Once 
Jackson’s task was complete, he looked forward to travelling to Berlin to assemble his 
staff, examine the evidence the U.S. Army had been collecting, and continue the 
preparations for the trial of the century.350 
The Judges Embark 
Francis Biddle and John Parker boarded the Queen Mary at noon on October 1, 
1945, to head across the Atlantic to Southampton, England. They refused to fly because 
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they wanted the extra time to prepare for the Trial.351 Parker hoped burying himself in the 
work would distract him from the fact that he had needed several vaccinations (e.g., 
typhoid, paratyphoid, typhus, tetanus, smallpox) before he could leave the country. 
The two judges were not alone on the Queen Mary. The famed journalist, William 
Shirer, who had been with the Germans in 1940 when they advanced along the Western 
front, was also aboard. He had been assigned to cover the Nuremberg Trial, along with 
dozens of other journalists, most notably a twenty-nine-year-old reporter for the United 
Press, Walter Cronkite. Biddle had also convinced several legal experts to join him and 
Parker in Nuremberg as they embarked on an uncharted path in international law: Quincy 
Wright, Herbert Wechsler, and James H. Rowe, Jr. Wright was an international law 
professor from the University of Chicago and a consultant in the State Department. He 
became an invaluable adviser to both of the American judges and to Robert Jackson. 
Wechsler had been a law professor at Columbia University who left to take charge of the 
War Division of the Department of Justice. As an assistant attorney general, he had also 
argued several cases on behalf of the federal government before the Supreme Court, 
including Korematsu. Biddle recalled that he and Wechsler became close friends after 
“Wex,” as he often called him, persuaded the Supreme Court to give blacks the right to 
vote in state primaries.352 Rowe had been an administrative assistant to President 
Roosevelt before serving as Biddle’s assistant attorney general from 1941 to 1943. He 
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then left the administration to serve in the Navy. He also held the distinction of being the 
last law clerk for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Biddle’s mentor. These men helped 
Biddle and Parker evaluate the evidence against the German defendants at Nuremberg, as 
well as navigate the complicated and unique issues in international law that came up 
during the Trial.  
Biddle was adamant that the Nuremberg Trial be based on existing international 
law. “Our opinion must at least have its roots in the past,” he wrote, “even if its fruits are 
to ripen in the future.” Wright and Wechsler cautioned that the German defendants would 
argue against the legitimacy of international law and claim that the charges against them 
were ex post facto, created after the fact and applied retroactively. This was a major 
concern for Biddle, who wanted the world to view the IMT as a just court of law.353 
When the Americans aboard the Queen Mary were not discussing administrative 
matters, they were getting to know one another. This was the first time many of them had 
worked together, especially on something as momentous as the world’s first international 
criminal trial, so it was important that they build a rapport before beginning the real 
work. Biddle frequently had tea in his cabin with Parker and insisted that the Southern 
gentleman call him Francis. Biddle noted that Parker “never calls the members of his 
court by their first names” and described him as “a lonely schoolboy who needs 
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mothering.” Still, Biddle held a positive view of his alternate and believed the North 
Carolinian was “sold” on Biddle’s general plan.354  
The men were on the ocean for six days before arriving in Southampton on 
October 7. Parker reported to his judicial colleagues back home that the voyage was 
pleasant and did him “a great deal of good.” That same day, Parker, Biddle, and their 
staff flew from England to Paris and spent the night. Parker was excited that he had been 
able to eat at the Raphael Hotel, walk through the city, and see the Arch de Triumph and 
the Place de Concord. Unlike Biddle, who had been born in Paris and had a more 
cosmopolitan disposition, Parker was more impressed with these sights. At noon the next 
day, the Americans flew to Berlin and got to work. From October 8 until October 18, the 
judges were almost constantly in session setting up the Tribunal, adopting rules, and 
reviewing the Indictment—and much of this collaboration had to take place with the aid 
of interpreters. The IMT officially opened in Berlin on October 18, and then everyone 
travelled to Nuremberg to prepare for the first day of the Trial, which was scheduled for 
November 20. Parker reported that he was in good spirits and hoped the Trial would be 
over within three or four months so that he could return to the U.S. in time for the Fourth 
Circuit’s March term. He, like everyone else involved, had no idea the proceedings would 
last until October of the following year.355 
One of the first orders of business was to select the president of the Tribunal, 
essentially a chief justice who would set the agenda for meetings and hold the deciding 
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vote during deliberations in case of a tie. In the few meetings that the judges had together, 
the British and the Russians were impressed with Biddle, who appeared the most 
diplomatic and organized. It seemed inevitable that Biddle would become Tribunal 
president, until Jackson caught wind of this development. He warned Biddle that the Trial 
already had the appearance of being too American, and he made the same argument to 
President Truman: 
 
…the United States Army is host at Nurnberg, all of the arrangements 
are American, all of the defendants except three prisoners taken by 
Americans. Also, we have a staff three times the size of that of all of the 
other nations combined and most of the evidence comes from our 
sources. In the division of the case, the major part of the trial work has 
been assigned to us because we are the people best prepared to carry it 
through. If we were also to furnish the Presiding Officer, there would be 
danger that these trials would look like a purely American enterprise.356  
 
 
If the trial was to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the world, Jackson believed the chief 
justice could not come from the U.S. Faced with this pressure, Biddle pulled his name 
from consideration, allowing the British jurist, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence—a man Biddle 
later described as an “old goat” who is “dumb” and “inept”—to become Tribunal 
president.357 Jackson was relieved, but Biddle had the last laugh. Writing to his wife, 
Katherine, Biddle remarked that “Lawrence depends on me for everything and I’ll run the 
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show.”358 The following month, as Jackson gave his opening address, Biddle sat next to 
Lawrence at the center of the bench, a whisper away from the power and influence he 
craved.359 (see Figure 6) 
Tensions between Jackson and Biddle lingered throughout the Trial. This is 
surprising given the fact that the two men had worked closely together for years in the 
Justice Department. Biddle had been solicitor general when Jackson was attorney 
general, and Biddle took his place when Jackson joined the Supreme Court. There is no 
indication that their relationship, both before and after Nuremberg, was anything other 
than collegial.360 However, decades later after Jackson passed away, Biddle criticized 
Jackson’s performance as the Chief U.S. Prosecutor for not being prepared in his cross-
examination of Hermann Göring and for appealing to the American judges to prevent the 
defendant from making speeches on the stand. In Biddle’s words, Jackson was 
“profoundly upset,” and Biddle and Parker had to “soothe and mollify him” and “stroke 
his ruffled feathers by telling him how much we all admired him, how well he was 
conducting the trial.”361 Biddle’s comments made Jackson appear juvenile, which drew 
the ire of Jackson’s son, William, who had aided his father throughout the Trial:  
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I have found it revealing to contrast the comments on my father 
contained in the latest volume of your autobiography with one of your 
letters which I recently came across in going through some of his papers. 
In that letter, dated April 24, 1946, you said to him: “…I remembered all 
you had done for me, and felt again a wave of gratitude.” Obligations of 
the type you owe my father are not dischargeable with time or mortality, 
and I should be less than candid if I did not say that I regard your present 
performance as a stench in the nostrils of decency.362 
 
 
Biddle provided a measured response, noting that when writing “about one’s friends, 
whether living or dead, it seems to me a disservice to speak only of their virtues and omit 
their faults. The picture should be kept accurate – and human.” He did not apologize to 
William but tried to assure him that he did not intend to insult him or the memory of his 
father. Biddle simply encouraged William to “think it over again, in light of what I have 
said.”363 
From 1945 to 1946, though, Jackson and Biddle were frequently at loggerheads. 
The first instance was when Biddle tried to become the Tribunal president, while the 
second arose not even two weeks later. On October 21, Biddle held an organizational 
meeting at the Villa Conradi, where he had taken up residence in Nuremberg. Parker and 
Jackson were present, along with the judges’ legal advisers—Wright, Wechsler, and 
Rowe. The Trial was supposed to begin in less than a month, and there were numerous 
administrative and organizational issues to resolve. For example, both Biddle and Parker 
expressed concerns about securing counsel for the defendants. The Germans were entitled 
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to legal representation, a basic constitutional right in the U.S., so either the U.S. Army or 
the Allied Control Council—the military governing body in occupied Germany that was 
made up of American, British, French, and Soviet members—would need to handle this. 
Wechsler pointed out that Germany’s communication system was in shambles, making it 
nearly impossible to get in touch with the lawyers the defendants wanted. Parker noted 
that getting witnesses and documents for the defense was also problematic. Rowe chimed 
in to say that the U.S. Army “could not be relied upon for this purpose,” and that it was 
better to let the U.S. prosecution take care of these matters.364 
Jackson tried to listen patiently throughout the discussion, but he became 
annoyed. He had been working behind the scenes for months to make this trial a reality 
and was already aware of these problems. This was why he had wanted the American 
judges to fly to Germany instead of travelling by boat “so that they could appreciate the 
situation.”365 Jackson knew the Trial was less than a month away, so he had already made 
plans to address these issues. He had identified and built relationships with the most 
reliable people in the Army who could be trusted to find lawyers, witnesses, and 
documents and bring them back to Nuremberg. From his point of view, Biddle, Parker, 
and their team of advisers had no idea what they were doing, and he feared they might 
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Judges of the International Military Tribunal 
confer as War Crimes Trials open at Nuremberg, 
Germany. Passing a word with each other during 
the reading of the indictment are (center left) Lord 
Justice Geoffrey Lawrence, presiding Judge of 
Britain, and (center right) former United States 
Attorney General Francis Biddle. November 20, 
1945, United States Army Signal Corps. Harry S. 
Truman Library & Museum. Accession Number: 
2004-437 
not be ready in time for the opening on November 20. Jackson was not about to let that 
happen. The Trial was too important, to the world and to Jackson’s legacy.366 
 
Figure 6. IMT Judges in 1945 
 
 
As if tensions surrounding the Trial were not already high enough, another 
incident two weeks later stirred up even more anxiety. On November 7, the Soviet 
delegation held a reception to mark the anniversary of the October Revolution.367 In the 
presence of Jackson, Biddle, and Parker, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei 
Vyshinsky offered a toast in Russian. The men standing around him smiled, raised their 
glasses, and began to drink. Vyshinsky had spoken quickly, so it took a few seconds for 
the interpreter to translate his remarks into English. The men stood aghast once they 
realized what they had just toasted to: “Here’s to the conviction of all the men who will 
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go on trial next Tuesday. May their paths lead directly from the courthouse to the grave.” 
Parker responded by whispering loudly, “I will not drink a toast to the conviction of any 
man, regardless of his guilt, before I hear the evidence.”368 Later that evening in Biddle’s 
chambers, Parker described Vyshinsky’s toast as “awful,” and confided that he would not 
be able to sleep if the press learned of it and responded with the headline “American 
judges drink to the death sentence of the men whom they are trying…” Critics were 
already calling the IMT an illegitimate court, an example of the victors exacting revenge 
on the vanquished under the guise of law. If reporters discovered that the American 
judges and the chief U.S. prosecutor had been part of a toast calling for the conviction 
and execution of the defendants before they even stood trial, then they would have had 
proof that the Trial was a farce. Biddle was not worried and tried to allay Parker’s fears 
by saying the whole incident was “a triviality that would be forgotten tomorrow.” Parker 
had every reason to be worried, but fortunately Biddle was right, and nothing ever came 
of Vyshinsky’s toast.369 
Parker’s anxieties surrounding the Trial persisted. On November 13, judges from 
each of the Allied countries walked into Courtroom 600 in the Palace of Justice for the 
first dress rehearsal. The courtroom had to be renovated to accommodate the large 
number of defendants, lawyers, interpreters, military personnel, stenographers, reporters, 
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photographers, and cameramen, so this was the first time any of the judges had seen the 
room. As the men entered, they approached the bench and saw four large, ornate chairs 
for the presiding member of each country, and four plain, simple chairs for the alternates. 
Parker was beside himself with anger. The message seemed clear that the voting 
members of the Tribunal were significant, while the alternates were not, and he argued 
that “such an exhibition detracts from the dignity of the Tribunal.”370 This was not what 
Parker had signed up for. He knew when he accepted the President’s offer that he would 
not be able to vote, but he still wanted to be treated as an equal. Biddle had assured him 
even before Parker took the assignment that “his status would be identical with mine, he 
would join in discussions with complete freedom to express his opinion, whether or not it 
differed from mine.”371 The chair incident motivated Parker to address the position of 
alternates at the Tribunal’s next organizational meeting, where he made clear that the 
alternates should be on equal footing with the voting members. “The people of England,” 
he insisted, “will praise or blame Sir Norman Birkett [the British alternate] for what goes 
on here just as if he had a vote in the proceedings…” In addition, Parker noted that the 
alternates did not know when they would be called upon to fill in for their country’s 
voting member, so they should be allowed to ask questions during court sessions so that 
they would be just as invested and informed as anyone else on the Tribunal. To that end, 
he wanted the four voting members to hear the alternates’ opinions before voting on any 
issues. Everyone agreed with Parker, and the following day, the U.S. Army replaced the 
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alternates’ chairs with grander ones. Spectators would no longer be able to distinguish 
voting members from alternates based solely on the seating arrangement.372 
The above examples illustrate how important public perception of the Trial was to 
Nuremberg’s American participants. Biddle wanted to be Tribunal president, but Jackson 
feared that the world would perceive the Trial as being too American. He knew the world 
was watching and that onlookers would assume the Trial was an American affair even 
though that was not true. He did not want perception to shape reality. Biddle understood 
this, so he allowed one of the British judges to serve as president. Parker feared that his 
role as the American alternate was insignificant, that he would not be on equal footing 
with the other judges, that perhaps he was only there for appearance’s sake. If he was 
going to represent his country overseas, he was going to be as valuable a member of the 
Tribunal as any other. Given the gravitas he brought with him to Nuremberg, it is no 
wonder he was also concerned with how the press would perceive the Trial’s legitimacy. 
If the Tribunal could not win the public relations battle, then Parker knew the world 
would not accept the Trial’s authority to adjudicate the defendants’ crimes. The world 
had to see that Nuremberg was fair and just, not vengeance run amok. Jackson, Biddle, 
and Parker all wanted to do what was best to ensure the Trial’s integrity and legacy, even 
before it began. Time, however, was against them. They needed the Trial to be fair but 
not at the expense of taking so long that the world became distracted and lost interest. 
Unfortunately, none of the participants had any experience with this kind of trial. 
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Nuremberg was like a train leaving the station, heading down an unfinished path. The 
train was not going to stop until the judges reached a final verdict, so everyone involved 
had to stay ahead of the locomotive to constantly keep laying new tracks. 
The night before the Trial was set to begin, the Soviets attempted to derail the 
train. They insisted on postponing the Trial because their chief prosecutor had contracted 
malaria and would not be in Nuremberg for the opening day.373 The Tribunal had already 
dealt with one administrative challenge the month before when it discovered that not all 
of the defendants had access to counsel, but it acted quickly to secure legal representation 
for each of the Germans and averted a potential crisis. But this new problem seemed 
carefully timed to prevent the Trial’s commencement. Jackson asked the Soviets if 
someone else could take the Russian prosecutor’s place so that the Trial could begin as 
scheduled, but the response he received was that no one else was authorized to serve as a 
backup. Jackson insisted that the Trial needed to begin on November 20 without delay, 
and he had the support of the American, British, and French judges. Once it became clear 
that the Tribunal would not postpone the proceedings, the Soviet delegation, after 
consulting with Moscow, relented. The chief Russian prosecutor would have to arrive as 
soon as he could.374 All this commotion left Parker wondering what to expect. There had 
never been a trial like this before—conducted in four different languages with a bench 
made up of judges from four separate countries representing distinct forms of  
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jurisprudence. Parker imagined that Nuremberg would be a spectacle and wrote to his 
daughter the night before that “there will be a big crowd [of newspaper men] for the 
opening tomorrow.”375  
He was right. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so 
calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot 
tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being 
repeated. 
Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement at Nuremberg, 1945376 
 
 
Robert Jackson confidently approached the podium in the center of Courtroom 
600, unclipped his prepared remarks, placed them on the lectern, and began to speak. His 
words flowed smoothly, methodically, and gracefully. Everyone fixed their gaze on the 
man who had taken a leave of absence from the U.S. Supreme Court to serve as the Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg. With news correspondents from twenty nations present, the 
eyes of the world were on Jackson, and he knew it. Jackson’s powerful oratory detailed 
the defendants’ crimes, explained the Nazis’ rise to power, and probed the depths of 
human depravity. Never again, he insisted, would the world tolerate aggressive war and 
the crimes against humanity that accompanied the Nazi regime. The nations of the world 
longed for peace and security, and Jackson was going to do everything in his power to 
ensure it. 
Jackson’s forty-five-page opening statement, which took him nearly four hours to 
read, was an intellectual tour de force that wowed spectators. “It was the subject of quite 
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flattering comment,” Jackson remembered years later. “There was a great outpouring of 
complimentary remarks about the speech. The press, as a whole, reacted very favorably 
to it.”377 The American judge, Francis Biddle, described it as “eloquent and moving.”378 
Jackson made clear that the defendants had been part of a conspiracy (Count One of the 
Indictment) to wage aggressive war (Count Two – Crimes against Peace). The Nazis had 
blatantly violated decades of international law designed to prevent unjustified conflict. 
Jackson, heavily influenced by legalism—of the idea that the rule of law and legal trials 
are the best way to ensure order and stability while eschewing violence and chaos—
wanted the Nuremberg Trial to adjudicate the defendants’ guilt and curtail future acts of 
aggression.379 In his mind, “civilization” itself would be at stake if the Western world did 
not come together to condemn the defendants’ actions and bolster international law in 
order to maintain peace.380 
However, the American judge-turned-prosecutor additionally believed that the 
conspiracy which led Nazi Germany to wage aggressive war also resulted in Crimes 
against Humanity: “It is my purpose to open the case, particularly under Count One of the 
Indictment, and to deal with the Common Plan or Conspiracy to achieve ends possible 
only by resort to Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity.” To 
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Jackson, the defendants’ crimes had been part of a sequence. The conspiracy came first, 
and the remaining charges stemmed from it. Crimes against Humanity had never before 
existed in international law, so Jackson focused more on aggressive war since it was a 
more established charge, and Biddle and John Parker decided to only consider evidence 
of it within the context of the war in Europe from 1939 to 1945.  
Rather than overlooking or even downplaying Crimes against Humanity, Jackson 
made it a central part of his opening statement. He defined Crimes against Humanity as 
“mass killings of countless human beings in cold blood,” and described wartime 
Germany as “one vast torture chamber,” where victims’ cries could be “heard round the 
world,” bringing “shudders to civilized people everywhere.”381 He also directly addressed 
the persecution of the Jews in a detailed section entitled “Crimes against the Jews,” even 
making it the longest section of his entire opening statement at approximately 4,000 
words. Jackson’s focus on Crimes against Humanity and Jewish persecution ultimately 
raised awareness of the Holocaust and advanced the development of human rights.  
Even though an implicit connection between the Nuremberg Trial and human 
rights and the Holocaust might seem obvious, this is a point of contention among 
scholars. Nearly every major work on Nuremberg asserts that Jackson emphasized 
Counts One and Two above Count Four, that he cared far more about Nazi aggression 
than Nazi atrocities.382 Judith Shklar believes the reason for this was because Jackson 
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wanted “to vindicate his own and Secretary Stimson’s position on the Neutrality Act and 
Lend Lease before America had entered the war,” meaning that Jackson wanted to 
demonstrate that the U.S. was justified in aiding Britain because the Germans had already 
violated established international law.383 Even Elizabeth Borgwardt, who has argued most 
forcefully that the Nuremberg Trial played a significant role in the institutionalization of 
human rights, declares that if it were possible to ask Jackson in his sleep what Nuremberg 
was about, he would have said, “it’s about aggression—the outlawry of aggressive 
war.”384 Similarly, the notion that Nuremberg contributed to our general understanding of 
the Holocaust, or that the horrors of the Nazis’ Final Solution led to the rise of human 
rights, is hotly contested. Whereas Borgwardt interprets Nuremberg as the fulcrum of 
human rights law, Donald Bloxham believes the Trial had a more limited impact, 
especially regarding any understanding of the Holocaust.385 He argues that the Trial did 
very little to raise awareness of the Holocaust, or genocide in general, and that it actually 
had the opposite effect. The American (and British) prosecutors failed to differentiate 
between concentration and extermination camps, highlight the Nazis’ anti-Semitism, or 
include more eyewitness testimony. In his summation, these shortcomings not only 
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downplayed the Nazis’ primary goal of eradicating the Jewish population, they also 
negatively influenced Holocaust scholarship well into the 1990s.  
A closer examination of Jackson’s arguments in his opening statement and 
throughout the Trial reveal that Nuremberg did more to highlight Nazi atrocities, the 
Holocaust, and human rights violations than has been previously understood. The 
evidence that the Allies presented on Crimes against Humanity was also enough to 
convince Biddle and Parker that most of the defendants charged with that count were 
guilty. While hindsight suggests that Jackson and his team of prosecutors could have 
done more with the charge of Crimes against Humanity, in particular by emphasizing the 
unique plight of the Jews and the tragic consequences of the extermination camps, and 
that Biddle and Parker could have defined the charge in broader terms to include the 
years before 1939, such musings are ahistorical. International lawyers today might have 
emphasized human rights more emphatically, but Jackson and the prosecutors were 
operating in uncharted waters and did not want to overreach (and possibly lose 
convictions). Also, almost no one in the immediate postwar period, save for Rafael 
Lemkin, the Jewish intellectual from Poland who lost his family in the Holocaust and 
coined the term “genocide,” could grasp the level of dehumanization and terror that the 
Final Solution inflicted on the Jewish people. Jackson, Biddle, Parker, and many other 
Nuremberg participants had their doubts about the magnitude of the Nazis’ crimes, but 
the Trial opened their eyes to the harsh reality of the world they now inhabited. Their 
experiences in Germany had a lasting impact on their worldview and forced them to 
reconsider the nature of individual rights, freedoms of speech and religion, democracy, 
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and America’s role in safeguarding such liberties around the world. In short, Nuremberg 
transformed each of them in varying degrees because of the human rights issues raised 
during the Trial, not the technical points of international law. 
The Trial Begins 
Hermann Göring, the most notorious Nazi who was still alive after the war, was 
only supposed to enter his plea—schuldig (“guilty”) or nicht schuldig (“not guilty”). But 
Hitler’s number two simply could not pass up an opportunity to shine in the spotlight. He 
stood slowly from his seat, made his way past his fellow defendants, approached the 
microphone, and pulled out a piece of paper. Guards, interpreters, prosecutors, and judges 
looked on. The German defense attorneys had to swivel around and crane their necks to 
watch. The lights and cameras were trained on Göring. The court’s translators went to 
work as he began to speak in German: 
“Before I answer the question of the Tribunal as to whether I plead guilty or not 
guilty…” 
The gavel sounded. Göring stopped and looked up.  
The distinguished British barrister and chief judge of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), Lord Geoffrey Lawrence, had interrupted him. “I informed the court that 
defendants were not entitled to make a statement,” Judge Lawrence said. “You must 
plead guilty or not guilty.” 
Göring was annoyed. In Nazi Germany, no one dared interrupt him. He had 
founded the Gestapo (secret police) and the early concentration camps, he was speaker of 
the Reichstag (Parliament), commander of the Luftwaffe (air force), and senior 
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commander of the Wehrmacht (armed forces). He had been a flying ace in World War I 
alongside the Red Baron, Manfred von Richtoven, and received the Pour le Merite, 
Germany’s highest wartime honor.386 He had received more than a dozen military 
decorations and awards. Just a few months earlier, he had been the second-most powerful 
man in Germany.  
But the Tribunal was unconcerned with his accolades. In this court, the law 
granted him no special treatment, so for the first time in two decades, Göring was no 
better than anyone else. He remained silent for a few seconds, glanced down at his 
unfolded paper—he had so much more to say—then looked back up at Judge Lawrence 
and responded, “I plead not guilty.” Göring refolded his paper, squeezing his thumb and 
forefinger along the crease, and returned to his seat. Over the course of the next year, he 
would have his chance to speak.  
Following Göring’s plea, Jackson began his opening statement. He clearly 
focused on Counts One and Two (Conspiracy and Crimes against Peace), but Count Four 
(Crimes against Humanity) was also significant to him. In fact, at the London Conference 
when Jackson met with Hersch Lauterpacht to discuss the IMT Charter and Indictment, 
Jackson intended to use Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first president of Israel, 
to provide a broad overview of the Jewish case against the Nazis and the suffering they 
endured during the Holocaust.387 In Jackson’s mind, the defendants’ crimes had been part 
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of a sequence. He believed the German defendants were first and foremost part of a 
conspiracy to undermine the peace that had come about after World War I, so the Allies 
charged all twenty-two men on trial with Count One. The conspirators then completely 
disregarded international law by waging aggressive war, so the Allies charged sixteen of 
the defendants with Count Two. In Jackson’s opening statement, he cited the following 
examples as proof that Germany had violated established international law: Treaty of 
Versailles, Pact of Locarno, Munich Pact, Geneva Protocol of 1924, Eighth Assembly of 
the League of Nations of 1927, Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, Sixth Pan-American 
Conference of 1928, and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression on July 3, 
1933. Although Germany did not sign or accede to all of these international agreements, 
Jackson pointed out that Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution stated, “The generally 
accepted rules of international law are to be considered as binding integral parts of the 
law of the German Reich.”388 Once the war started, the majority of the defendants 
committed War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, so eighteen of them faced Count 
Three, while a another group of eighteen faced Count Four.  
When the Allied prosecution teams met to divvy up responsibilities between 
them, Jackson wanted the U.S. to focus on Conspiracy (see Table 3). French and Soviet 
jurisprudence had no concept of a crime of conspiracy, but the American legal system 
did, so Jackson was more than happy to take the lead on Count One. In Jackson’s mind, 
the conspiracy charge was intertwined with the other three, so when the Americans 
presented their case, they often showed how the defendants’ conspiracy led to Crimes 
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against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity. His arguments must have been 
effective since Biddle commented years later in his autobiography that he believed that 
aggressive war “necessarily results in the kind of savagery in which the German leaders 
indulged, the torture rooms of the Gestapo and the concentration camps.”389 While 
Jackson’s strategy was convincing to the American judge, it also had the unintended 
effect of annoying the other Allies who felt Jackson kept using up all of their evidence 
before they could make their arguments.390 However, Jackson’s prosecutorial approach 
demonstrates that even though he focused on conspiracy to wage aggressive war, he 
believed all four charges were interconnected. 
 
Table 3. Responbilities of each Allied Prosecution Team 
 
COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES 
United States 
Count One – Conspiracy or Common Plan 
(as it applied to crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity) 
Great Britain Count Two – Crimes against Peace 
France 
Counts Three & Four in Western Europe – 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
Soviet Union 
Counts Three & Four in Eastern Europe – 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
 
 
                                                 
389 Biddle, In Brief Authority, 477. 
390 Smith, Reaching Judgment, 66-7, 84-5. This meeting took place on August 13, 1945. 
187 
Jackson contended that the Nazis had always conspired to eliminate all Jews from 
the face of the earth.391 The early statistic he provided estimating that the Nazis had killed 
5.76 million Jews was remarkably accurate, thanks in large part to the meticulous records 
the Nazis kept. Members of the U.S. Army and American prosecution amassed more than 
5 million pages of documentary evidence (see Figure 7).392 Much of this could not be 
used during the proceedings since it would have taken too long to read all of the 
documents out loud in court while the interpreters translated them into three other 
languages, but Jackson made sure the evidence appeared in print.393 Following the Trial, 
Jackson sent eight volumes of evidence of Nazi war crimes to President Harry Truman. 
“It was considered desirable to publish these,” Jackson said, “because they are the most 
complete and accurate documentation that history affords as to the origin and preparation 
of a war.”394 Jackson believed the best way to prove the defendants’ guilt was by 
referencing their own records. “If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you 
would think me intemperate and unreliable,” Jackson said. “ Fortunately, we need not 
take the word of any witnesses but the Germans themselves.” He quoted from one 
German report that ordered the shooting of women and children in the Warsaw ghetto, 
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U.S. Army staffers organizing 
documentary evidence collected for 
the Nuremberg Trial. Source: 
USHMM. 
while another discussed exterminating so-called “undesirables” with infectious drugs, gas 
chambers, and poison bullets.395 The documentary evidence made it impossible for any 
reasonable person to deny the Nazis’ crimes.396 
 
Figure 7. Organizing German Documents for the Nuremberg Trial 
 
 
 
Jackson’s decision to rely almost exclusively on written documentation created an 
archival record of the Final Solution that ultimately laid the foundation for Holocaust 
studies. As Lawrence Douglas has stated, “Many important histories of the Holocaust, 
such as Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews, could not have been 
written without the massive archive of documentary material assembled through 
Nuremberg’s act of legal discovery.”397 Even Donald Bloxham, who criticizes 
Nuremberg’s treatment of the Holocaust, admits that the records provided a conceptual 
framework for the Holocaust.398 This evidence also enabled Americans, who tended to be 
more skeptical of the reports coming out of Europe, to wrap their heads around the 
horrors. A Gallup Poll in 1943 indicated that not even half (47 percent) of Americans 
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believed the reports of German atrocities against the Jews. This was partly because few 
Americans newspapers covered these tragedies.399 Jackson openly admitted that he did 
not initially believe what he had heard about the Nazi concentration camps, but after 
examining the Germans’ own documents, he realized the evidence was 
incontrovertible.400 Telford Taylor, Jackson’s top aide who became the chief U.S. 
prosecutor for the subsequent Nuremberg military trials (NMT) from 1946 to 1949, 
commented that it was because of Nuremberg that he finally began to grasp “the full 
scope of the Holocaust.”401 Francis Biddle concluded that one of the chief purposes of the 
Nuremberg Trial was to “leave a record of the horrors that this last and greatest of all 
wars had brought in its wake.”402 And after the Trial was over, Parker noted, “When I 
first heard the story of the killing of the Jews I could not believe it; but there is no 
question as to its truth.”403 President Truman cited the Nuremberg Trial months later 
when he released a statement regarding crimes against the Jews, even pointing out that 
1.5 million Jews in Europe had no homes or food as the result of “the murderous reign of 
Hitlerism.”404 Jackson’s decision to focus on documentary evidence made Americans 
aware of the horrors of the Holocaust and ultimately led to a new academic discipline. 
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The connection between the IMT and the Holocaust is also apparent in later 
histories of human rights. For example, the foremost expert on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), Johannes Morsink, who argues that the connection between 
the Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946) and the origins and drafting of the UDHR (1947–1948) 
is “not as close as the dates suggest,” accepts the premise that the IMT and the Holocaust 
were connected.405 He says that “the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis” are what allowed 
human rights advocates to gain intellectual legitimacy, and it was the Holocaust that 
ultimately influenced the UDHR’s drafters, who were morally revolted by what the Nazis 
had done.406 
One of the criticisms Bloxham levels against Jackson is that his “opening 
address…included no references to camps in the section ‘crimes against the Jews.’”407 
Careful scrutiny of Jackson’s statement, however, suggests otherwise. In Jackson’s 
discussion of Kristallnacht, a violent riot against Jews throughout Nazi Germany on 
November 9-10, 1938, he stated clearly that the Gestapo “ordered twenty to thirty 
thousand ‘well-to-do Jews’ to be arrested. Concentration camps were to receive them. 
Healthy Jews, fit for labor, were to be taken.” In addition, throughout this section of 
Jackson’s opening speech, the Chief U.S. Prosecutor made numerous references to the 
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fatal hardships the Jews faced under the Nazis. He mentioned how the “Jews were 
segregated into ghettos and put into forced labor” as part of the “Nazi design for killing 
Jews” and the Nazi “policy of Jewish extermination.” He did not shy away from the 
“sufferings” the Jews faced, the “forced labor,” or the “gassing.” While it is true that 
Jackson did not make a distinction between concentration camps and death camps, the 
evidence demonstrates that he still made a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
the Holocaust, long before that term even existed in the American lexicon.408  
Not only did Jackson use the Germans’ own words against them to show the 
magnitude of their crimes against humanity, he also instructed his team of prosecutors to 
show motion pictures the Nazis had created, as well as footage the Americans had 
recorded of concentration camps they liberated. “Our proof will be disgusting,” Jackson 
averred, “and you will say I have robbed you of your sleep. But these are the things 
which have turned the stomach of the world and set every civilized hand against Nazi 
Germany.”409 Jackson made good on his promise. On November 29, 1945, the 
prosecution showed the Tribunal, the press, and the world what the American troops saw 
when they liberated the camps.410  
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The reel began with a black background and white letters that read “Nazi 
Concentration and Prison Camps.”411 The hour-long presentation played only 6,000 of 
the 80,000 feet of film the U.S. Army recorded, but that was more than enough to 
illustrate the unimaginable atrocities that took place.  
American GIs listened as survivors from each of the Nazi concentration camps, 
beginning with Leipzig in eastern Germany and concluding with Bergen-Belsen in 
northern Germany, recounted the tragedies. At Leipzig, SS guards lured 220 starving 
prisoners into a wooden building, lit it on fire, and then shot anyone who attempted to 
flee. Those who survived the hail of bullets died when they ran into an electric fence. At 
the Penig camp, many enslaved Hungarian women suffered from hunger, fever, and even 
gangrene. At Ordruhf, General Dwight D. Eisenhower personally inspected the camp, 
learned from former inmates the torture prisoners had to endure, and saw the grill where 
the Nazis burned prisoners’ bodies. He then invited American politicians to see the camp 
for themselves, but he forced Nazis living nearby to tour the camp as well. At Hadamar, 
survivors were so emaciated that they looked like walking skeletons. Liberating troops 
wearing gas masks exhumed graves so that a doctor could perform autopsies on the 
decaying corpses. Many of the victims died when the Nazis injected them with fatal 
doses of morphine. Some may have actually survived the overdoses, but then died from 
suffocation after being buried alive. At Meppene, Russian prisoners had to be deloused 
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because of the filth and disease they endured. They recounted how the Nazis considered 
it a privilege to allow a few camp inmates to sift through the ashes of burned garbage for 
scraps of food. At Breendock, a Belgian prisoner described how two Nazis split him apart 
at his crotch, while others illustrated the gruesome beatings, cigarette burns, and tortures 
they experienced, including the use of a thumbscrew—a vice that would crush a 
prisoner’s fingers. And at Buchenwald, which the narrator specifically described as an 
extermination camp, the film showed the ovens that cremated nearly 400 prisoners in a 
10-hour workday. The Nazis extracted gold teeth from the bodies before removing the 
bone ash from the crematorium, thus demonstrating just how dehumanizing the whole 
process was.412  
The concentration camp footage was dramatic and offered a glimpse of the crimes 
against humanity for which Jackson believed the German defendants were responsible.413 
The United States Holocaust Memorial and Museum (USHMM) has said that when the 
prosecution showed this footage, it “brought the Holocaust into the courtroom” and had a 
significant impact on everyone in attendance, including the defendants.414 Biddle, sitting 
on the judges’ bench, noted in his memoir that viewing this film in court “with the 
bulldozers piling up the huge stacks of naked, unidentifiable bodies, had unmanned most 
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of the prisoners.”415 The famed American reporter, Walter Cronkite, who was a junior 
member of the American press corps at that time, recalled decades later that the German 
defendants watched the footage, “buried their heads in their hands,” and “sobbed 
openly.”416 New York Times reporter Raymond Daniell, who wanted to avoid humanizing 
men who had just waged war against the U.S., offered a different depiction, describing 
the defendants as cool and collected, showing no emotion whatsoever because the film 
“had been too appalling even for tears.”417 
The crimes against humanity that the footage revealed evoked visceral responses 
from most of the people in attendance. Cronkite was so angry at the defendants for what 
they had done that he wanted to spit on them, something he said he had never considered 
doing before.418 Daniell reported that the audience was too stunned for words, but “one 
soldier remarked: ‘God, this makes me feel like killing the first German I meet.’”419 The 
footage was so unnerving that when the judges announced that court would adjourn, they 
forgot to follow protocol and specify what time they would reconvene the following 
day.420 
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No one, however, was more affected by the camp footage than Parker. Never in 
his wildest dreams could he have anticipated the horrors contained in the footage. Writing 
to his son, Francis, Parker reported, “I had an awful experience this afternoon. They put 
on moving pictures showing conditions in the concentration camps when the American 
troops moved in. The pictures were horrible. … I shall certainly be glad to get this 
unpleasant job behind me and get back home….”421 Parker’s disgust was so evident that 
those closest to him could sense it. His colleague, Biddle, commented that “Parker hated 
evil…The atrocities, to his emotions at least, were incredible, even if his mind could 
accept them.”422 When Parker returned home to North Carolina during the Trial’s 
Christmas recess, his family members knew something was bothering him. His nephew, 
Tom Lockhart, wrote to him in January 1946 and encouraged him to “Please take care of 
yourself, and don’t let the horrible evidence given at the trial bother you too much.”423 
Parker eventually got used to the harrowing evidence, as he indicated in another letter 
back home, but the horrors he witnessed would inspire him to advocate more forcibly for 
human rights after he returned stateside.424 Although only those in the courtroom were 
able to watch this footage, much of it appeared sixteen years later in the film Judgment at 
Nuremberg (1961), which was loosely based on the IMT and the NMT. 
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The moving pictures of the concentration camps set the tone that Jackson 
established in his opening statement, that the defendants had been responsible for 
committing such unimaginable crimes that the Nuremberg Trial must safeguard the world 
from future atrocities. The American prosecution emphasized this kind of shocking 
evidence again on December 13, when Jackson’s aide, Thomas Dodd (who went on to 
become a U.S. Senator after the Trial), addressed the conditions of the Nazi concentration 
camps when the U.S. Army arrived. Reading from an Army report, Dodd described how 
prisoners with “the best and most artistic” tattoos were killed, and their tattooed skin was 
removed and treated with chemicals for preservation. Some of these specimens were then 
turned into “ornamental household articles,” such as lamp shades. Dodd reluctantly 
offered another exhibit into evidence, “a human head with the skull bone removed, 
shrunken, stuffed, and preserved. The Nazis had one of their many victims decapitated, 
after having him hanged for fraternizing with a German woman, and fashioned this 
terrible ornament from his head.”425 The reporter for The New York Times was apparently 
so shocked by this evidence that he hardly knew how to react to it, choosing instead to 
simply state, “A shrunken human head and lamp shades made of human skin were 
submitted as evidence at the trial today.”426  
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The following day in court, one of the German defense attorneys asked the 
Tribunal if Dodd’s report could be stricken from the record since it contained testimony 
that was “so horrifying and so degrading to the human mind” that news outlets around the 
world were already reporting on it, and all of “civilization is justly indignant.” It would 
be months before the defense would have its turn to respond to such lurid accusations, 
and this particular defense lawyer was concerned about losing his case in the court of 
public opinion. Jackson responded by saying that the Charter gave the prosecution the 
authority to enter into evidence anything that is relevant and has probative value, and he 
believed the report Dodd read from met both criteria. He saw no reason to change the 
Charter’s evidentiary rules simply because “an affidavit recites horrors.” In fact, Jackson 
commented that the U.S. Army’s report could hardly be more shocking than “documents 
that have proceeded from sources of the enemy itself.”427 The other Allied prosecutors 
agreed with Jackson, and the Tribunal ruled against the German defense. A week later, 
the Trial recessed for Christmas.  
Jackson wanted to plow ahead with the proceedings and opposed taking a nearly 
three-week-long break, but the British insisted. This was the first time since 1938 that 
they could celebrate Christmas outside the shadow of war, and Jackson could not deny 
them this much-needed respite. The American justice thought about returning home, but 
flying conditions across the Atlantic were not ideal, so he took his son and some of his 
staff to the Mediterranean instead, spending several days in Cairo, Rome, Jerusalem, and 
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Bethlehem—where they were for Christmas Eve. The trip was refreshing, but hardly a 
vacation from work, as Jackson and his staff continued to plan their prosecution strategy, 
and Jackson’s secretary transcribed notes from the London Conference so that the 
Tribunal would know more about the Allies’ discussions the previous summer when they 
organized the IMT.428 
Once the proceedings resumed after New Year’s, the U.S. finished its 
presentations against the German organizations, and then the remaining Allies took turns 
making their cases. The British began their arguments against individual German 
defendants, while the French and Soviet teams, who were responsible for Counts Three 
and Four in Western and Eastern Europe respectively, emphasized the cruelties the Third 
Reich had inflicted on human beings. In January, the French called to the witness stand a 
survivor of a Nazi concentration camp to explain what she had experienced, while in 
February, the Soviets compiled a series of graphic images into a film called “The 
Atrocities by the German Fascist Invaders in the U.S.S.R..”429 Parker had let it slip that 
he, like most Americans at the time, thought the Soviets were exaggerating their claims 
that they had been victims of Nazi atrocities, so the Soviet prosecutors were determined 
to change that perception. According to one report, the images from their film were so 
horrific that Parker felt sick and had to leave the courtroom.430 The American 
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psychologist at Nuremberg, G.M. Gilbert, asked the German defendants how they felt 
about the Soviets’ film. One replied that he could not take any more of these images, that 
he was “drowning in filth.” Another defiantly stated, “Anyone can make an atrocity film. 
You only have to take the corpses out of the grave and show a tractor shoving them back 
in again.”431 Biddle admitted he was growing tired of “sitting on my tail,” listening to so 
much repetitive evidence.432 He was more interested in hearing from the defense, and 
thankfully, he did not have to wait long. The Allies completed their case against 
individual Germans on February 27, and the defense began in early March. 
Jackson’s Feuds 
The media’s interest in the Trial had diminished by the time the prosecution 
rested. Jackson’s strategy emphasizing documentary evidence, which the other Allies 
largely adopted, had created a boring ordeal, as various prosecutors often read out loud 
pages of documents. Parker’s brother, Sam, wrote in February that “Every one [sic] over 
here is still very interested in the trial at Nurnberg. The papers are not carrying as full 
accounts as they did at first, but the press seems to be emphasizing the important 
happenings.”433 Onlookers were especially eager to hear how Hermann Göring, who had 
been Hitler’s second-in-command until nearly the end of the war, would defend 
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himself.434 Göring was scheduled to take the stand in the second week of March, but 
before that happened, Winston Churchill gave his famous “Iron Curtain” speech on 
March 5. Churchill was no longer the prime minister of Great Britain by that time, so 
when he appeared at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, alongside President 
Truman, he spoke candidly of Soviet aggression and territorial expansion in Eastern 
Europe, describing it as an “iron curtain” descending across the continent. As Göring 
read the news, he could not help but smile. He was certain that Churchill’s speech would 
work in his favor and distract the Allies at Nuremberg just enough to keep them off 
balance. Churchill’s remarks were significant enough for Parker to mention them to his 
wife on March 6. Parker agreed with the former prime minister about notifying Russia 
that the U.S. “will not tolerate any attempt at world domination on her part. …The way to 
avoid war with Russia is to take a firm stand now.”435 Biddle’s wife, Katherine, also 
commented on Churchill’s speech, describing it as “pretty dreadful” and a “tinder 
box.”436 
On March 13, Göring sat on the witness stand and began defending himself 
against the allegations that he had violated international laws. In his mind, he had acted 
as a patriotic German soldier, and he did not regret that. His defense lawyer allowed 
Göring to speak for himself, presuming that this would be the Nazi’s last opportunity to 
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shape his legacy.437 Once Göring finished, Jackson began his cross-examination on 
March 18.  
Every major work on Nuremberg describes Jackson’s cross-examination as a 
failure—even the contemporary radio broadcasts described it as “devastating” to the 
prosecution’s case.438 Scholars typically claim that for three days, Jackson directed 
seemingly insignificant questions at Göring. For example, the first day he focused on the 
early history of the Nazi Party and how it came to power, asking about the Reichstag fire 
in 1933 and the Röhm Putsch in 1934, events that ultimately allowed Hitler to gain 
complete and absolute power over the federal government. Göring had been the second-
most powerful man in the Third Reich, and it would have made more sense for Jackson to 
focus on the crimes of which Göring was accused, but instead he wanted to show how the 
regime’s crimes stemmed from a conspiracy from the very beginning.439  
On the second day, Jackson became so frustrated with Göring’s refusal to answer 
questions directly with either a “yes” or a “no” that he asked the judges to intervene and 
force Göring to stop making speeches from the stand. The Tribunal refused. Jackson 
wrote to President Truman to express his disappointment that Biddle in particular allowed 
Göring to give lectures from the witness stand: “The Tribunal let us down badly in the 
examination of Goering, utterly failing to make him answer the questions without 
lectures. I am afraid that I have little complaint, for the ruling was made at the suggestion 
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of Biddle.”440 Jackson was so furious with Biddle that he stormed into the judge’s office 
to let him know it. Parker was already in Biddle’s office when Jackson arrived and was 
shocked that the chief U.S. prosecutor would go so far as to confront the American 
judges behind closed doors. Biddle listened patiently to Jackson’s frustrations, but 
ultimately responded that it was not the Tribunal’s place to censor the defendants. If 
Jackson did not like Göring’s answers, then it was his responsibility to modify his cross-
examination. In a letter to his wife, Biddle stated bluntly, “Bob Jackson fell down terribly 
in his cross-examination of Goering today. He didn’t know his case….He asked us to 
protect him…but I thought he better do his own job.”441 This had not been the first time 
Jackson had an informal, and perhaps inappropriate, conversation with Biddle either. 
Telford Taylor recalled another such encounter on October 9, 1945, when Jackson and 
Biddle discussed ways of expediting the trial.442 
It was only on the third day that Jackson finally outmaneuvered Göring and got 
the defendant off balance with a discussion of the persecution of Jews. According to most 
scholarly works, though, Jackson enjoyed his advantage for only a brief moment. Once 
he pivoted to crimes the German air force had supposedly committed, Göring was able to 
use his expertise as a pilot and of aerial photography to undermine Jackson’s argument. 
At the end of day three, observers remarked that Göring had gotten the best of Jackson, 
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and most scholars have concluded that Jackson’s performance during the Trial never 
recovered from this humiliation.443 
No one can deny that Jackson’s cross-examination of the most notorious living 
Nazi was not his finest moment, but scholars have failed to highlight the significance of 
Jackson’s questions on day three concerning the persecution of the Jews. Throughout 
most of the Trial’s morning session on March 20, Jackson asked Göring about his role in 
seizing Jewish property and keeping the Jews from participating in the economic life of 
Europe. Göring admitted that he fully supported the wave of violence against Jewish 
people and the wanton destruction of Jewish shops that took place on November 9 and 
10, 1938, what is often referred to as Kristallnacht (“Night of Broken Glass”). What 
bothered him the most about the damage to Jewish businesses, though, was that the 
German insurance companies would suffer by having to compensate the shopkeepers. 
Göring sought to rectify this problem, as he saw it, by declaring, “I have only to issue a 
decree to the effect that damage resulting from these riots shall not have to be paid by the 
insurance companies.” Jackson also got Göring to admit that he wanted to exclude Jews 
from German resorts and German trains. Regarding the former, Göring said that the Jews 
should have their own resorts, but “not the best ones so that people might say: ‘You allow 
the Jews to get fit by using our … resorts.’” Regarding the latter, he reported that if a 
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train had no available compartments for Jews, then Jewish passengers would either have 
to leave the locomotive or “sit alone in the toilet.”444  
A close analysis of Jackson’s third-day cross-examination reveals that the chief 
U.S. prosecutor successfully proved Göring had committed crimes against humanity. 
Göring was responsible for persecuting a group of people based on religious grounds, 
even though such actions were not considered a crime under German law, which clearly 
fell under the definition of “Crimes against Humanity” as laid out in the IMT Indictment. 
Then, in his closing argument on July 26, Jackson connected these persecutions to his 
sincere belief that Göring and the other German defendants had always plotted to wage 
aggressive war:  
 
…the whole group of prewar crimes, including the persecutions within 
Germany, fall into place around the plan for aggressive war like stones 
in a finely wrought mosaic. Nowhere is the whole catalog of crimes of 
Nazi oppression and terrorism within Germany so well integrated with 
the crime of war as in that strange mixture of wind and wisdom which 
makes up the testimony of Hermann Goering.445 
 
 
Göring rebutted Jackson by claiming that he had acted in the best interests of the 
German people, that the Allies were guilty of committing the same crimes as the 
Germans, and that the IMT was nothing more than victor’s justice. Before the Trial had 
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even started, Göring had described the proceedings as “a cut-and-dried political affair” in 
which “the victors are the judges … I know what’s in store for me.” 446 Göring’s final 
words also contained a defense that struck at the Nuremberg Trial’s very foundation. He 
claimed that the IMT had no jurisdiction over him, not just because he believed he had 
been charged retroactively with crimes, but because the Nuremberg Trial violated 
Germany’s national sovereignty: 
 
Mr. Jackson stated further that one cannot accuse and punish a state, but 
rather that one must hold the leaders responsible. One seems to forget 
that Germany was a sovereign state, and that her legislation within the 
German nation was not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign countries. 
No state ever gave notice to the Reich at the proper time, pointing out 
that any activity for National Socialism would be made subject to 
punishment and persecution.447 
 
 
No one seemed to pay any attention to Göring’s remarks at the time. In fact, a New York 
Times report on the defendants’ final statements included several quotes from Göring but 
omitted his statement on German national sovereignty. But Göring clearly renounced the 
IMT’s definition of crimes against humanity and what would later become international 
human rights.448 The most fundamental tenet of human rights is that they apply to every 
individual everywhere, even if they conflict with a country’s internal politics and laws. 
They necessarily supersede domestic laws, so a country cannot use national sovereignty 
as a shield to defend itself from abusing the human rights of its own people. That was the 
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crux of Göring’s defense when he stood before the court and addressed the world for the 
last time. He was still operating under the worldview that every nation had the authority 
to conduct internal affairs as it saw fit without interference from external powers. What 
Jackson had been arguing for, and what Biddle and Parker later affirmed in their final 
verdict, was that the legalistic societies of the world had taken steps over the past several 
decades to substantially change the way global powers interacted. National sovereignty 
had limitations. 
While Jackson waited for Biddle and Parker to reach a final verdict, he became 
engaged in a public fight with fellow Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. On April 22, 
1946, Chief Justice Harlan Stone passed away. Jackson was cautiously optimistic that 
President Truman would nominate him to take Stone’s place. Biddle echoed these 
aspirations, writing that he hoped “with all my heart” that Jackson would become 
chief.449 Roosevelt had assured Jackson when he made him an associate justice that he 
would elevate him to Chief one day. Unfortunately for Jackson, those promises died with 
the President.450 Stone’s unexpected death, however, opened a door of opportunity for 
Jackson, and onlookers quickly speculated that President Truman would nominate him to 
be the next Chief Justice. Black, having seniority over Jackson, did not want that to 
happen.  
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Black had been a senator from Alabama when Roosevelt nominated him for the 
Supreme Court in 1937, the same year the President’s Court-packing plan failed. Black, a 
New Deal liberal, had actually supported Court-packing and had earned a reputation for 
being a pro-government fighter. He was also from the South, which was not heavily 
represented on the Supreme Court at that time, so all of these attributes made him an 
attractive candidate, as Roosevelt wanted allies on the bench. The President surprised 
many Senators by nominating Black, but he soon received a shock himself when rumors 
began to circulate that Black had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan in his youth. The 
allegation was true, but no one could prove it before the Senate vote, and Black wisely 
chose to avoid commenting on the issue. The Senate confirmed Black by a 63-16 vote. 
Only afterward did newspapers confirm that Black had, in fact, been a Klan member.451 
Jackson interacted with Black in the late 1930s as solicitor general and attorney 
general in the Roosevelt administration, but the two were not close. As Jackson 
biographer Eugene C. Gerhart stated, while the two men were both lifelong Democrats, it 
was a “superficial similarity which becomes a difference on analysis.” Black had to join 
the Democratic Party in order to get ahead in rural Alabama. Party membership, as well 
as Klan membership, opened doors for Black, while the same political party affiliation 
had the opposite effect for Jackson in New York. Black also disdained wealthy and 
successful elites, having endured hard economic times himself, whereas Jackson was 
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quite adept at navigating such social spheres. The two men were not rivals before Jackson 
joined the Court, but their differences contributed to their impending feud.452  
The crux of the Jackson-Black feud involved a conflict of interest.453 In two 
Supreme Court cases—Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123 and 
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America—in 1944 and 1945 
respectively, the attorney for the unions was Black’s law partner from twenty years ago, 
Crampton Harris. In both cases, the majority of Supreme Court justices, led by Black, 
ruled in favor of the workers, represented by Harris. This apparent conflict of interest 
went unnoticed during World War II. For instance, when the justices released their ruling 
in the Jewell Ridge case on May 7, 1945, Americans were far more excited that the 
Germans had surrendered and the war in Europe was over. The Jewell Ridge Company 
proceeded to file a petition for a rehearing, in part because of Black’s past relationship 
with Harris. Even though Jackson had not sided with Black in the Jewell Ridge case, he 
still denied the company’s request. No procedure existed within the Court to force a 
justice to recuse himself, and Jackson did not want to set a precedent requiring a justice 
to do so. He did, however, write in his dissenting opinion that Black could have done 
more to address the appearance of a conflict of interest, as he could not be impartial. 
Black was furious and let Jackson know it. The feud gave Jackson even more incentive to 
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get away from Washington and the Court for a while and travel to London to hammer out 
the details of the IMT.454 
When word spread in late spring 1946 that Jackson might replace Stone as Chief 
Justice, journalist Drew Pearson reported that Black and fellow associate justice William 
O. Douglas threatened to resign in protest. This would have been disastrous for the 
Supreme Court’s reputation as an impartial arbiter and interpreter of the law. The 
American public held a high opinion of the Court after Roosevelt’s failed Court-packing 
plan, but this public feud between Jackson and Black began to portray the Supreme Court 
in a different light, as just another political institution with its own petty squabbles, secret 
cliques, and backdoor dealings.455 Then on May 16, another press report revealed private 
conversations the judges had while deliberating the Jewell Ridge case, characterizing the 
disagreements between Jackson and Black as a “blood feud raging on the Supreme 
Court.”456 Jackson was livid that one of his colleagues leaked private remarks to the 
press, but he decided to remain silent until a new Chief Justice was in place, which by 
that point he knew would not be himself. On June 6, President Truman nominated his 
Treasury Secretary, Fred M. Vinson, as Chief Justice, and the Senate swiftly confirmed 
him on June 21. 
In a bizarre move, while Jackson was in Europe, he cabled the Judiciary 
Committees of both the House of Representatives and the Senate to present his side of the 
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story. He voiced his approval of Vinson’s appointment, and then immediately revealed 
that Vinson’s main challenge was not to resolve a feud or “a mere personal vendetta 
among Justices.” Rather, the “controversy goes to the reputation of the Court for non-
partisan and unbiased decision.” He then summarized the Jewell Ridge and Tennessee 
Coal cases and noted that at the time the Court was reviewing them, he had expressed 
concern that Black had not recused himself. This put the Court in an awkward position 
since even Chief Justice Stone had recused himself in a case presented by his former law 
partners.457 Jackson claimed Black “became very angry and said that any opinion which 
discussed the subject at all would mean a ‘declaration of war.’” Jackson responded that 
he would not tolerate Black’s “bullying,” and that he was determined to maintain the 
Court’s integrity: “However innocent the coincidence of these two victories [Tennessee 
Coal and Jewell Ridge] … by Justice Black’s former law partner, I wanted that practice 
stopped. If it is ever repeated while I am on the Bench, I will make my Jewel Ridge [sic] 
opinion look like a letter of recommendation by comparison.”458 
Major newspapers printed Jackson’s cable, and reactions to the story were 
mixed.459 Parker supported Vinson’s appointment but felt sorry for Jackson. He knew all 
too well what it felt like to get one’s hopes up and feel the sting of defeat: “It means, 
most probably, that his life’s ambition has passed him by when he thought, and every 
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body [sic] else thought that he had it in his grasp. Black is responsible for defeating him; 
and the only comfort to him is that Black did not get the chief’s place. That would have 
created an intolerable situation for Jackson.”460 Even Parker’s brother, Sam, commented 
on Jackson’s statement, saying that his opinion of him had increased and that “it was a 
black day in the history of jurisprudence when Hugo Black was appointed to the Supreme 
Court.”461 Parker could grieve with Jackson since he had been denied his life’s ambition 
when the Senate failed to confirm him to the Supreme Court sixteen years before, but 
“Bob Jackson’s row with Black” made Parker glad that he was not a justice on the Bench. 
“I think life would be miserable for me there at this time,” Parker declared.462  
Biddle described Jackson as having “bitterness of the heart” and being “miserable 
with unhappiness” because Black had cost him the chief’s seat. He claimed Jackson had 
no basis for launching a public attack on a colleague and characterized the cable as a 
“foolish exhibition.” In his words, Jackson was “stumbling like a child in pain.” Biddle 
even noted that the British judges at Nuremberg were shocked that Jackson would air 
dirty laundry in public.463  
The Jackson-Black feud did not have a substantial impact on the Nuremberg Trial 
proceedings, but Telford Taylor recalled that the whole incident affected Jackson’s 
reputation. Jackson had already been assailed for his cross-examination of Göring in 
March, and just three months later even more people were critical of him, including 
President Truman. Taylor believed Jackson’s influence for the remainder of the Trial 
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diminished significantly.464 Once Jackson returned to the Supreme Court, he reported that 
relations between he and Black were quite cordial “as one gentleman to another.”465 
However, the Jackson-Black feud fueled Black’s opposition to war crimes trials in 
general and Jackson’s participation in Nuremberg specifically. In the years immediately 
following Nuremberg, Black attempted to undermine the authority of the Subsequent 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (IMTFE) by arguing for the expansion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction (see 
Chapter XI).  
Reaching A Verdict 
By the summer of 1946, there was nothing left for Jackson to do. The fate of the 
German defendants lay in the hands of the Tribunal, and Biddle and Parker were 
consumed with weighing all of the evidence. Neither of them had expected Nuremberg to 
last as long as it had, and the daily grind had taken a toll on them (see Figure 8). They 
often worked grueling hours, rising early in the morning and staying up until ten or 
eleven at night pouring over evidence and responding to numerous memos they received 
every day. Unlike Jackson, who could slip away from the Palace of Justice and allow 
other members of his team, or prosecutors from the other Allied powers, to handle the 
proceedings, the judges could not. They had to be present every time court was in 
session, and they deliberated in the judges’ chambers for hours.  
                                                 
464 Taylor, Anatomy, 420-1. 
465 Hutchinson, “The Black-Jackson Feud,” 221. 
213 
Both American judges had taken advantage of the Christmas break to get away 
from Germany and recharge. Parker had written to his daughter to express just how 
homesick, and even depressed, he was while in Nuremberg: 
 
We are grinding along with the trial and going as well as we can I 
reckon, but it is mighty slow. I get awfully blue and discouraged at 
times, but I try to keep a stiff upper lip and go about. After all, I didn't 
come here for pleasure, but strictly from a sense of duty; and I am doing 
the best I can. I certainly shall be glad, however, when the job is behind 
us and I can get back to the folks I love. You have no idea what it means 
to be in a foreign atmosphere doing an unpleasant job. I hope that what 
we are doing may add to the future of the world and the security of 
human relationships. If it does, I shall feel repaid for all the labor and 
worry that it has involved.466 
 
 
Biddle decided to travel to England for ten days to vacation with the British alternate, Sir 
Norman Birkett, and spend time with the British Prime Minister and the Lord High 
Chancellor. Biddle reported to President Truman that even though the Trial had been 
moving along slowly, much to the frustration of American newspapers, he felt it was 
more important for the Tribunal to be “building for the future” and creating a “structure 
[that] must be solid.”467 When he returned to Germany in January, he described his Trial 
experience with mixed feelings, saying, “I feel very much like a package of rather dried 
biscuits, tied up every morning, delivered, and delivered back at the house. We work very 
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long hours, but it is interesting and my associates agreeable and funny in different doses 
depending on the nationality.”468 
To break up the routine, Biddle and Parker traveled throughout the German 
countryside on the weekends, visited with American troops, and attended music concerts. 
They also held or attended receptions, of which there were many from all the delegations 
living in Nuremberg during that time. In fact, on the evening of March 20, 1946, the same 
day Jackson had questioned Göring, Biddle and Parker held a reception in honor of Willis 
Smith, President of the ABA.469 These kinds of activities often reenergized Parker, who 
sorely missed his family, friends, and colleagues back home. His Nuremberg letters from 
October 1945 to August 1946 reveal just how frequently he wished he could be home: 
“You don’t know how happy I will be to get the whole thing wound up and get back 
home where I can see my friends,” Parker wrote.470 
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Figure 8. Fatigued American Judges 
 
 
 
Biddle missed his wife, Katherine, a great deal, as well, writing to her on March 
5, 1946, “I drink too much; I sleep too little; I work too hard. The obvious answer is I 
need you.”471 Months earlier before the Trial even began, he had written to his brother, 
George, to ask him to bring any letters Katherine had written.472 The majority of Biddle’s 
Nuremberg correspondence reveals just how much he missed his wife, and she missed 
him just as much. In one particularly low moment for Katherine, she told her husband, 
“This hideous separation…is really driving us both crazy…I have been so unhappy in the 
last 24 hours that I have hardly dared to write you, because I cannot break down and cry 
to myself in the night anymore.”473 Katherine was so down at one point that she went to 
see a psychiatrist for help.474  
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Biddle became increasingly frustrated that his wife could not join him. He had 
gotten special permission from President Truman to allow her to travel to Nuremberg, but 
various circumstances prevented their reunion. At first, Biddle thought it was unwise for 
her to come, since General Dwight D. Eisenhower had initially refused to allow the other 
judges to bring their wives over.475 Later, when Eisenhower relaxed the Army’s policy 
and Katherine could travel to Nuremberg, she could not get the necessary paperwork. 
Biddle, in a fit of anger, believed Jackson was to blame, claiming, “I know he has it in for 
me” and lamenting, “I am afraid we are no longer friends.”476 Then, Biddle’s son, who 
was in the Army, contracted malaria while stationed in China, so Katherine stayed home 
to care for him.477 After that, Katherine had a play to put on, so she stayed in the U.S. for 
auditions, rehearsals, and productions. In February 1946, she injured her back and had to 
wait until she recovered before she could travel. Biddle shared with Katherine that he was 
so disappointed over her delayed arrival that it made him feel a combination of sickness 
and anger: “I suppose it is nothing more than my propensity to black rage when I can’t 
have my way,” he wrote.478 Oddly, when Katherine was finally able to travel to Germany, 
she only stayed for a few days.  
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During his wife’s extended absence, Biddle’s lonely heart turned to another 
woman for companionship. In the summer of 1946, Biddle had an affair with the famed 
British journalist Rebecca West. West had arrived in July to cover the Trial, and at age 
fifty-three, looking “tired, haggard, and gray,” she had no plans for romance.479 West had 
several lovers throughout her life, including English actor Charlie Chaplin and English 
writer H.G. Wells, with whom she had a son. She had known Biddle for nearly twenty 
years, having first met in the 1920s and then again in 1935 when she was in the U.S. to 
cover the New Deal.480 The two were close enough for Biddle to develop his own pet 
names for her, such as “my dearest Rat” and “my dragon lady.”481 Nuremberg offered the 
perfect opportunity to reconnect and consummate their feelings for one another. When 
Biddle saw her, he asked, “Why have you let yourself go? You could be as wonderful as 
ever.” West later admitted to one of her friends that Biddle had guessed correctly that she 
was not happy in her marriage. Rather than take offense to his remarks, she decided to 
color her hair and change her wardrobe.482 Biddle was instantly drawn to the attractive 
writer with gorgeous eyes and a captivating voice. He invited her to dinner at his private 
residence, the Villa Conradi, where the two became lovers. West confided that she and 
Biddle “were gloriously happy together.” She thought her love life was over, commenting 
that she had “put the shutters up,” but that Biddle “made me take them down.” The two 
spent ten days arm-in-arm in clear view of everyone else working in Nuremberg, many of 
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whom were men engaged in similar, promiscuous behavior.483 West stayed in Biddle’s 
villa and used a room decorated with erotic artwork as her office (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Francis Biddle in his Nuremberg Residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
West returned to London in early August with fond memories of her time with 
Biddle. One week later, she received the news that H.G. Wells had died, hurling her into 
a spiral of grief. To cope with her pain, and also to feel the warmth of Biddle’s embrace, 
she planned to return to Nuremberg soon after Wells’ cremation. Biddle, however, was 
concerned that his wife, Katherine, had learned of the affair and was planning to visit the 
villa. He instead suggested the possibility of traveling to Paris for a romantic rendezvous, 
even though such a plan was highly impractical.484 The night before the Tribunal read 
their final verdict, Biddle and West made love for the last time. They spent a few more 
days together while waiting for transport out of Germany, traveling to Prague, then to 
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England. She had hoped to stay in touch with the aristocratic lawyer and politician once 
the proceedings ended, but she never heard from him again. She later wrote in her diary, 
“Katherine has got him.”485 
Biddle’s affair with West exemplifies the painful drudgery and loneliness that 
loomed over the Nuremberg Trial. It is no wonder that Biddle asked President Truman, 
immediately after accepting the invitation to serve as the American judge, if Katherine 
could come with him. He did not want to be away from her and knew that he lacked the 
will power to remain celibate in her prolonged absence. West offered an escape from the 
horrors of Nuremberg, of a bombed-out city devoid of civilization, vibrancy, and love. 
For a brief period of time, Biddle poured out his affections into an attractive woman who 
coveted his attention. Once the Trial was over, though, he returned to his wife and life-
long companion. 
Before the Trial could end, though, the judges needed to reach a verdict. 
International law expert Quincy Wright, who had returned to the U.S. in the spring, wrote 
to Parker that the Trial was taking too long and needed to end soon. Audiences he 
encountered tended to be “sympathetic” toward the IMT, but he did not believe those 
sentiments would last much longer. He even relayed that the famed architect, Frank 
Lloyd Wright, who visited the University of Chicago to give a talk on architecture, pulled 
him aside to denounce the Nuremberg Trial. Quincy Wright noted that Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s knowledge of the Trial was “based upon a most extraordinary ignorance,” and 
that “like a good many people of artistic temperament…was more intent upon 
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proclaiming his apriori [sic] point of view” than listening to him, an expert on 
international law who helped lay the legal foundation for the Nuremberg Trial.486 Parker 
responded to Wright that while he recognized some people’s frustrations with the Trial’s 
length, he could see the light at the end of the tunnel and believed it was more important 
to conduct the proceedings properly and ensure Nuremberg’s lasting legacy on 
international law.487 
Biddle had grown tired of being away from home and was prepared to do 
whatever he could to conclude the Trial sooner rather than later. Thus, he secretly 
arranged meetings with the other judges in April, approximately four months before the 
defense rested its case, to begin preliminary conversations about how they wanted to draft 
their final judgment.488 Biddle hoped that by putting in this extra work now, everyone 
could go home sooner. He also felt the need to take charge since he generally had a low 
opinion of the other judges, at one point declaring, “This is not an able crowd on the 
‘bench’ – [Tribunal President] Lawrence never has a thought of his own, and adds 
nothing…The French add almost nothing.”489 He wanted to make sure the judges reached 
consensus whenever possible, but his depiction of his colleagues revealed he had 
doubts.490 
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The only member of the Tribunal with any significant expertise in international 
law was one of the French judges, but this does not mean, as some scholars have 
suggested, that Biddle and Parker were somehow unqualified to adjudicate the 
defendants’ guilt based on the merits of existing international law.491 As Part I 
illustrated, both American judges had been exposed to this rapidly developing field when 
they were in law school, having studied texts from the foremost American authorities on 
the subject. They also brought with them to Nuremberg several legal experts who briefed 
them on international agreements. Biddle may have only served as a judge for one year, 
but he was an experienced legal practitioner who understood the gravity of the Tribunal’s 
deliberations. He had also represented the U.S. government against the eight German 
saboteurs just a few years prior. Parker had more judicial experience than anyone else at 
Nuremberg, having served on the U.S. Fourth Circuit since 1925, so his mastery of the 
law was an invaluable asset when the judges began deciding the fates of the individual 
defendants. Parker actually had an annoying habit of reminding his peers how he 
conducted his courtroom back home, prompting one of the Russian judges to jokingly 
say, “Here comes the Fourth Circuit!” whenever Parker began to speak.492  
Of the four charges leveled against the German defendants, the ones that resulted 
in the highest conviction rates were War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. In both 
cases, eighteen defendants were indicted and sixteen were found guilty, resulting in a 
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conviction rate of 88 percent. By contrast, the judges found twelve out of sixteen 
defendants guilty of Count Two – Crimes against Peace (75 percent conviction rate), and 
only eight out of twenty-two defendants guilty of Count One – Conspiracy (36 percent 
conviction rate). Clearly, Jackson failed to provide enough evidence in support of Count 
One, but his team’s arguments were far more convincing for Count Four – Crimes against 
Humanity.493 In fact, when the judges read their final verdict against Göring, they cited 
his remarks from March 20, during Jackson’s cross-examination, as evidence that the 
defendant was unequivocally guilty of Crimes against Humanity.494  
By the middle of September, the judges seemed to be close to reaching a verdict, 
but Biddle suggested putting off the judgment for another week. This annoyed Parker, 
who was ready to be done and go home. It was obvious that he was at his wits end 
because he wrote to his wife to complain that Biddle “thinks we can’t be ready; but I 
think we could, if he would work as hard as I am to get the matter over with.”495 Parker 
rarely stopped working throughout the Trial. As a boy he never learned to play, so his 
work ethic and personality simply would not allow him to enjoy excessive amounts of 
leisure when there was a job to do. His frustrations with Biddle continued just a bit 
longer, though, as Biddle convinced Judge Lawrence to delay the verdict until the end of 
the month. 
On September 30, 1946, the judges returned to the courtroom to begin reading 
their verdict. Because the judgment contained more than 50,000 words, they took turns 
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over the course of two days reading all of it. Biddle read the section concerning “The 
Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy” while Parker read the first half of the next 
section on “War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,” which included subsections on 
“Murder and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War,” “Murder and Ill-Treatment of Civilian 
Population,” “Slave Labour Policy,” and “Persecution of the Jews” as punishable 
offenses.496 Biddle and Parker were deeply disturbed by the atrocities the German 
defendants had committed, particularly against the Jews. Biddle noted that one defendant 
had been complicit in murdering at least 3 million Jews, while another was “rabidly anti-
Semitic” and responsible for a euthanasia program that killed an estimated 275,000 
mentally disabled and elderly persons.497  
In the end, the judges found a total of nineteen defendants guilty, including 
Göring, who was sentenced to be hanged along with eleven others. But Göring somehow 
obtained a potassium cyanide pill and swallowed it just hours before his appointment 
with the gallows. It was the last decision he ever made. The Tribunal sentenced three of 
the remaining defendants to life in prison, four defendants to terms between ten and 
twenty years, and acquitted three defendants outright, much to the chagrin of the Soviet 
judges. Members of the media lingered to cover the acquittals, but most of the American 
participants quickly departed. The trial of the century was over. 
                                                 
496 “Judgement: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,” The Avalon Project: Documents in 
Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judwarcr.asp, 
accessed on July 11, 2016. One can easily confirm that Sir Norman Birkett wrote the Judgement, since he 
spelled “labour” with a ‘u.’ 
497 “ Judgement: Frank,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale 
Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judfrank.asp, accessed on July 11, 2016; “Judgement: Frick,” 
The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judfrick.asp, accessed on July 11, 2016. 
224 
CHAPTER IX 
 
PART III: HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER NUREMBERG
 
 
Robert Jackson, Francis Biddle, and John Parker left Germany with a sense of 
awe and responsibility. They knew they had been part of something special, and they 
were optimistic that the Trial would finally strengthen international law and prevent 
future acts of aggression. In the years immediately following Nuremberg, their hopes 
appeared to come true. The Trial led to the creation of the Nuremberg Principles, a set of 
seven guidelines for identifying war crimes, as well as international agreements like the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG, 1948), and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950). There were even calls to create a permanent 
international criminal court based on the Nuremberg model. The world was changing, 
and for a moment it appeared the U.S. would adopt a kind of Wilsonian internationalism, 
an idea put forward by President Woodrow Wilson nearly thirty years earlier that if 
nations embraced international agreements and international institutions then the world 
would be a more peaceful place. The U.S. had been instrumental in creating the United 
Nations (U.N.) and the International Military Tribunal (IMT), two beacons of a new 
internationalist era designed to curtail war through multilateralism and U.S. engagement 
in international institutions. For a moment, a revolution in international law was 
exploding with human rights at the forefront. 
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But only for a moment. 
The fear of communism ultimately blocked the emergence of a human rights 
revolution after the Nuremberg Trial. Conservative politicians attacked President Harry 
Truman’s policies both domestic (New Deal) and foreign (containment). This new group 
of isolationists was different from the hard-core isolationists of the previous generation 
who opposed virtually all political and economic entanglements between the U.S. and the 
rest of the world. The neo-isolationists feared government overreach, the loss of 
American sovereignty, and the spread of communism. In their eyes, the U.N. and the 
human rights movement exemplified all three. Putting German war criminals on trial was 
one thing, but developing a universal code of rights for all human beings that every 
nation had to respect was something else, and the idea of establishing a permanent 
international criminal court to enforce these principles was the last straw. Once the U.S. 
found itself locked in an economic and ideological battle with the Soviet Union, anything 
associated with the New Deal, including the U.N. and human rights, became tainted as a 
communist idea that had to be stopped.498  
Unfortunately, the anti-communist hysteria that infected the U.S. in the 1950s 
affected Jackson, Biddle, and Parker in ways they could not have anticipated. All three 
were skeptical of communist ideology, with Parker and Biddle wondering if one of their 
judicial colleagues had communist sympathies, while Jackson was particularly harsh in 
his rulings against members of the Communist Party.  
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In addition to the threat of communism, another challenge these men faced in 
promoting universal human rights was themselves. An examination of all three of their 
post-Nuremberg lives reveals that they failed to apply these universal concepts 
universally. Their devotion to American exceptionalism, that the U.S. holds a unique 
place in the world as the harbinger of human rights, helps explains why a human rights 
regime struggled to take root in the U.S. 
Jackson’s role in defending Nuremberg was more complicated than Biddle’s or 
Parker’s since he went back to work on the U.S. Supreme Court. As a general rule, 
Supreme Court justices tend not to inject their personal views into broader political 
conversations, preferring instead to remain above the fray in order to maintain the 
appearance of impartiality, and Jackson was no different. He published few articles on 
the Nuremberg Trial, at least when compared to Parker who referenced the Trial 
constantly, and he focused on his work—he did, after all, have a backlog of cases to deal 
with. As it turned out, though, the Court gave him ample opportunity to address issues 
related to Nuremberg. One of his colleagues tried to use the Court to discredit the very 
nature of war crimes trials, and Jackson was not tolerant of the Community Party in 
America. These issues tested his resolve and adherence to human rights in the Cold War 
era. 
Unfortunately, Jackson’s health began to fade in early 1954. He was in the 
hospital from March 30 until May 17, and then he returned to the Bench to vote with the 
majority in the Supreme Court’s historic Brown v. Board of Education ruling, which 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” clause. Nearly five months later, 
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though, Jackson had a heart attack and died on October 9, 1954. He was 62 years of age 
and never had a chance to witness the long-term impact Nuremberg would have on the 
world. 
Parker became the most outspoken supporter of human rights-related policies and 
international institutions in the postwar period. Through a series of speeches he gave to 
legal audiences, as well as articles and book reviews he published in legal journals, 
Parker expressed his unequivocal belief that the world needed the U.N., the UDHR, and 
the Genocide Convention in order to protect the rights of individuals and prevent future 
crimes against humanity. Had it not been for his controversial ruling following Brown v. 
Board of Education, saying that the Constitution does not require school integration, he 
might have been remembered as a champion of human rights. He died in 1958, and to this 
day, has been largely forgotten. 
Biddle came back to the U.S. unemployed. He had been solicitor general, attorney 
general, and a member of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals before going to Nuremberg, 
but his days as a public servant were over. For the next twenty years, Biddle was a 
lobbyist, a consultant, or a member of a Board of Trustees for various organizations, such 
as Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the internationally-focused Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Twentieth Century Fund, and Amnesty International 
USA (AI USA). He devoted most of his time and resources to defending the Trial and 
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arguing that the U.S. should lead the world in promoting human rights.499 He outlived 
both Jackson and Parker, dying on October 4, 1968, at the age of 82. 
Part III follows Jackson, Biddle, and Parker after October 1, 1946, when they 
returned home from the Nuremberg Trial. It demonstrates how their views on human 
rights and internationalism changed as a result of the Trial, but it also illustrates the limits 
of Nuremberg in convincing the American participants to advocate universal principles. 
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CHAPTER X 
FROM NUREMBERG TO SUPREME COURT
 
The trial and decision … does more than anything in our time to give to 
International Law what Woodrow Wilson described as “the kind of 
vitality it can only have if it is a real expression of our moral 
judgment.”500 
Robert H. Jackson 
 
 
It was a warm fall day in 1946 when Jackson returned to Washington, D.C. to 
retake his seat on the Supreme Court. For the past year he had swapped his judges’ robes 
for a prosecutor’s hat, but now it was time to hang it up. In his post-Nuremberg days, 
Jackson lamented that even though the IMT involved painstaking labor as he plodded for 
nearly a year toward a conclusion, at least it gave him a real sense of accomplishment. 
The Supreme Court never seemed to award him that satisfaction. When he reflected on 
his career near the end of his life, Jackson said the Nuremberg Trial had been “the most 
satisfying and gratifying experience of my life…. infinitely more important than my work 
on the Supreme Court…. I regard the Nuremberg trial as the high point of my 
experience.”501 He had left Washington in the summer of 1945 at a time when divisions 
among the justices had been particularly high. Now he was going back to a bench with 
the same factionalism and tensions that had been there before, but with a new chief 
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justice—a position Jackson felt should have been his—and a renewed rivalry with Justice 
Hugo Black. 
In his last official act as the Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson 
sent a final report to President Harry Truman on October 7, 1946. He provided a variety 
of Trial-related statistics—how many days the proceedings had lasted (216), how many 
witnesses the prosecution and defense had called (94 people combined), and how large 
the American staff had been at its peak (365 civilians and 289 military personnel). He 
also reported that the Allies had captured more than 100,000 German documents and 
25,000 photographs, many of which would be published and available to the public soon. 
All of these numbers only reinforced what Truman already knew: Nuremberg had been a 
massive undertaking, a “post mortem examination of a totalitarian regime,” as Jackson 
liked to say, borrowing the words of the American alternate judge, John Parker. When a 
newspaper reporter had asked him months earlier why the Trial had lasted so long, 
Jackson replied that “it was necessary to compile a complete record to prove that this was 
the most monstrous conspiracy against humanity to date.”502 The long hours and hard 
work had paid off, though, resulting in a mountain of evidence proving the defendants’ 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Tribunal found 19 of the 22 defendants guilty, 
sentencing 12 to death by hanging and the other 7 to prison terms.  
Of crucial importance to Jackson was that the Trial had made explicit what had 
previously been implicit in international law, namely that waging aggressive war was a 
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crime and that “to persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on 
political, racial, or religious grounds in connection with such a war, or to exterminate, 
enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international crime, and that for the 
commission of such crimes individuals are responsible.” The Nuremberg Trial thus set a 
new judicial precedent declaring that any potential violators of international law would 
face a similar fate as the German defendants. The treasure trove of German 
documentation made it impossible for anyone to deny that “Nazi aggressions, 
persecutions, and atrocities” had occurred. “Of course, it would be extravagant to claim 
that agreements or trials of this character,” Jackson admitted, “can make aggressive war 
or persecution of minorities impossible…[b]ut we cannot doubt that they strengthen the 
bulwarks of peace and tolerance.”503   
Although Jackson stressed that there was still much work left to do to strengthen 
international law, he did not support holding another international trial at Nuremberg. “A 
four-power, four-language international trial is inevitably the slowest and most costly 
method of procedure,” Jackson reported. In a memo Jackson prepared for the President 
before the Nuremberg Trial ended, he outlined the reasons why the U.S. should not 
participate in another international trial. The U.S. military had to arrange lodging, food, 
transportation, and security for hundreds of participants at Nuremberg, which was a 
massive and costly undertaking, and the U.S. could ill-afford to take on those 
responsibilities again. He also observed that since a member of the British judiciary had 
served as the Tribunal president at Nuremberg, it would only be fair for one of the other 
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countries, most likely France or the Soviet Union, to take the lead in the next trial. 
Jackson strongly cautioned against this, saying that it would not be in the U.S.’s best 
interests to be part of a trial with the Soviet Union in charge or the “French Leftists” as he 
labeled them. He also argued that Nuremberg had put on trial the highest-ranking German 
officials who had survived the war (this was before anyone knew Adolf Eichmann was 
still alive), and he believed that the evidence presented against these defendants was the 
strongest it was ever going to be based on the available documentation. Jackson’s 
concern was that if the U.S. took part in a second trial with lesser-known defendants and 
potentially weaker evidence, then the judges might not find them guilty, and he did not 
want that stain on the U.S.’s record. In fact, at the time he was making this 
recommendation to the President, the judges at Nuremberg were still deliberating, and no 
one knew how many of the Germans would be found guilty. Jackson was specifically 
concerned about the possibility of the Tribunal acquitting Hjalmar Schacht, a German 
banker, because he knew the evidence against Schacht was the weakest of all the 
defendants on trial—and as it later turned out, he was one of three defendants found not 
guilty.504 
Beyond all these considerations, though, was the fact that Jackson believed the 
Nuremberg Trial had achieved the goals he initially envisioned when he signed up for the 
job. The world’s first international criminal court had set a new precedent in international 
law that aggressive war would not go unpunished and that the nations of the world would 
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hold individuals responsible for criminal acts.505 Instead of holding a second IMT, 
Jackson recommended, and the Allies agreed, that each power would hold criminal trials 
in its respective zone of occupation with the prisoners in its custody. President Truman 
tendered his “heartfelt thanks and the thanks of the Nation for the great service which 
[Jackson had] rendered.”506 Jackson could finally breathe a sigh of relief. 
 
Figure 10. Robert Jackson Boarding a Plane 
 
Defending Nuremberg At Home 
The Nuremberg Trial had a profound impact on Jackson, as it did on both Francis 
Biddle and John Parker (see Chapters XI and XII), once he began to grasp the 
magnitude of the injustices that had taken place in Nazi Germany. Although Jackson 
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returned to his full-time job as an associate justice on the Supreme Court, the legacy of 
Nuremberg was always with him. Just days after being in Germany to hear the IMT’s 
Judgment, Jackson went on the lecture circuit at the University of Buffalo to celebrate the 
university’s centenary. During the convocation, Jackson addressed two interrelated issues 
that occupied his energies for the remainder of his life: Nuremberg’s impact on 
international law and its significance toward securing human rights at home and beyond. 
Whenever Jackson spoke of the Nuremberg Trial, he claimed it represented a 
signal departure from the past because it criminalized aggressive war, thereby ushering in 
a new era in international law. However, Jackson himself believed the IMT was about 
more than a conspiracy to wage aggressive war. As he made clear in his first post-
Nuremberg speech, Nuremberg condemned the defendants for “their persecution and 
extermination of the Jews, their part in enslavement of labor and deportation of 
populations.” 507 He even referred specifically to the “final solution” that the Nazis’ 
“method and degree of persecution of [Jewish] minorities” included “mass 
extermination.”508 Crimes against Humanity was an integral part of Jackson’s defense of 
the Trial from the very first public address he gave, and he continued to emphasize Nazi 
atrocities and crimes against Jews in his speeches over the course of the next decade. 
Nuremberg scholarship often concludes that Jackson only focused on outlawing 
aggressive war and that “Crimes against Humanity” was little more than an afterthought. 
                                                 
507 Robert H. Jackson, “Address at the University of Buffalo Centennial Convocation, October 4, 
1946,” Buffalo Law Review 60 (2012), 292. 
508 Ibid., 290. 
235 
The evidence does not support this conclusion, though, and since Jackson did not 
downplay human rights violations, neither should scholars.  
One can, however, argue that Jackson did not become a human rights activist—in 
the sense that he directly advocated a political position—after Nuremberg. Perhaps if he 
had, more scholars would remember the Trial for crimes against humanity, but Jackson 
was a Supreme Court justice and did not see it as his role to create law or policy. He 
wanted others to carry on the work he had started in Germany. “There is great need that 
the statesmen pick up where lawyers leave off at Nürnberg,” he declared.509  
Given the unimaginable crimes that had taken place under the Nazi regime, 
Jackson became even more concerned about the abuses that can take place when a 
tyrannical government ignores the “fundamental human rights of minorities.” He 
admitted that the U.S. was not perfect and had its own “domestic minority problem”—an 
obvious reference to African Americans—but he argued that the American constitution 
offered the best hope “of establishing limitations on absolutism.”510 As a member of the 
Supreme Court, he believed the responsibility lay with the judicial branch of government 
to guard against executive overreach in order to uphold the basic human rights of the 
American people. The Third Reich did not have a strong and vital judiciary, with some 
judges even collaborating with the Nazis’ racist agenda, and it led to numerous human 
rights abuses. Thus, following the Nuremberg Trial, Jackson argued that a democratic 
nation must have an independent judiciary in order for basic human liberties to exist and 
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thrive. However, while one might reasonably presume that Jackson’s Nuremberg 
experiences impelled him to vote consistently to uphold human rights (from October 
1946, when he rejoined the Court for its fall term, until his untimely death in October 
1954) because of his Nuremberg experiences, this was not the case. As discussed below, 
Jackson actually denied First Amendment rights in cases involving members of the 
Communist Party. Understanding this contradiction between the ideals Jackson professed 
and his decisions on the Supreme Court is key to situating the Nuremberg Trial within the 
complicated development of human rights in the U.S. 
In addition to his talk at Buffalo, Jackson spoke before a military audience at the 
National War College in Washington, D.C. on December 6, 1946. He wanted to address 
any concerns that members of the U.S. military might have about the Nuremberg Trial, 
particularly this notion that the U.S. had prosecuted and hanged soldiers simply for 
following superior orders, as well as waging a war and losing. If that was the precedent 
Nuremberg had set, then these American service personnel had good reason to worry. 
Jackson sought to quell those fears by quoting heavily from the IMT Judgment, which 
had not yet been published. He read several of the judges’ paragraphs related to Hermann 
Göring’s influence on Adolf Hitler, his military experience and involvement in World 
War II, and his responsibility for aggressive war: “He was the planner and prime mover 
in the military and diplomatic preparation for war which Germany pursued.”511 Jackson 
wanted to show that the convicted Germans were guilty of committing established 
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crimes, not for following orders or losing a war. He also cited a section of the German 
Military Code which stated that a “subordinate will share the punishment of the 
[superior] (1) if he has exceeded the order given to him, or (2) if it was within his 
knowledge that the order…concerned an act by which it was intended to commit a civil 
or military crime…”512 Jackson also made clear that national defense is not a crime and 
that he would expect the U.S. to defend itself against any threats. He further clarified that 
the German military (the Wehrmacht) “was a far more decent organization than the more 
Nazified military formations,” such as the Schutzstaffel (SS), which was the major 
paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party.513 He concluded that the U.S. upheld the defendants’ 
human rights by holding a trial in the first place. He believed giving the defendants “an 
opportunity to be heard” was a step in the right direction, as opposed to summary 
execution, which had been far more common.514 As Jackson stated a few years later, 
“…if the opponents of the trial could establish that there was no law which required 
German statesmen to respect the lives and liberties of other peoples, it follows that no law 
compelled the Allies to respect the lives or liberties of Germans.”515 
Defending the Nuremberg Trial was a necessity for Jackson. Too many high-
profile skeptics, such as U.S. Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), disagreed with the whole 
concept of an international criminal trial. It smelled too much like victor’s justice, that the 
parties who won the war were simply exacting punishment on those who lost by relying 
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on ex post facto law, of charging individuals with crimes after the fact. That was one of 
the reasons Jackson addressed the American military in Washington, D.C. Americans 
needed to know that the Allies based Nuremberg on existing international law, and that it 
represented a significant step forward toward peace. For these reasons, Jackson 
collaborated with Alfred A. Knopf to ensure that Trial-related documents appeared in 
print. The Indictment and Jackson’s opening statement had already appeared in The Case 
Against the Nazi War Criminals (1946), so the following year Knopf published The 
Nürnberg Case, which included Jackson’s initial report to President Truman in June 
1945, the London Agreement, his opening statement, his cross-examination of Göring, 
his closing address, the results from the Tribunal’s Judgment, and significant portions of 
Jackson’s final report to the President in October 1946 (see Figure 11). Jackson believed 
it was vital to “make conveniently available fundamental information about the world’s 
first international criminal assizes.”516 The Trial transcripts were simply too extensive to 
pick up and read, so Jackson wanted this condensed version to be more accessible. It also 
helped that Jackson had written his speeches with the average reader in mind. He hoped 
that by convincing the American public of the value and validity of the Trial, 
Nuremberg’s legacy would remain above reproach. Unfortunately, he was having a 
harder time convincing some of his own peers on the Bench that Nuremberg was a 
legitimate court of law. 
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The feud that took place between Jackson and Black before Nuremberg came to a 
close continued after Jackson returned stateside. The altercation not only affected 
Jackson’s stature at Nuremberg, but the war of words also gave Black and his supporters, 
including William Douglas, Frank Murphy, and Wiley Rutledge, even more reason to 
censure the Nuremberg Trial, which many of them had argued was an example of ex post 
facto law and the principle of nullem crimen sine lege (“no penalty without law”). Their 
opposition obviously carried some weight given their prominent judicial positions, but 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to review the merits of an international 
trial like the IMT, so their criticisms were philosophical in nature. They had no practical 
impact on the application of the law. However, this was not necessarily the case with the 
twelve Subsequent Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT), which, although they took 
place in the same courtroom as the IMT, were strictly an American affair. This 
potentially opened the door for the Supreme Court to review NMT cases.  
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Figure 11. Cover of The Nürnberg Case by Robert Jackson  
 
 
For example, the second of the NMT trials, the Milch Trial (November 1946 to 
April 1947), found the German defendant, Erhard Milch, guilty of War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity and sentenced him to life in prison. While incarcerated, Milch 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the U.S. Supreme Court in order to 
challenge the legal basis of his imprisonment. Jackson recused himself because of his 
involvement as the chief U.S. prosecutor at the first Nuremberg Trial. Black and his 
supporters believed the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review Milch’s application 
since he had been tried by Americans in the U.S. zone of occupation—even though it was 
a military trial and the defendant was not a U.S. citizen. The remaining four justices did 
not, citing Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which defines the Court’s jurisdiction.517 
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This resulted in a 4-4 tie, thereby denying Milch’s request, but it was not a complete 
rejection of the Court’s authority to review future petitions of this nature. As a result, 
Black and his supporters on the Supreme Court attempted to review numerous petitions 
from NMT defendants in the years immediately following Jackson’s return to the U.S., 
though none succeeded.518 
Black’s initial reason for wanting the Supreme Court to review these petitions was 
to undermine the authority of war crimes trials, and in particular Jackson’s participation 
at Nuremberg. As Black saw it, the world was changing, and he feared that increasing 
internationalism would result in a loss of America’s judicial sovereignty. He did not want 
these war crimes trials to overshadow the legitimacy of the U.S. justice system, so he 
wanted to extend the reach of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Each time Black moved 
to review another petition from an NMT defendant, Jackson had no choice but to recuse 
himself, and the ruling always resulted in a tie vote. Jackson could have upset Black’s 
agenda by not recusing himself and casting his vote, thus making it clear that the Court 
did not have jurisdiction, but that would have made him guilty of the same conflict-of-
interest accusations he had lobbed at Black at the end of World War II. Fortunately for 
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Jackson, Black began pushing the Supreme Court to review petitions involving Japanese 
cases, and that opened a door for Jackson to finally participate. 
In Hirota v. Macarthur (1948), two Japanese defendants, Koki Hirota and Koichi 
Kido, filed a writ of habeas corpus with the U.S. Supreme Court. Hirota was the only 
civilian who received the death penalty at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. He had been 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan during World War II, and the Tribunal 
convicted him for his role in the Rape of Nanjing, when Japanese troops invaded and 
pillaged the Chinese capital, raping and killing at least 40,000 civilians. As a result of his 
conviction, Hirota turned to the U.S. Supreme Court for relief. Justices Vinson, Stanley 
Reed, Felix Frankfurter, and Harold Burton believed the Court did not have jurisdiction 
to review the defendants’ petition. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge 
believed the Court should at least offer some relief to the petitioners. Unlike the German 
cases in which Jackson felt he had to recuse himself because he had been the chief U.S. 
prosecutor at Nuremberg, he did not believe a conflict of interest existed in the case of 
these Japanese defendants. He had not taken part in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, nor 
had he participated in the creation of its Charter. Thus, he felt free to vote, but he faced a 
dilemma. On the one hand, if he refused to grant a hearing, he would be sending a 
message to the world that even though the U.S. held most of the responsibility for 
capturing and trying these Japanese individuals, the U.S. Supreme Court could not review 
their case, even though half of the justices believed the sentences against them were 
already based on a “doubtful” legal foundation. On the other hand, if he granted a 
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hearing, he would embarrass the U.S. government and the President by undermining the 
credibility of the IMTFE.519 
In the end, Jackson decided it was wiser to grant a hearing: “Our allies are more 
likely to understand and to forgive any assertion of excess jurisdiction against this 
background than our enemies would be to understand or condone any excess of scruple 
about jurisdiction to grant them a hearing.” This meant that Jackson initially sided with 
Black and his supporters, who were against war crimes trials, but he made clear that he 
did not support their “views on the constitutional issues involved.”520 The Court heard 
oral arguments in the Hirota case on December 16 and 17, 1948, and the following day 
announced that it was denying the defendants’ application: “[T]he courts of the United 
States have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments 
and sentences imposed on these petitioners….”521 Jackson decided not to take part in the 
final decision, leaving it to the other justices to determine the jurisdictional issues 
involved. Shockingly, Black surprised everyone by siding with the majority’s per curiam 
opinion stating that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to review these cases.522 
What started as a feud between Jackson and Black over a conflict of interest in 
1945 grew into a constitutional debate over the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in 1948. 
Black was initially concerned with the prevalence and legitimacy of war crimes trials, 
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starting with Nuremberg and continuing with the NMT and IMTFE. He characterized 
such courts as political affairs that were more interested in vengeance than justice, so he 
wished to use the traditional American judiciary to act as the final arbiter. Surely, he felt, 
no court in the world was more capable of reaching justice than the U.S. Supreme Court, 
but that is exactly what Nuremberg and its progeny seemed to suggest, that they were just 
as if not more qualified to adjudicate the defendant’s guilt. It is no wonder, then, that 
Black fought vigorously to hear petitions from defendants tried outside of the traditional 
U.S. judicial system. He recognized that a new precedent in international law was 
emerging, one which he felt threatened American judicial sovereignty. He reacted in the 
only way he knew how, by trying to expand the Court’s jurisdiction. However, Black’s 
shocking volte-face in the Hirota case makes no sense. If he really wanted to expand the 
Court’s authority to review such cases, then why did he vote against it?  
In the Hirota case, Black realized he had overreached in trying to undermine both 
war crimes trials and Justice Jackson by expanding the Court’s jurisdiction through a 
broad interpretation of the Constitution. Black wanted to discredit Jackson’s efforts at 
Nuremberg and the whole war crimes trial enterprise, but he recognized the risk that a 
broad interpretation of the Constitution might have on the integrity of American law. 
Thus, Black sided with the majority in Hirota. Afterward, though, he still argued that the 
Court should grant similar hearings for defendants tried outside the usual American 
judicial system, but he no longer made a constitutional argument.523 This more nuanced 
position allowed Black to continue to question the legitimacy of war crimes trials and 
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challenge Nuremberg’s (and Jackson’s) legacy without opening the door to a 
reinterpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 
By the summer of 1949, Jackson began to feel that the Nuremberg Trial’s value 
“to the future of Germany and its future relations with the United States [had] depreciated 
through neglect.”524 Other Nuremberg trials, under the leadership of Brigadier General 
Telford Taylor, had taken place, but interest among the American public had waned 
while criticisms of the IMT continued. “It was not unexpected,” Jackson said, “that there 
would be changes of sentiment respecting these trials as we moved further away from the 
war….I told my son, when he went with me [to Nuremberg], that he would be defending 
me long after I was gone.”525 Thus, in 1949, Jackson felt it was time to renew interest in 
Nuremberg and defend its importance to humanity. In a speech titled, “Nuremberg in 
Retrospect: Legal Answer to International Lawlessness,” Jackson offered the usual 
defenses of Nuremberg, that the Allies had based it off of existing international law, that 
a trial was the only viable option, that there were no judges or prosecutors from “neutral 
countries” since the war had affected virtually every part of the globe and had made 
impartiality impossible, and that the existence of Soviet participation did not invalidate 
the Trial’s outcome.526  
However, Jackson’s 1949 speech provided his clearest critique of the state of 
international law before Nuremberg, admitting that the Trial was “the most definite 
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challenge to this anarchic concept of law of nations” that state sovereignty was absolute 
and states could engage in war whenever they pleased.527 In Jackson’s view, this concept 
of state sovereignty was no longer tenable. It had resulted in the worst global conflicts 
mankind had ever seen, and it allowed the Nazis to murder millions of Jewish people. 
“Civilization,” as Jackson often put it, had an obligation to protect human beings from 
tyranny, and Nuremberg was part of the solution, regardless of the attacks against it. 
Critics often complained that the IMT should never have existed, let alone have the 
authority or legal basis to judge anyone, but in Jackson’s mind, that argument was no 
longer valid. At the London Conference, four of the world’s greatest nations had agreed 
that aggressive war and crimes against humanity were violations of international law, and 
an additional nineteen countries agreed to adhere to these principles. 
The Nuremberg Trial had been a success, and most Americans confirmed that. 
Decades later, historian William J. Bosch assessed American opinions of the Nuremberg 
Trial by looking at essays, speeches, and polling data from nine groups of Americans.528 
These included the president and the policy makers around him, international lawyers, 
members of Congress, the American public, clergymen, domestic lawyers, historians and 
foreign affairs experts, members of the military, and behavioral scientists. Bosch focused 
on these particular individuals because the Trial forced them to debate “the legality of the 
trials, the composition of the court, the nature of the verdicts, and the consequence for the 
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future.”529  For example, did the Allies have the authority to hold individuals responsible 
for crimes against humanity? Was the trial fair, since only the Allies served as 
prosecutors and judges?  Were the verdicts too harsh or too lenient? And would the Trial 
prevent aggressive war in the future?  In the end, Bosch found that most Americans 
generally supported the Nuremberg Trial. Foreign affairs experts generally opposed it 
based on the grounds of victor’s justice, while many historians at the time simply 
withheld judgment.530  In addition, public opinion polls from October 1945 to August 
1946 indicated that 79 percent of respondents in the American zone of occupation 
believed the trials had been conducted fairly.531 
The world had watched justice unfold, and no one could doubt that the defendants 
had received a fair hearing. Even some of the German defense lawyers depicted the 
proceedings as fair.532 The Trial, as Jackson had said in his final report to the President, 
“put International Law squarely on the side of peace as against aggressive warfare, and 
on the side of humanity as against persecution.” Jackson was not so naïve as to believe 
that Nuremberg would make aggressive war impossible, but the Allied prosecutors and 
judges had “enunciated standards of conduct which bring new hope to men of good will 
and from which future statesmen will not lightly depart. These standards by which the 
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Germans have been condemned will become the condemnation of any nation that is 
faithless to them.” The standards Jackson referred to had originated in treaties, 
conventions, and pacts that the nations of the world had voluntarily agreed to in the 
preceding decades. What made the Trial so groundbreaking was that, by providing 
consequences to a nation that did not respect multilateral agreements, it laid the 
groundwork for international human rights law.533  
The Nuremberg Experience 
Following the success of the Nuremberg Trial, President Truman moved quickly 
to utilize the U.N. to further strengthen international cooperation and human rights 
concepts. By December 1947, the U.N. began the process of codifying aspects of the 
Nuremberg Trial into international law. These Nuremberg Principles, as they were called, 
made clear that international law could supersede internal (domestic) law, and that 
individuals would be held responsible for their actions, regardless of whether they were 
“just following orders” or were acting as a head of state. They also clearly defined crimes 
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, made clear that all three were 
punishable under international law, and even went so far as to say that it would be 
criminal to help someone commit any of these three crimes (see Table 4).  
In December 1948, around the same time the Nuremberg Principles were being 
discussed, the U.N. passed both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the Covenant on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG), or 
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what is also known as the Genocide Convention. Forty-eight out of fifty-eight member 
states voted in favor of the UDHR, while the remaining members either abstained from 
voting or were absent, giving the document unanimous approval.534 The UDHR had been 
a collaborative effort among U.N. member states. Although Eleanor Roosevelt often 
receives most of the credit for this foundational human rights document, Mary Ann 
Glendon’s seminal work on the subject makes clear that international figures from 
France, Lebanon, China, and even the Soviet Union influenced its creation. A drafting 
committee within the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) met in January 
1947 to begin working on the document’s content and structure. Following nearly two 
years of painstaking labor, the U.N. adopted the UDHR on December 10. It was a set of 
ideals that the nations of the world should adopt, but it was not enforceable law. Its 
founders, most notably Eleanor Roosevelt, wanted the UDHR to be a set of idealistic 
principles that the world should respect and uphold.535 However, the UNCHR did want 
the UDHR to become law, and its members urged the U.N. General Assembly to develop 
a Covenant on Human Rights, similar to a treaty, that would make the UDHR 
enforceable.536 Such a document could then, as the ABA argued, represent an 
international bill of rights that would safeguard individuals from human rights abuses.537 
With an international bill of rights in place, the U.N. could then establish a permanent 
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international criminal court (ICC), which would be based on the Nuremberg Trial’s 
model to try individuals accused of violating this human rights covenant. While these 
measures received wide support within the U.N., they were controversial within the U.S. 
(see Chapter XI). 
Jackson remained largely silent on the UDHR, the Genocide Convention, and 
talks of establishing a permanent ICC. He did not feel comfortable speaking out publicly 
on these issues once he returned to the Bench in 1946. For example, the State Department 
sent Jackson a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court on April 16, 1952, but 
there is no evidence that the justice replied.538 Law scholar and Jackson expert, John Q. 
Barrett, says that Jackson’s silence should not be construed as opposition, though. 
Apparently, Jackson was cautiously optimistic that the above examples would advance 
international law and continue the work begun at Nuremberg, but according to Barrett, he 
hoped they would not “risk what Nuremberg had accomplished by seeking to stretch it 
too far.”539  
One of the few times Jackson did speak out publicly on current events came in 
1948, when he penned a book review of Philip C. Jessup’s A Modern Law of Nations. 
Jackson praised Jessup’s work for showing that international law is a living force, not a 
static thing, and that it can only be vital if people generally support it. He agreed with 
Jessup’s argument that international law must apply to individuals and that the nations of 
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the world must agree to enforce it. At the heart of this argument lay one of Jackson’s 
chief concerns during the Nuremberg Trial that a country such as Germany felt it could 
do whatever it liked within its own borders. Too often governments denied individuals 
their fundamental human rights by committing atrocities and evils behind the shield of 
absolute state sovereignty, and Jackson, quoting from Jessup, believed that practice 
needed to stop: “Sovereignty, in its meaning of an absolute, uncontrolled state will, 
ultimately free to resort to the final arbitrament of war, is the quicksand upon which 
foundations of traditional international law are built.” Additionally, Jackson offered his 
support of the proposed International Bill of Human Rights—what ultimately became the 
UDHR—so long as it could be enforced: “…only if we put some legal fetter on all 
governments, such as our Bill of Rights puts on the Federal and state governments.”540  
The fact that Jackson supported restraints on national sovereignty, and even 
compared it to the application of the U.S. Bill of Rights in federal and state governments, 
would seem to suggest that his position on incorporation theory had shifted since he first 
joined the Supreme Court in 1941. However, while he expressed support for an 
International Bill of Rights in 1948, his dissenting opinion four years later in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois stated his opposition to incorporation (see Chapter III). 
Jackson’s inconsistent views at the international and national levels reveal a blind spot in 
his advocacy of human rights. He wanted limits on national sovereignty, believing it had 
been part of the problem in Nazi Germany, and he even claimed that he wanted those 
                                                 
540 Robert H. Jackson, “For International Legal Order: Steps Toward a Modern Law of Nations,” 
The New York Times (March 14, 1948). 
252 
limits to mimic the U.S. Bill of Rights, but as a Supreme Court justice weighing in on an 
American case, he clung to a states’ rights position. 
It is clear from Jackson’s review that he supported the U.N., though he made clear 
that he did not want it to become a tyrannical, supranational government that would 
impose its will on nations throughout the world. He noted in particular that the U.N. 
should not interfere in the internal affairs of countries that might be undergoing necessary 
revolutionary changes, again quoting Jessup that “peace will never be secure if progress 
is confined to putting an international lid on a national boiling pot.” Jackson articulated 
this position in reference to the American revolution, as if to say that he would not have 
wanted an international organization like the U.N. stepping into that situation and 
keeping the American colonists from overthrowing the British. International law should 
still guarantee individuals the right to rebel if their government was not upholding their 
human rights.541  
Aside from Jackson’s brief comments in 1948 on international law and the U.N., 
the only other current event he felt compelled to address was the international crisis 
consuming the country in the 1950s: communism and the Cold War. The threat of 
communism was certainly not new in the 1950s. The U.S. government and the American 
people in general had opposed the establishment of a communist regime in Russia 
following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, for example. The difference, though, was 
that American politicians, most notably Senators Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and John 
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Bricker (R-OH), used the specter of communism in the 1950s to advance their agendas, 
all the while undermining the U.S. Constitution. McCarthy scared people into believing 
that communist sympathizers and spies had already infiltrated the U.S. and were actively 
threatening the American way of life, while Bricker sought to amend the Constitution 
(the so-called Bricker Amendment) to limit the treaty-making powers of the executive 
branch of government—thereby preventing international human rights law from 
superseding U.S. domestic law, particularly Jim Crow.  Bricker’s fear was that the U.S. 
was sacrificing its national sovereignty by joining the U.N. and emphasizing human 
rights, so he was determined to protect the country from what he believed was the naïveté 
of internationalism. Jackson never commented on the proposed Bricker Amendment, 
which peaked around 1953. By that point, he was preoccupied with the Brown v. Board 
of Education decision on the Supreme Court, and his health had already seriously 
declined. He was also, as Barrett puts it, “not the type to inject himself in active 
politics.”542 The efforts of McCarthy and Bricker were largely unsuccessful (see  
Chapter XI for more on Bricker and John Parker), but Cold War pressures ran high 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. by the end of the 1940s, and Jackson could not remain 
silent. 
As early as 1948, Jackson was aware of the political tensions between the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. On June 16 of that year, Jackson wrote to President Truman to update 
him on the supposed whereabouts of Martin Bormann, the only German defendant at 
Nuremberg who was tried in absentia. No one knew where he was, and the U.S. had 
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assumed he was dead. However, after speaking with J. Edgar Hoover, Jackson believed it 
was possible that Bormann was in Argentina and recommended that the FBI be permitted 
to investigate the matter more thoroughly. Bormann was an especially hated Nazi in 
Eastern Europe, so if the Soviet Union discovered that the U.S. knew of his location but 
did nothing to capture him, Jackson believed it “would have propaganda value to 
Russia.”543 
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Table 4. Nuremberg Principles 
 
 
Nuremberg Principles  
(created by the International Law Commission and affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1950) 
 
Principle I 
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor 
[sic] and liable to punishment.  
 
Principle II 
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international 
law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.  
 
Principle III 
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as 
Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under 
international law.  
 
Principle IV  
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from 
responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.  
 
Principle V  
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.  
 
Principle VI  
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:  
(a) Crimes against peace:  
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances;  
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned 
under (i).  
 
(b) War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, 
illtreatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied 
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity.  
 
(c) Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts 
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such 
acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against 
peace or any war crime.  
 
Principle VII  
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set 
forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law. 
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Only a few years later, Jackson addressed tensions between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. during the Korean War. In 1951 and 1953, he gave speeches on liberty, 
contrasting the American constitutional system with that of the Soviet Union’s 
communist government. He described the period in which he was living as “an age of 
rebellion against liberty” and argued that the Cold War was “largely a war of ideas, a 
struggle for the minds of men.” He saw Communism as an inherently inferior and 
dangerous system of government because it opposed basic freedoms—speech, press, and 
assembly—that he believed were necessary for society to resolve differences peacefully 
without having to resort to military force.544 In Jackson’s mind, communism represented 
a unique threat to Western-style government because its main goal was to overthrow the 
existing political order. For example, he referenced the communist takeover of 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948, saying that the Czechoslovakian government “was 
completely tolerant of communist opposition.” By granting the communists the freedom 
to spread their message and become a minority party within the country, the government 
ultimately led to its own downfall, as the communists were able to set up a “murderous 
regime which tolerated not the slightest deviation in thought, speech or action from 
Communist dogma.”545 Jackson’s disdain for communist ideology during the Cold War 
skewed his perspective on the Supreme Court in cases involving the free speech rights of 
communists. 
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Before taking part in the historic Brown v. Board of Education decision, Jackson 
reviewed cases in which he voted against the constitutionally-protected freedoms of 
individuals who were members of the Communist Party. As legal historian Mary Dudziak 
has pointed out, Jackson was “unsympathetic toward the Communist Party, viewing it as 
a ‘conspiratorial and revolutionary junta, organized to read ends and to use methods 
which are incompatible with our constitutional system.’”546 She references three cases in 
particular (Terminiello v. Chicago, 1949; Dennis v. United States, 1951; Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 1952) to show that Jackson did not always uphold the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.  
The Terminiello case involved a priest who had been arrested for violating 
Chicago’s “breach of peace” ordinance because he incited a crowd with incendiary 
language. The Court threw out his conviction, saying that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Jackson dissented, arguing that the Court 
needed to apply “a little practical wisdom” instead of “doctrinaire logic,” or else it risked 
converting the Bill of Rights into a “suicide pact.” Jackson was bothered by the fact that 
Arthur Terminiello had made inflammatory remarks against the Jews and thereby 
fomented antisemitism among the crowd. He compared this to “the pattern of European 
fascist leaders” and even quoted from Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf to illustrate his point. 
Terminiello denied being a fascist, but freely admitted that communists had organized the 
whole demonstration. In Jackson’s mind, the case represented the struggle against 
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totalitarian ideology, and he could not bring himself to side with the majority on the 
Bench. His time in Nuremberg had educated him on the dangers of what might happen 
when a violent political party takes root in an otherwise civilized nation. He was not 
about to let anything even remotely like that happen in the U.S.547 
Dennis v. United States involved the arrest of Eugene Dennis, who was the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party USA, for creating a plot to overthrow the 
government. In a 6-2 decision, the majority ruled that the First Amendment did not 
protect seditious speech, so they upheld his conviction. Jackson wrote a concurring 
opinion, but he did not focus his argument on the First Amendment. Instead, harking 
back to his Nuremberg days, he emphasized Dennis’s involvement in a conspiracy to 
overthrow the government: “What really is under review here,” Jackson wrote, “is a 
conviction of conspiracy, after a trial for conspiracy, on an indictment charging 
conspiracy, brought under a statute outlawing conspiracy.” He went on to say that the 
“Constitution does not make conspiracy a civil right,” and that conspiracy is “an evil in 
itself” because—in this case—it threatened to undermine American law and order. Thus, 
Jackson believed communism was a singular threat to the U.S. that only existed to incite 
rebellion.548 
The last case Dudziak discusses in detail is Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, one “in 
which important human rights were at stake.” It involved the deportation of three legal 
aliens who had come to the U.S. as children but never became U.S. citizens. Each one 
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later joined the Communist Party and were deported under the authority of the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940, even though they renounced violence against the government. 
Jackson, writing for the majority, explained that the Court upheld their deportations 
because of the peculiar danger the country faced from the Communist Party during the 
Cold War. It was the nature of the communist threat, more than anything else, that drove 
their decision. Jackson also noted that each man had dual status as both a U.S. resident 
and a citizen of his home country, thus giving him the advantage of “two sources of law – 
American and international.” He speculated that these men’s home countries might call 
upon them to serve in the military, and if the U.S. were at war with those countries, then 
these men would become an even greater threat to American security. For these reasons, 
it made more sense to Jackson to deport them now. Dudziak expresses surprise over 
Jackson’s decision since his “vision of human rights had been crafted in an era when 
European Jews became states in their flight from the Holocaust, so he was attuned to the 
great human impact of the deportation power.”549 
In Jackson’s mind, the Communist Party represented a fundamental threat to 
American democracy. As a political organization rooted in the tenets of Marxism, it 
existed in order to overthrow capitalism and institute a communist form of government in 
which there would be no political opposition because the party would theoretically speak 
for all of society. Jackson’s prejudice against Communism and members of the 
Communist Party stemmed directly from his involvement at Nuremberg. He knew what 
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had happened when the Nazis showed no respect for individual human dignity, and he 
believed the communists were no different. In his eyes, Constitutional freedoms and 
protections did not apply to them since they did not respect America’s form of 
government. 
There can be no doubt that Jackson’s prominent role at Nuremberg influenced his 
judicial thinking when he returned to the Supreme Court. The above cases regarding 
communists obviously demonstrate how his understanding of totalitarianism impelled 
him to protect democracy even at the expense of human rights. A different case, though, 
near the end of Jackson’s life forced him to look past his own judicial philosophy in favor 
of protecting the rights of African Americans.  
The story of Jackson leaving the hospital on May 17 to cast his vote with the 
majority in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) has become something of legend. He 
had suffered a serious heart attack six weeks before and had not fully recovered when 
Chief Justice Earl Warren visited to let him know that the justices would be announcing 
their ruling. Jackson insisted on being present to show the full weight of the justices’ 9-0 
decision. However, Jackson initially opposed overturning Plessy v. Ferguson, and there 
was no guarantee that he was ever going to change his position. How Jackson finally 
decided to vote with the majority in this case demonstrates the full impact of the 
Nuremberg experience on his life and career.550 
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Jackson was a strong advocate of judicial restraint and believed that judges should 
not overturn laws the legislature had passed without a clear Constitutional imperative.551 
The U.S. Constitution established three branches of government and tasked Congress 
with creating laws. The Fourteenth Amendment—which provides “equal protection of 
the laws”—also makes clear in Section 5 that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislations, provisions of this article.” Jackson did not believe a justice 
should legislate from the Bench. He had served in the Roosevelt administration during 
the New Deal and saw what he viewed as activist judges engaged in judicial supremacy, 
striking down the President’s economic reforms, a practice with which he strongly 
disagreed. As a result, when he joined the Bench in 1941, his judicial philosophy told him 
to exercise restraint, as far as possible, when reviewing Congressional acts.552  
While Jackson found segregation morally repugnant, he was reluctant to rule 
against it when the law was not on his side.553 As MaryJane Shimsky comments, Jackson, 
as a lawyer, found “’nothing in the text’ – neither in the legislative history nor in prior 
court cases – ‘that says [“separate but equal”] is unconstitutional.’”554 His focus was on 
legal precedent, and if there was none, Jackson was wont to create one. His two law 
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clerks at the time, Donald Cronson and future Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, also 
prepared memoranda for Jackson expressing their views that it was Congress’s job, not 
the Court’s, to abrogate Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.555 Jackson did not support 
segregation—unlike his judicial colleague Stanley Reed—but in 1952 and 1953, he was 
not sure he could legally justify abolishing it. In Shimsky’s words, he hated the idea of 
“looking for the right arguments to justify a pre-ordained result….”556 
While Jackson struggled with the legal justification for overturning Plessy, he was 
also concerned with the impact such a ruling would have on the South. Legal scholar 
Gregory Chernak believes Jackson recognized that even if he could legally justify 
abolishing Plessy, he knew it would commit “the Court to take the lead in a major social 
upheaval.”557 He presciently speculated that the South would undoubtedly refuse to obey 
such a ruling, and some regions might simply close down all public schools before 
integrating them. The Court simply had no mechanism for enforcing its own decisions, 
and Jackson feared that even the highest court in the land could not force people to 
change their mindsets and behaviors toward race relations. In a set of Harvard lectures 
Jackson prepared but never delivered before his death, he noted this limitation within the 
judiciary and averred, “I know of no modern instance in which any judiciary has saved a 
whole people from the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny 
which have threatened liberty and free institutions.” Chernak concludes that Jackson’s 
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argument stemmed from his Nuremberg experience. He knew that a German court in 
1933 refused to blame the communists for setting the Reichstag on fire—an accusation 
the Nazis made against them—but the judicial ruling did not stop Adolf Hitler and the 
Nazi Party from advancing their agenda.558 Jackson felt a similar fate could occur in the 
U.S. if the Supreme Court ruled to abolish school segregation even while wide swaths of 
Southerners had no intention of following the Court’s directive. 
Towards the end of 1953, it appeared the Court would not be able to overturn 
Plessy. Only four of the justices favored such action, Reed strongly opposed doing so, 
and the remaining justices expressed reservations about overturning it. Jackson seemed 
determined to postpone judgment for as long as possible and wanted to hear further 
arguments before taking a vote. He got his wish in a roundabout way when Chief Justice 
Fred Vinson had a sudden heart attack and died unexpectedly on September 8. His tragic 
death left only eight justices on the Bench, and the Court needed to wait for President 
Eisenhower to choose a successor before they could proceed. The President nominated 
California’s Republican Governor, Earl Warren, who had previously been the state’s 
attorney general but who had no judicial experience. Warren had also been Thomas 
Dewey’s vice presidential running mate in the 1948 election, and he was even favored as 
the Republican party’s presidential nominee for the 1952 election before Eisenhower and 
Richard Nixon ultimately gained the nomination. The new president had initially wanted 
Warren to serve as U.S. Solicitor General, but after Vinson died, Eisenhower nominated 
him for the Supreme Court instead, and the Senate quickly confirmed him. The newly-
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constituted Warren Court then began hearing a second round of arguments pertaining to 
Brown from December 7 to 9, 1953.  
Warren’s appointment marked a turning point in the Brown deliberations.559 He 
made clear that he did not see how the Court could continue racial segregation because 
the principle of “separate but equal rests upon the basic premise that the Negro race is 
inferior….[but] the arguments of Negro counsel proved that they are not inferior.”560 His 
leadership helped convince the other justices who did not openly support overturning 
Plessy that the Court needed to end segregation. Jackson still felt uneasy, though, saying, 
“I don’t know how to justify the abolition of segregation as a judicial act. If we have to 
decide this question, then representative government has failed.”561 To him, segregation 
was wrong and needed to be eliminated, but he could not see a way to justify using the 
Supreme Court to do so. Nevertheless, he continued to think and write about the legal 
justifications for ending school segregation because he believed it was the right thing to 
do.  
Based on Shimsky’s analysis of Jackson’s draft opinions in January and March 
1954, it is clear that the justice’s legal views on overturning Plessy began to shift. 
Jackson probably would have articulated a clearer legal argument for doing so had he not 
suffered a debilitating heart attack on March 30, which put him in the hospital for nearly 
two months. While recuperating, Chief Justice Warren occasionally visited Jackson and 
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updated him on the Court’s progress toward reaching a unanimous decision. Jackson was 
apparently “relieved” on Saturday, May 15 when Warren showed him a draft opinion that 
was satisfactory to all of the justices.562 For the longest time Jackson had been unable to 
bring himself to reach a legal judgment based on a moral principle, but in the end, he 
recognized that perpetuating racial segregation in the public school system was inherently 
immoral and had to stop.  
Jackson’s Nuremberg experiences also played a key role in influencing his 
decision to vote with the majority. As his close friend on the Court, Felix Frankfurter, 
said the following year, “…Nuremberg, I believe, had a profound influence on his 
endeavor to understand the human situation,” because it was in Germany that Jackson 
was “made to realize how ultimately fragile the forces of reason are and how precious the 
safeguards of law so painstakingly built up in the course of the centuries.”563 The impact 
of Nuremberg and human rights on Jackson’s legal philosophy is evident in letters 
between him and Charles Fairman, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard 
University and a former student of the aforementioned Frankfurter. Going back to March 
1950, just as the Supreme Court was about to hear arguments in Sweatt v. Painter 
regarding the constitutionality of forbidding a black man from matriculating in the 
University of Texas’ School of Law, Jackson admitted that he could not understand why 
so many on the Court opposed integration, stating that he “attended public school along 
with a few Negro pupils and never gave it a thought.” “I cannot remember that it was 
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ever even discussed,” he remarked. He then explained that he could not support racial 
segregation because of his participation in the Nuremberg Trial: “You and I have seen the 
terrible consequences of racial hatred in Germany. We can have no sympathy with racial 
conceits which underlie segregation policies.” Jackson was a staunch believer in using 
the rule of law to maintain peace and order. He knew what could happen when the law 
did not protect or apply equally to everyone within society, and he felt compelled to act 
so that the U.S. did not head down a path similar to Nazi Germany.564  
Fairman responded two weeks later with his take on the issue of school 
segregation. He discussed the role of the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting the 
educational rights of blacks and said that it was his “impression … that in 1866-68 
‘equality’ did not have an accepted meaning that excluded segregation.” He believed that 
the reason the Court ruled in favor of “separate but equal” in 1896 was because of the 
prevalence of social Darwinist thought arguing that blacks were an inherently inferior 
race. He suggested that if he were in Jackson’s place, he would remind the other justices 
that such views were no longer tenable and that the U.N. Charter and UDHR created a 
higher legal and moral standard “to respect and observe ‘human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race.’” He went further and argued that 
America’s “treatment of the Negro is an exceedingly vulnerable spot in our armor,” and 
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lent credence to the Soviet Union’s claims that the U.S. was not a harbinger of human 
rights.565  
Four years later, when Jackson began to pen—but never released—his Brown 
opinion, he agreed with Fairman that the Plessy doctrine had emerged in an era of 
scientific racism which concluded that the black and white races were inherently different 
and that these differences necessarily warranted “separate classification and 
discrimination” in public life. Nearly sixty years later, though, Jackson believed public 
education could not be seen as a “privilege which may be given or withheld as a matter of 
grace,” but was instead a fundamental right of all American citizens.”566 He continued, 
 
I am convinced that present-day conditions require us to strike from our 
books the doctrine of separate-but-equal facilities and to hold invalid 
provisions of state constitutions or statutes which classify persons for 
separate treatment in matters of education based solely on possession of 
colored blood.567 
 
 
While this quote does not specifically mention the Nuremberg Trial, it is significant that 
Jackson focused on the issue of “colored blood” to make his case against racial 
discrimination. Surely the arguments surrounding school segregation in the U.S. 
reminded him of similar arguments within Nazi Germany that “Jewish blood” made the 
Jews inferior and subject to discriminatory treatment. 
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Jackson also agreed with Fairman that maintaining racial segregation would 
damage the U.S.'s reputation during the Cold War since the Soviet Union often criticized 
the U.S. for its institutionalized racism. The Brown decision would not only guarantee 
human rights for African Americans, but it would also serve as a defense against Soviet 
propaganda.568 It took every fiber within Jackson’s being to look past his deep-seated 
belief in judicial restraint and vote with the majority in Brown, but as Shimsky puts it, “if 
a jurist were to compromise his or her most fundamental beliefs about the nature of law 
and justice just once, it should be for a case like this one. Jackson chose well.”569 
Had Jackson not taken part in the Nuremberg Trial, it is unlikely that he would 
have been motivated to vote to overturn Plessy. The outcome in Brown v. Board of 
Education would probably have still been the same, but a unanimous decision carries 
more weight than a vote of 8-1. The reason Jackson went against his own philosophical 
and judicial views to eliminate school segregation was because he believed mandating 
separate public schools for African Americans was a violation of their human rights. He 
had fought once before to bring justice to those who restricted the rights of a minority 
group, and he did so again at the end of his life. 
Five months after the Brown decision, on October 9, 1954, Jackson had a heart 
attack and died. Jackson’s death evoked a wave of sympathy from the highest levels of 
government, both in America and beyond. Presidents Herbert Hoover, Harry Truman, 
and Dwight Eisenhower all wrote to Mrs. Robert Jackson to express their deepest 
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condolences, as did ambassadors in European, South American, and Asian countries. One 
remembrance that stood out came from the ABA, which specifically mentioned Jackson’s 
role at Nuremberg and described his judicial career as “the best tradition of devotion to 
justice and equality of human rights.”570 Although he died at the young age of 62, it is 
fitting that his final act on the Bench upheld the civil and human rights of America’s 
public school students. 
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CHAPTER XI 
FROM NUREMBERG TO NORTH CAROLINA
 
The trial did more than merely bring retribution to those who richly 
deserved to be punished for crimes which had shocked the conscience of 
mankind….What was more important, however, was that … it was, 
through the co-operation of a group of nations acting in behalf of the 
world community.571 
John J. Parker 
 
 
John Parker could not wait to get home. The American judge had been away from 
his native North Carolina since September 1945, with only a brief return for Christmas, 
so by the time the Nuremberg Trial ended on October 1, 1946, he was physically, 
mentally, and emotionally drained. He never expected the Trial to last for nearly a year, 
and he only agreed to go because the request came directly from the President.572 The 
sixty-year-old jurist had a rewarding job on the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
a comfortable life in Charlotte. In his younger and more ambitious days, he had hoped to 
serve on the U.S. Supreme Court, but after the Senate failed to confirm him in 1930, his 
hopes faded. Going to Germany and being part of the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT), the world’s first international war crimes trial, seemed the next best thing to 
serving on the highest court in the land, but the long and tedious work hours in a foreign 
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and hostile country left Parker homesick and exhausted. In a letter to his son-in-law, 
Parker wrote, 
 
Living in this city is a pretty depressing proposition. It is not like being 
in Hawaii, where the climate is fine and the people are our own. Here 
the climate is cold, the people are alien and hostile, the city has been in 
large measure destroyed and the entire atmosphere is foreign to anything 
that we have been used to. ... I shall certainly be glad when the trials are 
over and I am able to go home again.573  
 
 
After Parker and his colleagues finished reading the judgment on October 1, the Southern 
judge quickly departed. By October 3, he had returned to the U.S., and by October 9, he 
had written to President Truman to tender his resignation as the American alternate at 
Nuremberg.574 Truman responded with praise, thanking Parker for his “learning, integrity 
and conscience and judicial temperament,” adding that the North Carolinian had “served 
faithfully and well the cause of civilization and of world peace,” and concluding that 
history would ultimately determine the Trial’s legacy.575 Little did the president know 
that Parker would spend the rest of his life working to enhance that legacy. 
Of the American participants at the center of this study, Parker was the first to 
directly connect Nuremberg with human rights. His first published statement on the Trial 
showed how waging aggressive war and committing atrocities against the Jews were 
human rights violations: 
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[The war] had been accompanied by violation of international law and 
disregard of the elemental decencies of human life on a scale hardly 
believable. …The war had been accompanied by utter disregard of the 
rules of civilized warfare and of the most elementary human rights. Not 
to speak of the killing and torturing of prisoners of war, the plunder of 
civilian populations and the revival of the barbarous practice of taking 
and killing hostages…it had resulted in two gigantic crimes of 
unparalleled cruelty and barbarism. One was the revival of human 
slavery….The other was the attempt to exterminate all the Jews of 
Europe by a program of deliberate murder, which resulted in the killing 
of more than six million innocent people.576 
 
 
Parker’s references to concentration camps and the Final Solution as “two gigantic crimes 
of unparalleled cruelty and barbarism” were arguments against Nazi atrocities. These 
offenses resonated deep within him.577 Parker recounted how unbelievable he initially 
found the reports of the Jewish annihilation, but after hearing testimony at Nuremberg, he 
knew it was true. The German defendants’ crimes would have led to summary execution 
in an earlier time period, but after World War II, the only sensible course of action was to 
grant them the privilege of defending themselves in a court of law, something the Nazi 
regime had denied its own victims.  
In Parker’s view, the German defendants who enslaved thousands of people while 
exterminating millions more were guilty because they had violated the dignity and worth 
of human beings, which had been a bedrock principle in international law going back to 
at least the 1864 Geneva Conventions. He also cited the Hague Conventions (1899 and 
1907), which he had first been exposed to in law school, the Geneva Protocol for the 
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Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1924), the Locarno Treaties (1925) that 
stated Germany would not go to war with other countries, and a slew of measures 
undertaken within the League of Nations to demonstrate once and for all that aggressive 
war was neither permissible nor legal in 1939 when Germany invaded Poland.578 He even 
went so far as to say that the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 reflected attitudes that had 
already existed within the minds of government officials: “The pact embodied and made 
concrete conclusions which the world conscience had already reached on the question of 
aggressive war; and for this reason it was not regarded as revolutionary or as marking any 
abrupt change.”579 Reflecting on his experiences at Nuremberg, Parker made an 
impassioned plea for the U.S. to embrace multilateralism and to codify principles 
established at the IMT. Only then could the world hope to prevent future atrocities 
against humankind. 
In the months following the Trial, Parker went on the lecture circuit to address bar 
associations in Atlantic City, New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago, Louisville, Norfolk, 
and Richmond. His goal was to defend Nuremberg’s fairness and legitimacy among legal 
audiences because he believed it was crucial for lawyers to see the value of the 
Nuremberg Trial if Americans were ever going to respect international law. One of the 
lawyers in attendance at his Richmond lecture, Henry W. Anderson, wrote Parker to 
congratulate him on his “fine presentation.” Anderson shared that he never agreed with 
“the basic concepts underlying these trials” because he was concerned that they might 
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“lead us into grave difficulties in the future.” But he was quick to commend Parker for 
the “patriotic service” he provided the country, and he concluded that the Trial provided 
“a very distinctive public service.”580  
While some people were like Anderson and disagreed with the idea of an 
international criminal court based on the Nuremberg model, they usually saw the validity 
and fairness of it after they heard one of the American participants defend it. This was 
one of the reasons why Robert Jackson published The Nürnberg Case in 1947, at a time 
when Nuremberg’s critics derided the proceedings for being little more than “victor’s 
justice.” Jackson sent a copy to Parker, who thanked him. Parker wrote back to share that 
one of their esteemed judicial colleagues, Learned Hand, who had not participated in the 
Trial, was planning to write an article attacking Nuremberg for not having any legal 
basis. “[I]t would be most unfortunate for Judge Hand to publish an article of this sort,” 
Parker wrote, “One of the chief values arising from the trial was the creation of public 
opinion in this country in favor of an international order based on law.” Parker then asked 
Jackson if he might be able to convince Hand not to publish the article.581 Apparently not 
wanting to risk any damage to Nuremberg’s legacy, Parker then proceeded to contact 
Judge Hand himself and send him a copy of the Nuremberg Trial Judgment along with 
other documents supporting the legitimacy of the Trial.582 When Jackson finally replied 
to Parker’s initial letter, he was not as worried about Hand’s potential criticism as Parker 
had been, since most of the lawyers he knew appreciated “the magnitude and importance” 
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of the Trial. He commended Parker for his numerous speeches on the matter, saying that 
they “have done much to change the tide of feeling about [the Nuremberg Trial].”583 
Apparently Parker’s efforts had some impact on Hand, as the latter never publically 
attacked Nuremberg’s legitimacy.584 
In between Parker’s lectures on Nuremberg, his work on the Fourth Circuit 
continued at a hurried pace. He had been gone for nearly a year and needed to catch up 
quickly on the cases that lay before him. This included travelling to the North Carolina 
mountains during the summer of 1947 for the Judicial Conference and Asheville term of 
court. Although Judge Parker attended, his mind was elsewhere. He had received tragic 
news in June that his infant granddaughter, who had just recently come into the world, 
was dying. She was born with pyloric stenosis, a condition that prevents food from 
passing from the stomach to the small intestines, leading to vomiting, dehydration, and 
weight loss. She needed two surgeries to try to correct the problem, but they were 
unsuccessful. His daughter, Sara, was beside herself with grief. Writing to his brother, 
Sam, on June 10, Parker expressed little hope that the baby would survive: “…I am afraid 
that nothing can save the baby’s life. Sara is heartbroken, as you can imagine, and we are 
all greatly distressed. The baby was a lovely little thing….”585 The baby, whose name 
Parker never revealed in his correspondence, struggled for a week before passing away. 
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The family was saddened “beyond the power of language to describe.”586 Judge Parker 
had already lost an adult son. Now he had lost an infant granddaughter. He shared the 
horrible news with his former Nuremberg colleague, Sir Norman Birkett, admitting that 
what was even harder than losing the baby was seeing his daughter “so grieved and 
disappointed.”587 No parent wants to see their child in pain. No parent should have to 
bury their own offspring. 
 There was nothing Parker could do to ease his daughter’s pain, or his own. All he 
could do was move forward with his life and his career. His work became his grief outlet, 
and he soon found himself busier than he had been in Nuremberg. At least it felt that 
way. 
Parker continued advocating for individual freedoms and human rights at the end 
of 1947 and the beginning of 1948. On December 4, 1947, the Freedom Train, a traveling 
exhibit designed to educate the public about the fundamentals of American freedom, 
stopped in Charlotte, and Parker was there to address the crowd. He quoted from the 
Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal, and he explained that the 
U.S. Constitution matters because it guarantees the rights of the individual, the right of 
the people to govern themselves, and a separation of powers. He also shared briefly on 
his Nuremberg experience, calling the Trial “an autopsy on a totalitarian state” and using 
Nazi Germany to illustrate why free speech and the right of habeas corpus are necessary, 
lest societies should fall. Parker also reiterated his commitment to human rights, 
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declaring that the U.S. must “carry into the world community the principles of fair 
dealing and respect for human rights” in order to “make the world a better place to live 
in.”588 The speech’s overall content and argument were much the same as the lectures he 
gave to various bar associations at the end of 1946 and throughout 1947, and he 
continued this theme in March 1948 when he addressed UNC’s Law School. The biggest 
difference with the latter speech was that he commented directly on the United Nations 
(U.N.), saying that he had “high hopes” for the organization since, unlike the League of 
Nations, the U.S. was a member. He concluded that “the dream of the founding fathers of 
this country is today the dream of all mankind,” and that the U.S. had the duty to lead the 
world in the postwar era.589 
The Backlash 
At around the same time Parker was arguing for increased international 
engagement, a wave of opposition from conservative politicians threatened to impede the 
human rights momentum that began at Nuremberg. This backlash stemmed from 
opponents of Roosevelt’s New Deal, as well as the NAACP’s quest for racial equality. 
Conservative politicians believed the President’s signature domestic policy had 
created a convoluted bureaucracy that enlarged the federal government’s executive 
authority at the expense of states’ rights. As far as they were concerned, the U.N. was the 
New Deal writ large, with President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter 
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calling for a new world order based on human rights, and they did not want a 
supranational organization limiting American sovereignty. They argued that the U.S. 
would lose the ability to govern itself if the U.N. had the authority to enforce human 
rights standards all over the world, particularly in the U.S. South where discrimination 
against African Americans was rampant. What they were especially concerned with was 
maintaining the status quo in terms of race relations. As historian Carol Anderson puts it, 
“the last thing [Southern Democrats] wanted was a UN Charter that provided yet another 
legal instrument that the NAACP and African Americans could use to break Jim 
Crow.”590 These politicians’ fears seemed justified, then, when the NAACP threw its 
support behind both the U.N. and human rights just as the war in Europe was ending. 
The efforts of Walter White and the NAACP toward promoting black rights in the 
postwar period led many conservative politicians to block the emergence of a human 
rights regime. Over the course of the war, White came to believe that human rights were 
the only way to bring about racial equality in the U.S., and he felt that the U.N.’s 
establishment in 1945 signaled a new hope for African Americans. To that end, W.E.B. 
Du Bois, who had only just returned to the NAACP after a ten-year hiatus, represented 
the Association as a consultant to the San Francisco Conference and petitioned the 
delegates to support the rights of minorities. When the drafters of the U.N. Charter 
introduced anti-discrimination language stating that everyone “is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms … without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
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religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status,” Du Bois, White, and other members of the NAACP rejoiced. The U.N. Charter 
finally seemed to offer what the U.S. Constitution never could: a guarantee of racial 
equality.  
Southern Democrats and other conservative politicians opposed this language in 
the U.N. Charter. They could not bear the thought of a single document undermining 
generations’ worth of American laws and social norms. Jim Crow was the law of the 
land; what gave the U.N. the authority to arbitrarily take that away?591 Fortunately for 
them, one of the American delegates, John Foster Dulles—who later became President 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State—had a solution. He included a “domestic sovereignty” 
clause in the Charter, which would protect the U.S. from outside meddling: “Nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state….”592 As Anderson 
says, Dulles’s statement received the approval of the American and Soviet delegations, 
but White and Du Bois were furious, arguing that “under those restrictions, the UN would 
be unable to prevent another Holocaust … [or do] anything to stop the human rights 
abuses that blacks suffered in the United States.”593 Other delegations also opposed the 
domestic sovereignty clause, but to no avail. The world order was too fragile in the 
immediate postwar period, and the American delegation got what it wanted. White and 
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Du Bois began to wonder if linking black rights with human rights was the best strategy 
for achieving racial equality. 
In 1947, two years after the San Francisco Conference and one year after the 
Nuremberg Trial ended, Du Bois filed an appeal with the U.N. in which he claimed that 
African Americans had been denied their human rights for generations, so he asked for a 
remedy. He did not mince words, boldly declaring that the treatment of “American 
Negroes…is not merely an internal question of the United States. It is a basic problem of 
humanity; of democracy; of discrimination because of race and color; and as such it 
demands your attention and action.” His main point was that the U.S. was hypocritical for 
claiming to be the world’s greatest democracy while at the same time denying basic 
individual rights to black people. He quoted several passages from the Constitution, 
including the three-fifth’s compromise (Article I, Section 2), the mention of the slave 
trade (Article I, Section 9), and the fugitive slave clause (Article IV, Section 3) to show 
that racial discrimination was written into the country’s founding document and had been 
the nation’s most enduring legacy. He pointed out that African Americans had a rich 
culture that had contributed to American music, art, literature, and religion, and that 
blacks defended the U.S. “in every war, on land and sea.” Du Bois finally appealed to the 
world that “No nation is so great that the world can afford to let it continue to be 
deliberately unjust, cruel and unfair toward its own citizens.” Given the fact that the 
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UNCHR, headed by Eleanor Roosevelt, was meeting in 1947 to draft the UDHR, Du 
Bois hoped his appeal would improve the situation of blacks in America. It did not.594  
Although the NAACP forged alliances with President Harry Truman and Eleanor 
Roosevelt, hoping that these two figures would help them advance racial equality on the 
global stage, neither could embrace the kind of racial harmony that White desired, given 
the strength of the conservative backlash in the postwar period. In fact, even President 
Roosevelt, as a result of the political pressure he felt from conservatives, had to find a 
balance between upholding American sovereignty and pushing for international human 
rights law. For example, after he articulated his human rights vision for the world in his 
Four Freedoms speech and in the Atlantic Charter, the State Department began 
translating “these goals into postwar policy.” Roosevelt, however, could not support 
having a “postwar international peacekeeping body enforce human rights standards,” 
because his political opponents would worry over the loss of national sovereignty. 
Similarly, while Roosevelt wanted to create a new international organization to take the 
place of the League of Nations, he did not push to include human rights in what 
eventually became the U.N. Charter. It was actually his personal liaison at the Dumbarton 
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Oaks Conference, Benjamin Cohen, who “recognized that without at least an 
acknowledgement of human rights, especially in light of the Holocaust, the proposed UN 
would appear to be nothing more than a façade for power politics as usual.”595  
After Roosevelt died, this tug-of-war between American sovereignty and 
international human rights law continued with Eleanor Roosevelt’s work on the UDHR 
and the U.N.’s Genocide Convention, two human rights instruments that were intended to 
have enforcement powers to prevent the kind of atrocities that occurred during World 
War II. However, presidents from Roosevelt to Truman to Eisenhower could not risk the 
integrity of American sovereignty in pursuit of a human rights agenda—conservative 
politicians simply would not allow it, so these documents became little more than 
idealistic statements, of hopes and dreams to be longed for rather than normative laws to 
be enforced. The NAACP thus made the strategic decision to abandon human rights in 
favor of legal challenges to racial inequality.596 
As the Cold War with Russia and East Asia heated up in the 1950s, American 
conservatives aligned human rights with the Communist Party. Dulles’s “domestic 
sovereignty” clause provided some reassurance that the U.N. would not overtake the 
U.S., but American politicians insisted that the U.N. would become a world government 
that would eventually strip the U.S. of its right to govern itself. Their goal was to make 
Americans, who were already afraid of Communism’s promise of a one-world 
                                                 
595 Anderson, Eyes off the Prize, 36. 
596 Rowland Brucken, A Most Uncertain Crusade: The United States, The United Nations, and 
Human Rights, 1941-1953 (Dekalb, Illinois: NIU Press, 2014), 4-6. Other discussions of paradoxes 
between the U.S. policy and human rights can be found in Clair Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human 
Rights Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy (New York: Routledge, 2006), and Glenn Mitoma, Human Rights and 
the Negotiation of American Power (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvanian Press, 2013). 
283 
government, fear the U.N. and human rights so that they would have to oppose them 
both. One of the most vocal leaders among these conservative politicians was John 
Bricker.  
After failing to become the country’s vice president in 1944, Bricker, a 
conservative Republican from Ohio, ran for the U.S. Senate. He wanted to stop the 
Truman administration’s constant meddling with the economy. As historian Richard 
Davies puts it, Bricker faulted Truman for continuing to control prices and often 
grumbled that the Office of Price Administration “has made more criminals and raised 
prices higher in America than anyone could have thought possible.”597 Bricker believed 
the president’s continued adherence to his predecessor’s New Deal policies led to 
housing and food shortages, so he argued against increasing regulations and advocated 
instead for a free marketplace. He blasted the New Deal by claiming it was incompatible 
with American values, labeled organized labor unions as communist (and said Truman 
was aligned with their interests), and argued that the entire policy was akin to totalitarian 
control.598 As a result, Bricker became a U.S. senator in 1946, the same year Joseph 
McCarthy won his U.S. Senate seat in Wisconsin. Both Bricker and McCarthy rose to 
prominence based on similar xenophobic reasons. Whereas McCarthy scared people into 
believing that communist sympathizers and spies had already infiltrated the U.S. and 
were actively threatening the American way of life, Bricker sought to keep communist 
ideas from spreading to the U.S. by limiting the treaty-making powers of the executive 
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branch of government (see below). His fear was that the U.S. was sacrificing its national 
sovereignty by joining the U.N. and institutionalizing human rights, so he was 
determined to protect the country from what he believed was the naïveté of 
internationalism. 
It was because of Bricker’s vocal opposition to the U.N. and human rights that 
Parker became such an outspoken supporter of both. This was in keeping with Parker’s 
personality and profession. While he frequently wrote and spoke about legal issues, given 
his expertise as a respected circuit court judge, he was less inclined to take a public stand 
on policy matters. The only reason he did was because of the backlash coming from 
conservative circles, first from Bricker and then from the American Bar Association 
(ABA).  
ABA President Frank Holman openly opposed the UDHR in January 1949, one 
month after the U.N. adopted it, calling it a manifesto that would “promote state 
socialism, if not communism, throughout the world.”599 Holman believed the U.N.’s 
human rights project was part of a socialist agenda that would violate American 
sovereignty by imposing a set of international principles on the U.S. His opposition was 
grounded in the ideological and economic struggles he perceived during the Cold War. 
Tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were heating up as the 1950s approached, and 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin from June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949 only confirmed 
American fears that irreconcilable differences existed between the two global powers. In 
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fact, Parker confided in his nephew over lunch that another world war may have already 
started, but “don’t tell your mothers.”600 The fact that the Soviet Union had been part of 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights made observers like Holman even more 
suspicious of the UDHR. 
Not surprisingly, the ABA opposed the Genocide Convention, too. The chairman 
of the ABA’s Committee on Peace and Law Through the United Nations criticized the 
convention’s definition of genocide for being vague and difficult to interpret.601 Article II 
of the CPPCG defined genocide as: 
 
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.602 
 
The ABA committee wondered why national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups were 
included in the convention but not political groups. U.S. senators, particularly from the 
South, speculated that if the U.S. ratified the Genocide Convention, it could be charged 
with committing genocide against Native Americans, African Americans, or both.603 The 
ABA committee also pondered what exactly constituted “serious” harm? What did the 
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convention mean by “mental harm”? How many “members of the group” had to die 
before the crime could be considered “genocide”? Most importantly, the convention 
defined genocide as an intentional act, but this seemed impossible to prove. It is difficult 
enough to find someone guilty of intent to commit murder. How much more arduous 
would it be to prove intent to commit genocide? 604 
Parker fully supported the Genocide Convention, the UDHR, and the U.N. as a 
whole. In a lecture titled “World Order Based on Law,” which he gave at Washington 
and Lee University’s School of Law after the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the convention, 
Parker spoke on a wide range of topics, from legal theory to America’s role in the world. 
Towards the end of his talk, he made it quite clear that his experiences at Nuremberg 
compelled him to address critics who opposed the U.N.’s efforts to create a more 
peaceful world: 
 
I have little sympathy with those who view with alarm the Declaration 
of Human Rights by the Assembly of the United Nations or the proposed 
Genocide Statute. One who has heard, as I have heard, the sickening 
evidence of the oppression of helpless minorities and the murder of six 
million Jews has an abiding conviction that no legal theory ought to be 
allowed to stand in the way of effective action to prevent such 
outrages.605 
 
 
In his next breath, Parker went further and addressed the argument coming from the 
opponents of internationalism that the U.S. had given up its sovereignty by joining the 
U.N.:   
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No nation should be permitted, under the guise of exercising its 
nationality, to engage in conduct which so shocks the conscience of 
mankind; and the world community, if it is fit to live, will find a way to 
prevent it. Nothing will do more to preserve the peace of the world than 
guaranteeing to all the world's peoples the fundamental rights of human 
manhood.606 
 
 
As a lawyer, a judge, and a key participant at Nuremberg, Parker knew that the Genocide 
Convention was a step in the right direction if the world wanted to prevent the kind of 
atrocities that had taken place in Nazi-occupied Europe. The Germans had claimed that 
they were within their nation’s sovereign rights to do as they pleased within the confines 
of their own borders, but the Nuremberg Trial invalidated that line of reasoning. Parker 
had hoped the Senate would have recognized the importance of ratifying the convention, 
but the internationalist spirit that had surged following World War II was under attack, 
and a wave of anticommunist feelings was moving to take its place. By the beginning of 
the 1950s, tensions with the Soviet Union had escalated to such a point that Americans 
began to question if it was possible, or even desirable, for the U.S. to take an active role 
in international organizations or agreements. Such actions were not only unpopular, they 
were also considered un-American.  
The Bricker Amendment 
From 1951 to 1955, Bricker and his supporters attempted to push through 
Congress a constitutional amendment that would fundamentally change the balance of 
power between the executive and legislative branches. Bricker wanted to amend Article 
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VI of the Constitution to address what he believed was a loophole where it states “all 
Treaties made … under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land.”607 Bricker was afraid that treaties might impose international laws on the U.S. 
and supersede American laws, which was the same position Holman had taken when he 
was elected ABA president in 1948. For this reason, Bricker wanted to modify the 
Constitution so that foreign laws could not be enforced in the U.S. without congressional 
approval.608 He was primarily concerned with attempts to create a human rights covenant 
that would enforce the principles of the UDHR.  
Ever since 1947, when the UNCHR had met to draft the UDHR, some of the 
delegates also wanted to create a covenant that would be legally binding upon all U.N. 
nations. The U.S. initially signaled its support for a declaration and a covenant, but later 
reneged, as Eleanor Roosevelt reported that the U.S. wanted to wait until all of the 
participating states could accept a covenant. In one of her “My Day” newspaper columns, 
she stated that the U.S. would have to carefully consider balancing the creation of a 
legally-binding document with the matter of “state’s rights.” Roosevelt believed in these 
early stages of international cooperation that it would be enough to create a simple 
declaration of human rights because it “would have moral value.” Perhaps the U.N. could 
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revisit the idea of a covenant later. Once the UDHR passed in December 1948, though, 
calls for a treaty on human rights increased.609 
Bricker was not going to allow that to happen. In his own words, “My purpose in 
offering this resolution is to bury the so-called covenant on human rights so deep that no 
one holding high public office will ever dare to attempt its resurrection.”610 Bricker’s 
fears were not entirely without merit. The UDHR did undermine the principle of national 
sovereignty by stating that human rights were universal and belonged to “all members of 
the human family,” and the proposed Covenant on Human Rights would become a 
legally-binding agreement under international law.611 If the U.N. passed the Covenant, 
the U.S. would have to uphold the human rights of all people within its borders, which 
would not have been easy in the 1950s, as African Americans and other minority groups 
faced widespread, systemic discrimination. Bricker wanted to prevent U.N. meddling by 
appealing to the principle of national sovereignty, a defense that the Nuremberg Trial had 
flatly rejected. If the U.S. permitted the kind of discrimination that the UDHR explicitly 
forbade, then it would have made more sense to reexamine American law rather than 
block international law. Bricker clearly had a different objective in mind, though.  
Bricker also opposed proposals for a permanent international criminal court. The 
U.N. General Assembly had appointed a committee on establishing such a court, and the 
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committee finished its draft statute in 1951.612 Even Raphael Lemkin, author of the term 
“genocide” and the face of the Genocide Convention, did not support the creation of a 
permanent international criminal court because he did not believe the world was ready for 
a judicial institution that would impinge upon the principles of state sovereignty.613  
Bricker’s amendment and his opposition to the ICC represented an attack against 
everything the Nuremberg Trial stood for. Instead of working with the international 
community to establish order and stability, as Nuremberg’s American participants had 
done, Bricker wanted the U.S. to retreat from multilateralism and protect its own 
interests. His greatest fear was that the U.S. would become subject to international laws 
that contradicted the Constitution, so he wanted to ensure that, regardless of who 
occupied the Oval Office, no president would be able to enter into executive agreements 
with foreign governments without congressional approval. In the minds of Bricker’s 
supporters, the Ohio senator’s amendment was necessary to prevent international 
agreements from superseding American laws. The battle between national sovereignty 
and the Bricker Amendment on the one hand, and international human rights and 
multilateralism on the other was escalating.614 
Parker was a staunch supporter of the proposed ICC and vehemently opposed 
Bricker’s legislation. The ICC was intended to be a permanent version of Nuremberg, 
and Parker believed strengthening international law and international institutions would 
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only benefit the new world order. Unfortunately, when Parker attended the ABA’s Mid-
Year Meeting in Chicago, he could not convince the House of Delegates to support the 
ICC; they voted instead to take no action on the proposal at the time. “The Bar 
Association is afflicted with considerable isolationism,” Parker wrote to Robert Jackson, 
hoping that the Supreme Court justice might have better luck persuading the ABA’s 
members.615 In the meantime, Parker continued to push for American involvement in 
international institutions. In 1952, the American Bar Association Journal ran a two-piece 
article on the pros and cons of a permanent international criminal court. Parker argued for 
the former in “An International Criminal Court:  The Case for Its Adoption.” He outlined 
his view that the U.S. should lead the world in international law because the U.S. 
Constitution was the best document to safeguard individual rights. In Parker’s view, so 
long as the U.S. Constitution was the foundation of the ICC, the U.N., and other 
international bodies and agreements, then there would be no conflict between 
international law and American domestic law.616 
The North Carolina judge described the Bricker Amendment as “absurd” and 
“suicidal…when so much depends upon the leadership of this country in international 
affairs.”617 He used his position as an appellate court judge to attempt to sway members 
of Congress to oppose the amendment. He contacted numerous politicians to explain why 
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the bill was unnecessary and unconstitutional. One such individual was Rep. Charles 
Raper Jonas, a Bricker supporter who wanted greater checks on the President’s executive 
power.618 Parker believed that Jonas had no reason to worry that “the President and the 
two-thirds of the Senate will impair the safeguards of constitutional liberty embodied in 
the Constitution.”619 He responded to Jonas’s letter by saying, “I thoroughly agree with 
you that we should not abdicate our sovereignty to a super government; and it is because 
I take this view that I am opposed to limited treaty making power.”620 His response 
reflected how differently he and Jonas viewed the U.N. Jonas saw the international 
organization as a world government that would control the U.S. from afar. Parker did not 
see it that way, viewing it instead as an opportunity to work together with other nations to 
strengthen the vitality of international law.621 He believed multilateralism and 
international cooperation were preferable, provided that they were compatible with the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Parker continued his letter-writing campaign at a steady pace and found a trusted 
ally in Estes Kefauver, the Democratic senator from Tennessee who later became Adlai 
Stevenson’s running mate during the 1956 Presidential election. Kefauver was a member 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee who opposed the Bricker Amendment. He enlisted 
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Parker’s help in early 1953 by asking him to come to D.C. to argue against the bill. 
Parker eagerly agreed.622  
In Parker’s statement before the Senate, he emphasized that the nations of the 
world were looking to either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. for global leadership. The Korean 
War in Asia marked the beginning of Cold War hostilities, and if the President did not 
have the freedom to enter into executive agreements with foreign countries, then Parker 
believed it would severely hamper the U.S.’s ability to lead the world “at a time when the 
leadership of this country in the international field is needed as never before in our 
history.” He reminded the committee that without executive agreements, the U.S. would 
not have been able to occupy Germany after the war or conduct the Nuremberg Trial. 
Furthermore, he pointed out that the Constitution already required a two-thirds majority 
in the Senate to ratify a treaty, which he felt had been sufficient to protect the country 
from potentially dangerous or unwise international agreements. “Surely the President and 
the Senate can be trusted,” Parker declared. “If the time should ever come when the 
President, the Secretary of State and two thirds of the Senate are willing to bargain away 
by treaty the rights or liberties of the people of this country, we would have reached such 
a stage of national deterioration that nothing written in the Constitution could save us.”623 
Additionally, if the Senate ever passed a treaty that violated the Constitution, Parker was 
confident the Supreme Court would rule it unconstitutional. His faith in the rule of law 
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prevailed over Bricker’s fears of an international organization or treaty imposing itself on 
the American people. 
Another fear that Parker directly addressed in his statement concerned the idea of 
a “super government” whose authority would supersede that of the U.S. Parker did not 
support such an entity, but he did support the U.N., declaring that “There is no longer any 
safety in isolation.” He concluded that while the world had undergone and was 
continuing to undergo rapid changes, there was no reason to “take unusual precautions to 
protect our institutions….” The U.S. must not give in to fear, lest the Soviet Union 
prevail as the dominant nation on earth.624 
There is no evidence that Parker experienced any fallout from opposing the 
Bricker Amendment, even though many members of the ABA supported the proposed 
legislation. For instance, when the ABA’s Section of International and Comparative Law 
met in Boston on August 25, 1953, the Committee on Constitutional Aspects of 
International Law, of which Parker was a member, voted almost unanimously against the 
amendment with the following resolution: 
 
Resolved, That the American Bar Association opposes the adoption as 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States of Senate Joint 
Resolution 1, as revised and reported to the United States Senate by the 
Committee on the Judiciary.625  
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The Committee then read its report before the entire Section, and two lawyers (Otto 
Schoenrich of New York and George Finch of Washington, D.C.) supported the Bricker 
Amendment, while two others (Harvard Law Professor Arthur Sutherland and Oregon 
State Supreme Court Judge James Brand) opposed it. Parker then closed the debate by 
voicing his opposition.626 The Committee’s resolution went before the ABA’s House of 
Delegates, the organization’s larger body in charge of making policy, for a vote, but that 
body rejected it. Even though this was not the vote Parker had hoped for, he did not seem 
bothered. Writing to several colleagues in September 1953, after returning from a much-
needed vacation, Parker reported his belief that the U.S. Senate would pay more attention 
to the Section’s vote than the ABA’s at-large body.627 His prediction turned out to be 
correct, as the Bricker Amendment failed to become law.  
The Senator from Ohio continued for another two years to revise and reintroduce 
the bill, but Bricker never drummed up enough support. The Bricker Amendment 
consumed Parker’s energies throughout the early 1950s, though. Every time it 
reappeared, Parker began writing letters to close friends and members of Congress to 
express his opposition. He was even asked to return to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
the following year to oppose the revised amendment, but he politely declined, replying 
that he had already expressed his reasons for opposing the bill. The appearance of a 
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respected circuit court judge before the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposition to the 
Bricker Amendment had helped defeat the legislation.  
While Parker concentrated his efforts on advocating for increased U.S. 
involvement in international affairs, the human rights situation at home was reaching a 
tipping point. The domestic struggle to eliminate school segregation would reveal the 
limits of Parker’s human rights advocacy. 
School (De)Segregation 
The most controversial case of Parker’s career involved the public school system 
of Clarendon County, South Carolina. The case of Briggs v. Elliott (1951) involved the 
dilapidated condition of black public school facilities. As one of the judges on the case 
remarked, “The white schools were nothing to be really enthusiastic about, but they were 
fairly respectable-looking…[with] running water, and things of that kind. The Negro 
schools were just tumbledown, dirty shacks with horrible outdoor toilet facilities.”628 
Thurgood Marshall, representing Harry Briggs, knew he could win the case on the 
grounds that the black school facilities were not equal to the white ones. The visual 
distinctions between the two were incontrovertible, so it would have been easier for 
Marshall to make a simple argument over the equalization of facilities. However, he set 
his sights higher and wanted to tear down the generations-old practice of segregation 
itself and leave Plessy behind in the dustbin of history.  
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Marshall knew that if his plan was going to succeed, he would have to be patient 
throughout a lengthy judicial process. He first needed to argue his case before a special 
three-judge district court. Parker, as the chief judge of the Fourth Circuit, was part of this 
group, along with George Bell Timmerman and J. Waties Waring. Marshall would have 
to convince two out of the three to side with him, but he was skeptical, and for good 
reason. Parker had a reputation for siding with Supreme Court precedent, and Plessy v. 
Ferguson had been the law of the land for 55 years by that point. Throughout that time, 
the court had upheld “separate but equal” numerous times, reinforcing the notion that 
segregation was both lawful and acceptable. It was highly unlikely that Parker would go 
against the Supreme Court. The same went for Timmerman, who was a white 
supremacist. Only the third judge, Waring, was likely to side with Marshall, but that 
would not be enough to win. All Marshall could do was deliver his argument, hope for 
the best, and then appeal to the Supreme Court if necessary. 
Marshall planned to challenge the constitutionality of South Carolina’s 
segregation law first by demonstrating that segregated schools were unequal and then by 
arguing that they could not be made equal since the notion of “separate but equal” 
necessarily created unequal conditions. That would then allow him to claim that state-
sanction school segregation violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States…nor deny to any person within its 
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”629 Marshall’s witnesses had planned to 
testify about the unequal conditions between white and black school, but the defense beat 
them to it. Robert McCormick Figg, attorney for the defendant R.W. Elliott, did not deny 
that the public schools were unequal and argued that a lack of resources for the entire 
county had resulted in substandard facilities for both black and white schools. Marshall 
was dumbfounded. Figg had undercut him before he could even launch his argument, and 
he never recovered.630 
On June 23, 1951, the special three-judge district court reached its decision. 
Parker read the court’s opinion upholding Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine, writing 
that, “It is equally well settled that there is no denial of the equal protection of the laws in 
segregating children in the schools for purposes of education, if the children of the 
different races are given equal facilities and opportunities.” He then cited numerous cases 
in which the courts had sustained Plessy v. Ferguson, thus demonstrating that segregated 
schools were not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parker also had a great deal 
of respect for the institution of the Supreme Court, and if the greatest legal minds in the 
country’s history had ruled in favor of Plessy, then he saw no reason to go against them: 
 
… when [segregation of the races in the public schools] has received the 
… unanimous approval of the Supreme Court of the United States at a 
time when that court included Chief Justice Taft and Justices Stone, 
Holmes and Brandeis, it is a late day to say that such segregation is 
violative of fundamental constitutional rights. 
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This does not mean that Parker believed segregated schools were necessary, though. 
Later in his opinion, as Parker addressed whether or not states should integrate schools, 
he commented on the separate roles of the legislative and judicial branches and explained 
that it would be a gross overreach of power for the federal judiciary to tell individual 
states how they should respond to educational problems at the local level: 
 
In some states, the legislatures may well decide that segregation in 
public schools should be abolished, in others that it should be 
maintained all depending upon the relationships existing between the 
races and the tensions likely to be produced by an attempt to educate the 
children of the two races together in the same schools. The federal courts 
would be going far outside their constitutional function were they to 
attempt to prescribe educational policies for the states in such matters, 
however desirable such policies might be in the opinion of some 
sociologists or educators. For the federal courts to do so would result, 
not only in interference with local affairs by an agency of the federal 
government, but also in the substitution of the judicial for the legislative 
process in what is essentially a legislative matter. 
 
 
The three-judge panel also pointed out that South Carolina Governor James Byrnes, who 
had previously been a Supreme Court justice and a member of Roosevelt’s cabinet, had 
announced a plan to institute the state’s first sales tax in order to raise approximately $80 
million to equalize to public school facilities and transportation. Segregated schools 
remained the law of the land.631 
After Parker ruled that Clarendon County’s segregated schools were lawful, the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court the following year, but the justices sent the case 
back to the lower court after Clarendon County argued that it had made progress in 
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equalizing white and black facilities. Marshall maintained that so long as white and black 
students attended separate facilities, they would always receive unequal educations. Part 
of his argument included testimony from Kenneth and Mamie Clark, African American 
psychologists who had conducted experiments on two different groups of children (those 
enrolled in segregated schools and those in integrated schools), between the ages of three 
and seven, using dolls that were identical except for skin color. The Clarks would ask the 
children to identify the race of the dolls and which one they wanted to play with. The 
majority of children preferred the white doll, and as a result of the experiment, the Clarks 
concluded that segregated schools made African American children feel inferior. Armed 
with this sociological knowledge, Marshall appealed the Briggs decision to the Supreme 
Court again, but by that time in 1952, the Court had several school segregation cases on 
its docket, including Oliver Brown et al. v. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 
which involved segregated elementary schools. Thus, the Supreme Court consolidated 
these cases into Brown v. Board of Education.  
 On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous 9-0 decision that 
segregated schools were inherently unequal. The Brown v. Board of Education decision 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, as well as Parker’s ruling in Briggs v. Elliott. Parker 
handled the reversal gracefully, even imploring his state’s governor to comply fully with 
the ruling at the University of North Carolina (UNC). In a letter to Governor Luther 
Hodges, Parker commented on the fact that UNC’s Board of Trustees had recently passed 
a resolution forbidding blacks from matriculating. Parker could not attend the meeting 
because he was in Richmond to fulfill his duties on the Fourth Circuit, but he made it 
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quite clear that he did not support the resolution and recommended reconsidering it. The 
Supreme Court had nullified the decades-old practice of “separate but equal,” and in 
Parker’s mind, it was the “duty of all law-abiding men to accept and obey the law as laid 
down by the Supreme Court of the United States.” He also suggested forming a 
committee to “deal with the problems that would be presented by admitting Negroes to 
the undergraduate departments of the University.” He felt it was important for UNC to 
“take the lead in providing for…peaceful observance [of the law] by our people. If the 
problem is approached in this spirit, many difficulties which now appear troublesome 
will be solved without friction.”632 This evidence demonstrates Parker’s acceptance of 
and compliance with the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
However, Parker’s public response to Brown and the Supreme Court’s decision to 
overturn his ruling appears, on the surface, to contradict his private reaction. The 
Supreme Court sent Briggs back down to the lower court “to take such proceedings and 
enter such orders and decrees consistent with [the Brown] opinion as are necessary and 
proper to admit to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis with all 
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.” Parker released his second Briggs ruling on 
July 15, 1955. In an attempt to mollify frightened Southerners who felt their world was 
changing too quickly, Parker included a paragraph specifying exactly what the Brown 
decision did and did not do. He explained that the federal courts were not taking over 
public schools since that responsibility resided with the states. The only thing the 
Supreme Court did was declare that “a state may not deny to any person on account of 
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race the right to attend any school that it maintains.” He wanted to state unequivocally 
that people of different races could still voluntarily choose to attend separate schools, just 
“as they attend different churches.” And then, in a statement that appears controversial 
when taken out of context, Parker wrote, “The Constitution, in other words, does not 
require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.”  
Scholars of civil rights and school desegregation often argue that Parker’s words 
gave segregationists legal justification for obstructing Brown by resisting integration.633 
Any analysis of Briggs (1955) that is limited to just these two sentences makes it appear 
that Parker was obstructing Brown, that he was essentially making a distinction without a 
difference by emphasizing that the abolition of segregation did not necessitate the 
institution of integration. However, the larger point Parker was attempting to make 
concerned the Supreme Court’s role in interpreting the Constitution and how the 
Fourteenth Amendment affected the power of state governments. The statements he made 
immediately following the above quote make this clear: 
 
 [The Constitution] does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the 
result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental 
power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation 
upon the exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation 
upon the freedom of individuals. 
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Parker wanted to reassure Southerners that the Supreme Court had not overreached by 
limiting individual liberty. Instead, under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court had limited the power of state governments by saying that segregation was 
inherently unequal, and that states could no longer mandate segregated public schools. 
This was not an attack on individual rights, which would have been anathema to Parker 
who believed they were the foundation of the U.S. Constitution. Instead, this was a 
reinterpretation of the power of the states to regulate public schools under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Plessy precedent said segregated public schools were constitutional. 
The Brown decision declared 58 years later that they were not. 
Parker had to maintain a certain balance when it involved racial segregation in the 
Jim Crow South, similar to his friend Frank Porter Graham when he had served on 
Truman’s Presidential Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) in 1946. For instance, Graham 
was racially progressive but, as Civil Rights historian Steven Lawson describes him, had 
to “walk a fine line” in the South. To that end, he followed Jim Crow tradition in 1939 by 
blocking a black student from enrolling at UNC, but at the same time he called for 
enfranchising black voters so that they could have a voice in the political and economic 
life of the South. When the PCCR released its final report, many Southerners 
understandably lambasted it for its criticism of Jim Crow, and they also branded Graham 
a traitor, even though he did not personally support the recommendations on school 
desegregation.634 This careful balancing act of supporting racial equality while opposing 
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the complete dismantling of Jim Crow was strategic. As a Southerner, Graham did not 
wish to antagonize an entire generation of people who could not imagine an integrated 
society. Change would come, but it had to come gradually in order to avoid a violent 
backlash. Parker and Graham were peers and had worked closely together at UNC for 
many decades, so it is understandable that the two would approach race issues in a similar 
fashion. 
When Parker first ruled on Briggs, he merely upheld Supreme Court precedent 
that school segregation was lawful. In his mind, the only court with the authority to 
change that precedent was the Supreme Court itself, so he respected the Brown decision 
and immediately recommended steps to implement it. His letter to Gov. Hodges 
concerning integration at UNC demonstrates that he never intended for his words in 
Briggs to become a rallying cry for segregationists. He was simply trying to put out fires 
before they ignited. Unfortunately, his strategy did not work, and numerous school 
districts in the South went to extraordinary measures to block school integration, in some 
cases even shutting down all public schools. 
 The most vocal critic of Parker’s decision in Briggs is historian Kenneth Goings, 
who has argued that Parker intentionally impeded school integration because he did not 
support race mixing. Goings believes that ever since Parker’s failed Supreme Court 
nomination in 1930, the Southern jurist continued to hold out hope that he might one day 
join the highest court in the land. In order to do that, though, he needed a solid judicial 
record that would not evoke controversy should the President nominate him. But in 
Goings’s words, when Parker did not receive the Supreme Court nomination in 1953, 
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which went to Earl Warren instead, “He probably realized that he would never be on the 
Supreme Court. There was no need to temper himself on the race issue anymore, hence 
the Briggs dictum.” As evidence of Parker’s racist attitudes, Goings cites a letter Parker 
wrote but never sent in 1930 in which he said, “In the first place there can be no such 
thing as social equality or intercourse between the races. In the second place the 
participation by the Negro in politics is a source of evil and danger to both races and is 
not desired by wise men in either race.” Goings concludes that from 1930 to 1955, 
“Parker had not changed,” and that the only reason he ever appeared progressive on race 
issues was to improve his chances of joining the Supreme Court. Once that was no longer 
a possibility, Goings says Parker stopped hiding his “true feelings and beliefs.”635  
In addition, Goings relies on the original 1975 edition of Richard Kluger’s Simple 
Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for 
Equality, to demonstrate Parker’s detrimental impact on the lack of school integration in 
the South. Quoting Kluger, Goings claims that Parker “set the standard for evasiveness 
by school districts throughout the South” when he announced his Briggs ruling on July 
15, 1955, that the Supreme Court did not require integration.636 However, Goings 
misquoted Kluger when he said Parker “set the standard for evasiveness…” Kluger’s 
original text actually reads that Parker “set a standard for evasiveness….”637 This may 
seem like a minor distinction, but it is worth noting how the meaning of the sentence 
changes when the definite article is replaced with an indefinite one. Also, while Kluger 
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does touch on the “Parker doctrine” in the first edition of his seminal work, the revised 
edition, issued in 2004 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the original Brown 
decision, makes no mention of it. In fact, Kluger omits Parker entirely from the final 
chapter, which assesses Brown’s lasting legacy. It would seem that nearly thirty years 
after penning his magnum opus, Kluger no longer felt the need to emphasize Parker’s 
final decision in Briggs.638 
The argument that Parker only supported racial equality, such as in City of 
Richmond v. Deans (1930) and Alston v. Norfolk (1940), because he hoped it would 
secure him a seat on the Supreme Court is unconvincing. Such an argument would have 
to demonstrate conclusively that Parker’s rulings for a period of more than twenty years 
were motivated more by personal ambition than by judicial integrity. It also implies that 
Parker’s thinking remained mostly static from the time he was 45 until he was in his late 
60s, a claim that simply does not hold up to scrutiny. It overlooks, for instance, Parker’s 
participation in the Nuremberg Trial, a seminal event in his life that influenced his views 
on human rights and his subsequent push for increased U.S. engagement in international 
institutions and agreements. The John Parker who failed to receive Senate confirmation 
in 1930—in part because of remarks he had made ten years earlier while running for 
governor of North Carolina—was not the same man who heard horrifying testimony of 
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unimaginable atrocities and returned to the U.S. determined to prevent similar human 
rights abuses. 
While Parker earnestly supported the U.N., international human rights law, and 
America’s global leadership, he never seemed to make the connection that in order to 
implement human rights, they had to apply at home as well as abroad. Racial segregation 
was a violation of universal human rights, yet Parker’s ruling in Briggs did not recognize 
that fact. This exemplifies a key paradox concerning human rights in the U.S. after 
WWII. Parker genuinely supported human rights around the world, but he could not see 
the need to uphold these universal principles in his own backyard. He was more 
concerned with making sure Southerners would respect the Supreme Court’s decision 
than he was in fighting for racial equality. Judge Simon Sobeloff, who had represented 
the federal government as solicitor general during both Brown decisions before joining 
Parker on the Fourth Circuit, wrote to Parker to share his concerns over this matter: 
 
I know how earnestly you have endeavored to moderate emotions in this 
area of race relations, and you have taken occasion to say in our court’s 
opinions that which would help to lessen resistance to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. It was both true and useful to point out, as you have 
done in the past, that the law does not require wholesale reshuffling of 
pupils to compel mixing; but I am wondering if it serves the desired 
purpose to keep repeating this assertion. I fear that such repetition is less 
likely to allay fears than to encourage inaction.639 
 
 
Had Parker been more consistent in his human rights advocacy, he would have applied 
the same logic to school desegregation as he had the UDHR or the U.N. While this does 
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not mean Parker was disingenuous in his support of human rights, it illustrates that it was 
easier to argue for the implementation of them in international affairs than it was in the 
domestic arena. It is often challenging for individuals to address long-standing traditions 
of oppression in their local communities. Parker probably felt that segregation was 
beneficial to blacks, but from the perspective of international law, such practices clearly 
violate human rights standards. Parker’s story reveals that even when human rights 
supporters call out atrocities that are taking place around the world, they have a much 
harder time being as critical of similar conflicts in their own backyard. 
On March 18, 1958, Parker prepared to speak before the U.N. League of Lawyers 
in a talk entitled, “We Must Go Forward: Law in the World Community.” Parker planned 
to reiterate the same arguments he had made since returning from Nuremberg, that only 
through the rule of law could the world hope to live in peace, and that the U.N. was the 
only organization suited to attaining this goal. In his drafted remarks, he wrote that the 
alternative to the rule of law was the rule of force, and he blamed the latter for causing 
the destruction of World War II and the Korean War. It was time to “rise above the 
narrow limitations of nationalism,” Parker penned, and “support an intelligent 
organization of world life based upon law and righteousness.”640 This was the crux of 
Parker’s message, but he never had the chance to deliver it. Parker died unexpectedly of a 
massive heart attack the day before.  
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CHAPTER XII 
FROM NUREMBERG TO NOWHERE
 
The [Nürnberg] trial was a step in international cooperation. War is now 
no longer seen as a romantic adventure, but as a degrading crime, a 
crime which cannot be permitted if life itself is to continue. And the only 
alternative to war is the acceptance and development of a universal law 
based on the necessity of living together in peace.641 
Francis B. Biddle 
 
 
Francis Biddle never enjoyed listening to cases, let alone one taking place in four 
different languages, so Nuremberg had been especially taxing.642 By the summer of 1946, 
he was ready to leave Germany, return to the U.S., and be with Katherine, his wife. She 
had been unable to join him throughout most of the proceedings, and the sexagenarian’s 
letters back home reflect how desperately he longed for her attention. After October 1, 
though, the “Trial of the Century” was finally over, and the flight across the Atlantic had 
never felt so good.  
Biddle echoed many of the things Robert Jackson said in his final report. Writing 
to the president on November 9, 1946, Biddle remarked that the Trial was significant 
because it criminalized aggressive war and put future offenders on notice that they, too, 
would be tried and punished if they violated this most fundamental international law. 
Biddle also agreed with Jackson that simply outlawing aggressive war would not be 
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enough to stop it in the future, but unlike Jackson, he specifically addressed the principle 
of national sovereignty in his report:  
 
the Judgment has formulated, judicially for the first time, the proposition 
that aggressive war is criminal, and will be so treated. I do not mean that 
because of this interpretation men with lust for conquest will abandon 
war simply because the theory of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked 
to protect them when they gamble and lose;643 
 
 
Biddle’s point was that criminalizing aggressive war would not prevent all individuals 
from engaging in conflict, even though it was no longer possible for them to use national 
sovereignty as a defense. Before Nuremberg, people who waged war and lost could hide 
behind the borders of a sovereign nation and be immune from prosecution, not because 
international law allowed it but because international laws were rarely enforced. 
Nuremberg changed that. The Allies had assumed authority over the German defendants, 
gave them a fair trial, judged all but three guilty, and executed the majority of them. 
 President Truman praised Biddle, just as he did Jackson and Parker after receiving 
their final reports, for taking part in a judicial endeavor that “marked a departure from the 
past.” He then emphasized that “an undisputed gain coming out of Nurnberg is the formal 
recognition that there are crimes against humanity.” This is significant because whenever 
Biddle and Jackson reflected on Nuremberg, they usually focused on the conspiracy 
charge and Crimes against Peace. The President also mentioned aggressive war and 
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hoped that Nuremberg would set a new precedent in international law that such actions 
were criminal, but he saw fit to highlight Crimes against Humanity above all the other 
charges at the Trial. He expressed his desire that the United Nations would “reaffirm the 
principles of the Nuremberg Charter in the context of a general codification of offenses 
against the peace and security of mankind,” which came to be known as the Nuremberg 
Principles (see Chapter X).644 
 Just as Parker defended the Nuremberg Trial when he returned home, so too did 
Biddle.645 He addressed many of the complaints critics had lobbed at the world’s first 
international criminal trial, namely that it was a vindictive exercise in victor’s justice and 
that there was no legal precedent for it. What stands out about Biddle’s article is his 
frequent reference to the German saboteur case from 1942, in which he had participated 
as U.S. attorney general. Responding to the criticism that it was unfair to have only the 
victorious powers standing in judgment over the German defendants at Nuremberg, 
Biddle compared it to the saboteur case, which saw only Americans deciding the fate of 
the suspects. Biddle concluded that these accusations of unfairness were illogical since it 
would have been unreasonable to expect anything else. He then explained that, like with 
the case of the German spies, Nuremberg upheld the human rights of the defendants by 
holding a trial at all, when there was public pressure to simply execute the Germans 
instead. Finally, Biddle used the saboteur case to address the issue of national 
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sovereignty. Nuremberg’s critics claimed that international law should not apply to 
individuals, but Biddle explained that the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Ex parte 
Quirin that “international law does impose duties and liabilities upon individuals as well 
as upon States.”646 As far as Biddle was concerned, the Nuremberg Trial’s legal 
foundation and fairness were sound and incontrovertible, and he used his involvement 
with  the German saboteurs to prove his point. His role in two military trials against 
German war criminals—one American, the other international—demonstrates his 
commitment to the rule of law over brute force and summary judgment. 
A Public Servant No More 
As Biddle was preparing to leave Nuremberg, he received a cable from President 
Truman asking if he would be interested in serving as Secretary General of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which was 
headquartered in Paris. “I answered that I was interested,” Biddle remembered years 
later, “and that I would like to talk to [the President] immediately after my return.”647 As 
outlined in UNESCO’s Constitution, the organization’s purpose is to contribute “to peace 
and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science 
and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, 
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without distinction of race, sex, language or religion….”648  The job would have been 
perfect for Biddle. He had served on the Philadelphia Board of Education before coming 
to Washington, D.C., he was a seasoned lawyer and White House operative, he had 
significant international experience at Nuremberg, and he was fluent in French. 
Unfortunately, the British wanted Sir Julian Huxley, an evolutionary biologist and 
eugenicist, instead. They argued that Biddle knew nothing about education (“You cannot 
educate the world with Bob Hope and Mickey Mouse,” they argued), but they were also 
afraid that the U.S.’s expanding global role would lead to “cultural imperialism.” When it 
became clear that Biddle would not secure the appointment, he withdrew his name, and 
Huxley became the first head of UNESCO.649 
All was not lost, though. Around the same time that Senators Joseph McCarthy 
and John Bricker were being sworn in to the Senate in January 1947, President Truman 
was nominating Biddle to be the U.S. representative on the U.N.’s Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). Secretary of State George Marshall recommended Biddle for the 
appointment, and the President felt it was the least he could do after forcing Biddle to 
resign as U.S. Attorney General in 1945, and then sending him away for nearly a year to 
serve as the American judge at Nuremberg.650 If Biddle could not be the head of 
UNESCO in Paris, then he hoped he could at least hold a different U.N. position and 
continue his internationalist work. 
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The Economic and Social Council is an integral part of the U.N., having been 
created in Chapter X, Articles 61 to 72 of the U.N. Charter. Its main function is to 
conduct research and write reports on matters related to economics, society, culture, 
education, and health, and then make recommendations to the General Assembly or to the 
Security Council. Article 62, paragraph 2 explicitly states, “It may make 
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”651 ECOSOC also coordinates with specialized 
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organization 
(WHO), and UNESCO.652 In addition, it had created the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1946, the same group that Eleanor Roosevelt chaired to 
create the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). As a member of the Council, 
Biddle would have the opportunity to sway international policy within the U.N. and 
influence the development of human rights around the world. Again, similar to his 
nomination for UNESCO, Biddle’s appointment for ECOSOC seemed like a good fit, 
given his legal experience as both solicitor general and attorney general, and the pivotal 
role he played at Nuremberg. His peer, John Parker, supported Truman’s decision, 
praising Biddle “as a man of the highest character and the first order of ability.”653 
 Unfortunately, Biddle’s nomination faced unexpected opposition. Sen. Arthur 
Vandenberg (R-MI), the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
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did not support Biddle’s nomination and would not place his name before the Senate 
chamber for a vote.654 He made it clear that he did not want former members of the 
Roosevelt administration and so-called “New Dealers” to represent American interests at 
the U.N.655 Biddle had been part of Roosevelt’s cabinet for more than five years and was 
a prominent New Dealer. According to Biddle’s autobiography, Vandenberg had also 
“stuck his head out to back an ardent New Dealer” in the person of David E. Lilienthal 
for chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, so “it was not unnatural that 
[Vandenberg] should be less enthusiastic about another.”656 Vandenberg himself admitted 
that since the Republicans had gained a Congressional majority in the 1946 elections, he 
believed the voters had sent a clear message that they did not want liberal New Dealers to 
remain in positions of power.657 For those reasons, Vandenberg, who had only become 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on January 3, 1947, made it impossible for 
Biddle to serve on the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council.  
The situation frustrated Biddle so much that, after three months of waiting, he 
wrote a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt asking if she could convince Vandenberg to support 
his nomination. The former first lady had worked with Vandenberg the previous year at 
the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly. She described him as “rude and 
arrogant,” but she recognized that he was a heavyweight in foreign affairs who was 
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committed to internationalism.658 Eleanor did not mince words when she wrote to 
Vandenberg on April 17: “I have been wondering whether there is any real reason for 
opposing Mr. Francis Biddle’s nomination…” she said. “It seems to me important that we 
get a permanent member on that body which should be doing important work in the next 
few weeks.”659 Mrs. Roosevelt received a response from Vandenberg and promptly 
reported the bad news to Biddle on April 23 that Vandenberg “feels that the Social and 
Economic Council is the point at which we must prudently control the United Nations 
tendency toward premature expansion into specialized agencies. He feels we can tie in 
our representation on the Economic and Social Council with our permanent 
representation in the United Nations.”660 Vandenberg refused to budge. 
At around the same time, Biddle reached out to Parker to share his frustration. 
Parker, a Republican, responded by meeting with Vandenberg in person in an attempt to 
persuade the senator to support Biddle’s nomination. Vandenberg had voted against 
Parker’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1930, but apparently there were no hard 
feelings between the two men. Parker reminded the senator of Biddle’s service at 
Nuremberg, as well as the years he spent defending civil liberties as attorney general. 
Unfortunately, Parker’s pleas fell on deaf ears, and he lamented that he “didn’t 
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accomplish anything.”661 Without Vandenberg’s support, Biddle’s nomination could not 
proceed. 
By May 1947, Biddle knew his nomination was moribund. Although the Foreign 
Relations Committee had held an executive hearing that month to ask Biddle some 
questions, Biddle knew his name would not go before the Senate for a vote. The 
President remained loyal to Biddle and told him that he would not withdraw his name 
unless Biddle asked him to do so. On June 30, the former attorney general did just that, 
explaining that ECOSOC was too important for the U.S. not to be represented on it. “I am 
devoted to the principles of the United Nations,” Biddle said, “and want above all else to 
see them realized.”662 As long as Biddle remained the president’s nominee, ECOSOC 
would continue without American input. Truman acceded to Biddle’s request and 
withdrew his name. 
Vandenberg’s reasons for blocking Biddle’s nomination were strictly political. 
Truman’s next nominee, Willard Thorp, who received confirmation for the ECOSOC 
position, had been an adviser to President Roosevelt and had served on New Deal 
programs.663 Vandenberg praised Thorp’s nomination, though, because he was a 
“seasoned economist with wide experience in government and international relations.”664 
If Biddle’s connections to Roosevelt and the New Deal disqualified him from serving on 
ECOSOC, then why did Vandenberg allow Thorp’s nomination to move forward? Since 
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both Biddle and Thorp were New Dealers, even though Biddle never got along that well 
with Roosevelt, the only other explanation is that Vandenberg believed Biddle’s 
Nuremberg experiences disqualified him as the U.S. representative on the U.N. The 
Michigan senator had been a staunch isolationist before the war, had opposed most of the 
New Deal throughout the 1930s, and had helped defeat Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in 
1937. After the war, though, he moved away from isolationism and began to embrace 
internationalism, but only to a point. For instance, Vandenberg supported the Marshall 
Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and remarkably, Truman’s 
containment policy, making him one of few Republicans to do so. He was obviously a 
more moderate Republican than someone like Bricker or McCarthy, but he still did not 
want an internationalist with Biddle’s Nuremberg credentials representing American 
interests at the U.N. As one senator wrote to Biddle later that summer, Biddle had been 
“the victim of this reactionary trend which temporarily grips the country.”665 This trend 
was incompatible with the developing notion that every human being around the globe 
was entitled to rights that transcended national borders. After more than a decade in 
public service, the former solicitor general, attorney general, and judge was unemployed. 
The World’s Best Hope 
In the wake of Biddle’s defeats on the U.N., the former attorney general and 
Nuremberg judge turned to the lecture circuit to occupy his attention. In February 1948, 
he travelled to the University of Chicago, one of the premier institutions specializing in 
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international law, to deliver a series of lectures on, what he described as, “our ‘new’ 
foreign policy, the changes in our traditional isolationism.”666 He entitled his talk “The 
World’s Best Hope,” a phrase he borrowed from Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural 
Address that the U.S. government was the strongest on earth and had kept Americans 
free.667 He discussed the rebuilding of Europe (i.e. the Marshall Plan), the differences 
between socialism and communism (the former being an acceptable form of government 
while the latter being anathema to American political ideology), and the need to embrace 
internationalism in the postwar period. The University of Chicago published Biddle’s 
lectures the following year, giving it the subtitle “A Discussion of the Role of the United 
States in the Modern World.” 668 
On February 10, 1949, Biddle travelled to North Carolina to see his old friend, 
John Parker receive the Carolina Israelite Award for his “outstanding contribution to 
interfaith amity and human rights”669 (see Figure 12). Biddle gave Parker a copy of his 
latest book as a gift, and Parker eagerly reviewed it for the ABA Journal. He praised 
Biddle for arguing that the U.S. must continue to support Western Europe, even though 
most of those countries were socialistic, since they were the best defense against the 
spread of Soviet communism. He also agreed with Biddle that the U.S. could not afford 
to focus so narrowly on its own nationalistic interests and instead needed to embrace an 
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international focus.670 Another reviewer was far more explicit in connecting Biddle’s 
argument to the maintenance and continued development of human rights, saying that 
Americans should not fear socialism since it “is characterized by a belief in the integrity 
of the individual and the importance of human rights,” and that Biddle was insisting 
“upon the integrity of democratic human rights.”671 
Biddle not only argued for the U.S. to take the lead in spreading and enforcing 
human rights around the world, he also reinforced an American exceptionalist narrative 
that the U.S. was the only country able to do so. He believed the U.S. Constitution and 
Bill of Rights provided the universal principles that European countries needed in order 
to be free:  
 
Men must be allowed to elect and control their government—free and 
regular elections, the ultimate supremacy of the legislature, open 
criticism through freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly. Courts 
must be nonpolitical. The individual must be protected by the tested 
procedure of fair and speedy trials and by denial to the government of 
improper searches and seizures or the power to inflict cruel punishments, 
methods always resorted to by police states.672 
 
 
Biddle contested that these freedoms were necessary so that a tyrannical government 
could not subjugate its people. No such protections had existed in the Third Reich, where 
the world “saw Hitler’s ruthless imperialism destroy those rights—boastfully preaching 
that they were soft and outmoded—while he conquered and held, tortured and enslaved, a 
                                                 
670 John J. Parker, review of The World's Best Hope by Francis Biddle, American Bar Association 
Journal 35, no. 4 (April 1949), pp. 322-324. 
671 Robert S. Rankin, review of The World's Best Hope by Francis Biddle, The Journal of Politics 
11, no. 4 (Nov. 1949): 772. 
672 Biddle, The World’s Best Hope, 95-6. 
321 
very substantial part of the world.”673 Biddle had heard the graphic testimony of the 
German war criminals and had seen the fatal consequences of a country that did not 
respect the rights of the individual. By the time The World’s Best Hope appeared in print 
in 1949, the Cold War was escalating, and the Pennsylvania jurist was concerned about a 
new totalitarian threat coming from Eastern Europe:  
 
And now we find, in these years of cold struggle, that under the impact 
of a not dissimilar imperialism, with the same techniques of conquest, 
seizure of ‘friendly’ controlled governments, mass deportations and 
enslavements, and the same control and concentration of propaganda, 
such rights as existed in eastern Europe are not merely threatened but 
have been destroyed.674 
 
 
In Biddle’s eyes, the time was ripe for the U.S. to lead the world in implementing human 
rights norms.  
While Biddle believed the U.S. was the world’s best hope to secure and 
institutionalize universal rights, he did not want American sovereignty to rise above the 
authority of international law. He felt the U.S. should respect international agreements 
and institutions, such as the U.N., especially when it provided rights that the U.S. did not. 
For example, Biddle referenced racial restrictive covenants to show why the U.S. needed 
to obey the U.N. Charter and grant equal rights to African Americans, who had been 
unjustly limited in their ability to purchase or occupy real estate throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century. Racial restrictive covenants had become common throughout the 
U.S. since the Great Migration of the 1920s, when African Americans left the South in 
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search of work. White homeowners who did not want black neighbors entered into a 
covenant stating that they would not sell, lease, or rent their property to African 
Americans.  
 
Figure 12. John Parker and Francis Biddle in 1949 
 
In 1948, racial restrictive covenants became the subject of a U.S. Supreme Court 
case in Shelley v. Kraemer. J.D. Shelley purchased property in St. Louis, Missouri 
without realizing that it was subject to a racial restrictive covenant, and a white neighbor, 
Louis Kramer, sued to keep the Shelley family from buying the home. A similar 
discriminatory housing practice occurred in Detroit, Michigan with another African 
American couple, Orsel and Minnie McGhee—represented by NAACP attorney 
Thurgood Marshall—so the Supreme Court merged McGhee v. Sipes into Shelley v. 
Kraemer to decide once and for all if restrictive covenants were a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and if a court of law could enforce such covenants. The 
Judge Francis Biddle (right), travelled 
to Charlotte, NC, to speak when Judge 
John Parker (left) was recognized as 
the “Carolinian of the Year” and 
received the Israelite gold medal. The 
two men remained close friends after 
serving together at Nuremberg.  
SOURCE: Charlotte Observer, February 10, 
1949, available in Katherine Biddle Papers, 
Georgetown University, Box 58, Folder 6. 
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American Association for the United Nations (AAUN), an organization founded in 1943 
to educate Americans on the U.N. and to encourage active American participation in the 
organization, filed an amicus brief in favor of the black defendants.675 The brief cited 
article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter states that “the United Nations shall promote…uniform 
respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
discrimination as to race, sex, language, and religion.”676 Robert Jackson was on the 
Supreme Court at this time, but he had to recuse himself because he owned property that 
was subject to a racial restrictive covenant.677 However, given his vote to end school 
segregation six years later (see Chapter VI), it is unlikely that he would have voted in 
favor of continuing these discriminatory practices. Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s majority 
opinion did not cite the U.N. Charter, but the Court did rule that such covenants were 
unenforceable in a court of law. Biddle suggested that in order for universal human rights 
to exist, the U.S. needed to stop clinging to its own doctrine of national sovereignty and 
embrace a “sense of brotherhood with all the people of the world.”678 Only then could the 
U.N. contain the enforcement power necessary to uphold human rights in all parts of the 
world, but if the U.S. was determined to block international laws from superseding its 
own domestic laws, especially ones that were discriminatory against African Americans, 
then human rights would never flourish. 
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As American lawmakers continued to struggle with the role the U.S. should play 
in promoting human rights around the world, Biddle did not see much hope for the 
country until more than a decade later. In 1963, following President John F. Kennedy’s 
tragic assassination, Biddle offered his full support to President Lyndon Baines Johnson. 
The two men had known each other since Biddle’s days as solicitor general in the 
Roosevelt administration when Johnson represented Texas’s Tenth District in Congress. 
Biddle wanted to reassure the President that he was capable of leading the country 
because, referring back to his 1949 book, he said, “You have my unqualified admiration, 
for I believe that you are, to use a phrase from Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address, 
'the World's Best Hope.'”679 Biddle believed President Johnson had come to embody the 
plans he had outlined for American global engagement in 1949, and would lead the world 
by example and become a beacon for human rights activism. He was not disappointed, as 
Johnson’s administration would secure the passage of both the Civil Rights Act and the 
Voting Rights Act in 1964 and 1965 respectively. Before Biddle could witness these 
historic events, though, he had to address the country’s rising anxiety over the threat of 
communism. 
The Age Of Fear 
As the 1940s gave way to the 1950s, Biddle’s claim that the U.S. was the world’s 
best hope seemed shallow. The country descended into a period of anti-communist 
hysteria, and Biddle responded by picking up his pen and writing another book. In The 
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Fear of Freedom: A Discussion of the Contemporary Obsession of Anxiety and Fear in 
the United States; Its Historical Background and Present Expression; and Its Effect on 
National Security and on Free American Institutions (1952), Biddle attempted to provide 
an historical analysis of the inherent conflict between fear and freedom. He argued that 
fear and freedom cannot coexist, and that Americans had unwarranted anxieties about 
communism. Paraphrasing former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Biddle contended 
that members of the American public are the source of American power, but they seemed 
“to be approving the slow abandonment of individual freedoms” because “in fear of an 
imagined peril to their institutions of freedom, [they] demand that they be secured by 
repressions which may ultimately stifle them.”680 The fear of anti-capitalist ideologies 
was not new, and Biddle rightly pointed out that the U.S. took steps to address the rise of 
the Bolsheviks and the First Red Scare with the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition 
Act of 1918. More than thirty years later, parts of the country were doing even more to 
restrict communism at the expense of freedoms of thought and association. 
For example, Biddle pointed out that state and federal governments were acting 
irrationally by passing laws designed to keep communists out of the public square. 
Maryland, for instance, required its public school teachers to take a loyalty oath to keep 
their jobs. Four Quakers resigned in protest and several more faced termination because 
of their “Communist affiliations.”681 On the federal level, Biddle attacked the McCarran 
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Internal Security Act, which had become law on August 29, 1950. Named after Pat 
McCarran (D-NV), the act was designed to crack down on the Communist Party and 
communist sympathizers by having them register with the Subversive Activities Control 
Board.682 Biddle described the law as “unwise and unworkable” because it “brands the 
Communist party as a criminal conspiracy—and then asks Communists to step up and 
register.”683 President Truman echoed Biddle’s sentiments and opposed the bill, but 
Congress overrode his veto. 684 
Biddle held special disdain for those who would deny individuals their basic 
human rights. This is evidenced by the book’s dedication: “To The Memory Of My 
Father, Algernon Sydney Biddle.” Biddle’s father had been named after Algernon 
Sydney, an English politician and member of parliament who opposed absolute monarchy 
in the mid-1600s. Sydney’s most famous work, Discourses Concerning Government, 
argued that individuals should have the right to choose their own government, an 
argument that later found favor among America’s Founding Fathers, most notably 
Thomas Jefferson. Unfortunately for Sydney, he was accused of committing treason 
against King Charles II and was executed on December 7, 1683. In Biddle’s dedication, 
he emphasized how Sydney had been denied his most basic human rights: 
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[He] was refused a copy of the indictment, a direct violation of the law, 
and denied the assistance of counsel. He was convicted on hearsay 
evidence, the testimony of a perjured informer of the Crown, and 
extracts from papers supposed to be in his handwriting, in which he 
upheld the lawfulness of resistance to oppression.685 
 
 
By including Algernon Sydney in his dedication, Biddle made clear that The Fear of 
Freedom was personal for him, as Americans were allowing their own worries and 
prejudices to control their behavior, leading to the institution of unconstitutional laws. 
Ironically, Biddle was not immune to the anti-communist hysteria flooding 
American society. In early 1950, Biddle became chairman of Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA), a progressive political organization that Eleanor Roosevelt had founded 
with the intention of keeping the New Deal alive. This new position allowed Biddle to 
continue serving his country, not as a cabinet official, but as a lobbyist. On April 27, 
Biddle wrote to Parker to recommend Judge William H. Hastie to the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the same appellate court that Biddle had served on briefly from 1939 to 1940 
before becoming solicitor general. Hastie was an African American who was already 
serving on the Third Circuit in an interim capacity. He had a distinguished record, having 
earned his law degree from Harvard University, serving as the first African American 
federal judge for the U.S. District Court for the Virgin Islands, and becoming Dean of 
Howard University School of Law. Hastie had also crossed paths with Parker years 
earlier as counsel for Melvin Alston in Alston v. Norfolk (1940), which the Fourth Circuit 
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decided. A permanent appointment to the Third Circuit would make Hastie the first 
African American federal appeals court judge.  
However, as historic as it would be for Hastie to permanently join the Third 
Circuit, Biddle was concerned that he, “like so many members of his race,” had joined 
“subversive” organizations that had communist affiliations, which would make his 
confirmation impossible. Parker agreed with Biddle and asked for more information 
before recommending Hastie, whom he regarded “as a man of character and ability 
thoroughly qualified for a federal judgeship, and that, in my opinion, it would be 
unfortunate for the judiciary and for the country for the first Negro who has been 
appointed to high judicial position to be denied confirmation.” Even though Parker 
thought highly of Hastie, he made clear that he did not want “any man of communist 
affiliations or sympathies” on the federal bench. Biddle agreed.686 Fortunately, Biddle 
wrote back on May 1 to report that Hastie was not a communist. Either the organizations 
associated with Hastie were not subversive when he joined them or he was only included 
on each group’s mailing list but was never actually a member. Both men were relieved, 
and they were happy to see the Senate confirm Hastie to the Third Circuit on July 19.  
Had Biddle discovered stronger ties between communism and Hastie, the African 
American judge never would have joined the federal bench. The fear of communism 
taking over key American institutions was simply too great, and even a liberal “New 
Dealer” like Biddle, who opposed laws that discriminated against communists, could not 
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stomach the idea of a communist sympathizer joining the federal judiciary. In his mind, 
communism was akin to Nazi fascism, both of which were incompatible with human 
rights principles and the U.S. Constitution. 
Similar to The World’s Best Hope, Biddle’s next book received glowing reviews. 
Parker congratulated Biddle on his latest work, writing that The Fear of Freedom was “a 
really superb piece of work. It comes at a time when something of the sort is greatly 
needed…I shall never forget the importance of what you did in preserving civil liberty 
during the pressures of the war years. This book is a service of the same sort.”687 
Distinguished Harvard Law professor Arthur Sutherland, Jr., compared the book to 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, saying that Biddle was one of the most 
qualified minds to assess “the same characteristics of American life and opinion which 
troubled de Tocqueville….”688 Apparently Biddle had another critically-acclaimed 
commentary on his hands.  
Being chairman of the ADA, rather than serving in a political position, gave 
Biddle the leisure to pursue writing and other opportunities to advocate for human rights. 
For instance, the same year that The Fear of Freedom appeared in print, Biddle became a 
member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The PCA is an international 
organization designed to utilize arbitration to peacefully resolve disputes, usually 
between two states but also between private parties and intergovernmental organizations. 
The PCA is actually not a court at all but an administrative framework for settling 
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disputes on an ad hoc basis, as well as administering conciliation and fact-finding. The 
types of disputes the PCA typically resolves are territorial delimitations, commercial 
issues, and human rights. Parties involved in an altercation could call upon a member of 
the court, such as Biddle, to serve as an arbitrator. Since Biddle was involved with the 
PCA for ten years, from 1951 to 1961, he would have had opportunities to resolve human 
rights disputes, a cause about which he cared deeply. Unfortunately, scholars will have to 
wait to probe these sources since all PCA records during Biddle’s tenure are private and 
have not yet been released. Biddle’s post-Nuremberg papers, located at Georgetown 
University, also disappointingly contain no entries related to the PCA.  
When Biddle was not settling disputes for the PCA, he was mounting a campaign 
to nominate Harry Truman for the Nobel Peace Prize. Alfred Nobel left instructions in his 
will to award the eponymous peace prize “to the person who shall have done the most or 
the best work for fraternity between nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies 
and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.”689 Obviously, human rights 
activists meet this criteria, and over the past century since the first recipients received the 
award in 1901, more than a dozen people have been recognized for their efforts to 
promote and strengthen human rights. The first such recipient was actually an 
organization. The International Committee of the Red Cross received the award in 1963, 
while Amnesty International received it in 1977. Individuals who have been recognized 
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for their advocacy of human rights include Polish union leader Lech Wałęsa, former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter, and Chinese writer Liu Xiabo.  
Biddle’s membership in the PCA made him eligible to submit a nomination, so in 
1953, he formally contacted the Nobel Committee in Norway to put forward Truman’s 
name. Biddle believed the President was worthy of this award because of his opposition 
to Soviet aggression and support of internationalism and the U.N. Biddle highlighted 
Truman’s foreign policy decisions to send aid to Europe (Greece and the Marshall Plan), 
as well as his “stand in Korea against Chinese Communist aggression.” He closed by 
predicting that future historians would remember Truman for “’promoting fraternity 
between nations,’ and in preventing war and evolving measures that have lead and are 
leading in the direction of peace.” Although Biddle did not specifically mention 
Truman’s support of the Nuremberg Trial, he made sure to include his service as the 
American member of the IMT when he signed his nomination letter.690 
After writing to the Norway, Biddle proceeded to contact numerous dignitaries 
asking them to endorse Truman for the award. Recipients of his missives included the 
current and former British prime ministers, Clement Atlee and Winston Churchill; British 
participants at Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross and Sir David Maxwell Fyfe; and 
Franklin Roosevelt’s widow, Eleanor.691 When Truman learned of the nomination, he 
beamed, writing to Biddle that he would “certainly swell up like a pizened pup” if he won 
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the award.692 Unfortunately for Truman and Biddle, the U.S. President did not win. That 
distinction went to another influential American, George C. Marshall—author of the 
Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after the war—who had actually written a letter 
supporting Truman’s nomination.693  
A Forgotten Human Rights Icon  
Whereas Jackson and Parker died unexpectedly in the 1950s, Biddle lived into the 
1960s. The septuagenarian finally began to feel his age. On March 10, 1960, he slipped 
and fell, breaking and dislocating his ankle so that it “seemed to have no connection with 
[his] leg.” He had to remain in the hospital for a week and then rest at home for two more 
before he could be brought “back to pretty good shape.”694 Realizing that he had more 
years behind him than ahead of him, Biddle decided it was finally time to write his 
memoirs. The result was two volumes, A Casual Past and In Brief Authority, detailing 
everything from his early years in Pennsylvania, his heritage, and his legal training, to his 
time in the White House as solicitor general and attorney general, culminating with his 
Nuremberg experiences.  
One chapter from In Brief Authority called “Defending Civil Liberties” is 
especially insightful. Looking back on his life’s work in the Roosevelt administration, 
Biddle expressed regret over the Smith Act, enacted in 1940 when he was solicitor 
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general (see Chapter V). He admitted that he was uneasy about the law and only 
supported it because he was “motivated by the instinct to display firmness on appropriate 
occasions.” In his view, sedition laws existed to criminalize criticism of the government, 
especially during wartime, and he felt they were neither necessary nor helpful. “I doubted 
whether any speech or writing should be made criminal,” Biddle wrote. He decided to 
test the law, hoping that it would be appealed to the Supreme Court and subsequently 
“knocked out.” He charged Vincent Dunne and his brothers, members of the Trotskyite 
Socialist Workers Party, with conspiracy to overthrow the government, the first time 
anyone had faced sedition charges in peacetime since 1798. Dunne and his brothers were 
found guilty, and they appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court. Unfortunately for 
Biddle, the highest court refused to hear the case, Dunne spent more than a year in federal 
prison, and Biddle’s plan to undo the law backfired dramatically. Writing in 1962, Biddle 
lamented, “I have since come to regret that I authorized the prosecution.”695  
Biddle’s reasons for not opposing the Smith Act from the beginning are consistent 
with his failure to prevent Japanese internment. He was new to the Cabinet and went 
along with his superiors’ demands, even when he morally opposed them. He was non-
confrontational by nature and did not want to rock the boat, so to speak. On the one hand, 
then, Biddle’s remorse over the Smith Act is not surprising, especially as he paused to 
look back over his life. He never supported it, but he lacked the willpower to stand up to 
those above him. On the other hand, though, Biddle’s involvement at Nuremberg also 
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explains why he expressed his regret decades later. Participating in the Trial showed him 
unequivocally what can happen to a society when the government criminalizes free 
speech. He only wished he had done more to protect Americans from the kind of 
government overreach that had occurred in Nazi Germany. 
While Biddle obviously cherished his time on the IMT and viewed it as a 
watershed moment in international law, it is surprising that even when he was writing 
about his life in the early 1960s, he ended his memoirs in 1946. Only the last four and a 
half pages, out of a nearly five hundred-page autobiography, deal with his life post-
Nuremberg, and even that discussion is too brief. Also, since his memoirs appeared in 
print in 1961 and 1962, they do not include his involvement with two of the earliest 
human rights organizations in the U.S.: the U.S. Committee for Democracy in Greece, 
and Amnesty International USA (AI USA). Biddle was the chairman of the former, while 
he provided crucial financial advice to the latter, which helped it stay afloat and 
ultimately become what it is today. The fact that Biddle was part of both reveals his 
desire to promote human rights at home and abroad. 
In April 1967, a coup d'état in Greece led to a military dictatorship and the gross 
violation of individual rights. Six months later, the U.S. Committee for Democracy in 
Greece emerged to advocate for the restoration of democracy and constitutional 
government in the country, and Biddle was its chairman. He wrote to former President 
Truman and current President Johnson to ask for their support in restoring “democratic 
constitutional government in Greece….” Johnson’s administration responded that the 
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White House was primarily concerned with minimizing “long-run economic damage” to 
Greece in order to ensure “a healthy and prosperous Greece.”696  
The organization, according to historian Barbara Keys, employed tactics that 
became standard practice for human rights organizations: “It gathered information, 
worked to attract publicity, spotlighted the celebrities who backed its cause, and lobbied 
Congress, policy makers, and pundits.”697 In fact, Keys argues that the U.S. Committee 
for Democracy in Greece was closely connected with another, more famous human rights 
organization that emerged around the same time, namely AI USA: “In the late 1960s AI 
USA's work on Greece was virtually indistinguishable from that of the U.S. Committee 
for Democracy in Greece.”698 Biddle was involved with both of these organizations.  
In 1967, AI USA was a young organization—its parent association in London had 
only come into being in 1961—and it needed financial support to sustain its lobbying 
efforts to uphold human rights and free prisoners of conscience. The organization’s 
executive director, Paul Lyons, wrote to all board members in August to report that AI 
USA only had enough money to last through October. Lyons was doing everything he 
could to cut costs, such as operating the entire organization out of a basement apartment 
in Chevy Chase, Maryland, and personally contributing $85 a month to AI USA, but 
without an influx of cash, the organization would shut down. Lyons also emphasized that 
the group could hardly be taken seriously by the press or foreign governments by being 
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the kind of “hand-to-mouth operation” it was. He planned to use direct mailings to attract 
new members, and he also implored the board to reach out to foundations who might be 
interested in funding Amnesty’s work.699 
From the organization’s earliest days, Biddle agreed to be an honorary 
chairman.700 AI USA had connections with both the ADA and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), two organizations to which Biddle also had ties, so his 
involvement with AI USA is not surprising. In his advisory role with AI USA, Biddle 
suggested Lyons apply for funding from the Twentieth Century Fund, where he was vice 
chairman of the board of trustees, in order to keep the organization afloat. The Twentieth 
Century Fund (which is known today as The Century Foundation) is a progressive think 
tank founded to solve the country’s problems by funding research projects related to 
public policy, and occasionally by awarding grants in aid. Lyons jumped at this 
opportunity and drafted an application asking for $25,000 per year for the next three 
years. This would provide AI USA with nearly half of its $60,000 annual budget, and 
Lyons was confident that he could secure the difference.701 Biddle reviewed the 
application but remained skeptical of AI USA’s financial stability, saying that it had “no 
really working capital to fall back on.” The group needed to do more to strengthen its 
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bottom line and prove it could be fiscally responsible before the Twentieth Century Fund 
could hand over that much money.702 
There is no direct evidence that the Twentieth Century Fund ever bailed out AI 
USA. The archival records indicate that Lyons and Biddle wrote back and forth for 
several months, with Lyons expressing hope that the Fund might provide a matching 
grant.703 Biddle contacted the Twentieth Century Fund’s director describing AI USA as 
“a very young organization, feeling its way along with spirit, and a capacity for getting 
information about forgotten political prisoners in Europe” and asking him to put 
Amnesty’s application on the agenda for the next meeting.704 The director responded 
favorably that AI USA was a “worthwhile” organization and that the Fund would be 
more disposed to provide financial assistance.705  
However, whether the Twentieth Century Fund ever actually gave money to AI 
USA is not as important as the fact that Biddle’s advice lit a fire under Amnesty’s 
American leadership, motivating Lyons and others in the organization to be more 
intentional in how they raised and spent their funding. After the Twentieth Century Fund 
took no action on Lyons’s initial application, he redoubled his efforts to seek financial 
assistance from other foundations, and Biddle was always there to offer advice. The 
former Nuremberg judge was fully committed to AI USA’s cause to uphold human 
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rights, and it did not matter to him whether the organization sought money from the 
foundation he was a part of or not. Had it not been for Biddle, AI USA may have been 
forced to close its doors.706  
The last letter addressed to Biddle on this issue of granting funding to AI USA 
came in September 1968. One month later, though, he was dead at age 82. Afterward, AI 
USA’s chairman contacted Biddle’s widow, Katherine (see Figure 13), to ask if the 
nonprofit organization could establish the “Francis Biddle Human Rights Award,” which 
would be given to an individual who had "most signally advanced human rights" in the 
previous year.707 It should not be surprising that AI USA wanted to honor Biddle’s 
memory with a human rights award. His participation at Nuremberg, his efforts with the 
PCA, the U.S. Committee for Democracy in Greece, and AI USA, established a worthy 
human rights legacy. 
One of the lesser-known but still striking examples of Biddle’s compassion and 
humanity, though, came in October 1967, when he issued a statement calling for the 
immediate release of Rudolf Hess, one of the leading defendants at the Nuremberg Trial. 
Hess had been part of Adolf Hitler’s inner circle and was second in line to command the 
Third Reich behind Hitler and Hermann Göring. However, Hess famously flew to 
Glasgow in May 1941, supposedly to form an alliance with Great Britain before Germany 
invaded the Soviet Union. The British swiftly took him into custody, where he remained 
before appearing in front of the Allied Tribunal at Nuremberg. Initially, Hess seemed 
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insane—even entering the nonsensical plea of “No” when asked if he was guilty or not 
guilty—but the Allies determined him mentally fit for trial, and the judges found him 
guilty of Counts One and Two (conspiracy to wage aggressive war). He received a 
sentence of life in prison, but as early as 1959, his former defense lawyer petitioned for 
his release.708 By the late 1960s, Hess’s only son, Wolf Rüdiger Hess, had also joined in 
this effort.  
It was the younger Hess’s appeal in September 1967 that convinced Biddle to 
support Rudolf Hess’s release. Biddle wrote that Hess was “an old man, insane and was 
not guilty of any cruelties.” Even though the Allied prosecution had accused Hess of War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, the Tribunal did not find him guilty of either 
charge, so he was not a dangerous criminal like Göring. In addition, Hess was the only 
inmate left at Spandau prison in Berlin—all of the other prisoners had either died or been 
released—essentially restricting him to solitary confinement and making the penitentiary 
a costly one to operate and maintain. Biddle reached out to IMT President Lord Justice 
Geoffrey Lawrence and they called for Hess’s release as the American and British judges 
at Nuremberg.709 The English historian John Wheeler-Bennett reported that he was 
“impressed” by Biddle’s statement and wanted a full copy of the text to include in a book 
project he was working on.710 Unfortunately for Biddle, his appeal fell on deaf ears, as 
                                                 
708 “Petition to Free Hess,” The Times, December 8, 1959, p. 10. 
709 “U.S. and British Judges Call for Release of Hess,” The New York Times, October 11, 1967, p. 
9; letter from FBB to Geoffrey Lawrence, September 21, 1967, FBB Papers, Georgetown University, Box 
7, Folder 22. 
710 Letter from Sir John Wheeler-Bennett to FBB, November 21, 1967, FBB Papers, Georgetown 
University, Box 7, Folder 21. 
340 
the West German authorities refused to let Hess go. He remained imprisoned at Spandau 
until August 17, 1987, when he committed suicide at the age of 93. 
Biddle’s appeal for clemency in Hess’s case reflected his commitment to fairness, 
justice, and human rights. As far as he was concerned, Hess had suffered enough and was 
not a threat to society. To keep him in prison by himself for the rest of his life was cruel, 
inhumane, and a violation of his dignity. The fact that Biddle was a key participant at 
Nuremberg and still sought Hess’s release indicates he was a man of great conviction, 
willing to stick his neck out for a cause he believed in, whether it was popular or not, and 
whether it succeeded or not. Anyone worthy of a human rights award named after Biddle 
would have to live up to his example. 
Unfortunately, the Francis Biddle Human Rights Award never made it past the 
proposal stage, for reasons scholars may never fully understand. Consequently, the late 
cabinet official, judge, lobbyist, and human rights advocate who died in 1968—the same 
year the U.N. declared the “International Year for Human Rights”—faded into obscurity, 
where he has remained. 
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Figure 13. Katherine and Francis Biddle circa 1968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the last photographs of 
Katherine and Francis Biddle. The 
two shared deep affections for one 
another, even though Francis was 
not always faithful to his wife. 
Taken from Katherine Biddle 
Papers, Georgetown University, 
Box 58, Folder 8. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
 
CONCLUSION: REMEMBERING NUREMBERG
 
 
The great question today is not whether the Nuremberg principles are 
valid, but whether mankind can live up to them, and whether it can live 
at all if it fails. 
 
Telford Taylor, Chief Counsel, U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunals711 
 
Twelve more trials took place in Nuremberg after the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), but none has been as scrutinized or as popular as the first. The U.S. led 
these often forgotten legal proceedings, referred to as the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials 
or Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT), from October 1946 to April 1949, and 
continued the IMT’s legacy. This was in part due to the prosecutor who was in charge of 
them. Brigadier General Telford Taylor had been Robert Jackson’s chief assistant 
throughout the Nuremberg Trial and assumed his superior’s role at the NMT once 
Jackson returned to the Supreme Court. Taylor oversaw the American-led trials against 
various groups of suspected German war criminals, including doctors, judges, military 
officers, industrialists, and members of the German mobile killing units (the 
Einsatzgruppen). In the first trial he prosecuted, the Doctors Case of twenty-three Nazi 
physicians charged with conducting horrific medical experiments, Taylor emphasized the 
charge of “Crimes against Humanity,” attacking the defendants for committing “murders, 
                                                 
711 Telford Taylor, “The Nuremberg Trials,” Columbia Law Review 55, no. 4 (Apr. 1955), 525. 
343 
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhuman acts.” The indictment even 
mentioned that the defendants’ crimes against humanity violated international law, 
specifically the Hague Conventions of 1907. The American tribunal found sixteen of the 
defendants guilty, seven of whom were sentenced to death by hanging. Just as with the 
first Nuremberg Trial, the judges acquitted several of the defendants. In fact, of the 183 
defendants the U.S. indicted over the course of the twelve subsequent NMT, 86 were 
acquitted, thus further demonstrating a commitment to justice and the rule of law over a 
visceral impulse for revenge.712 
Taylor published an initial analysis of Nuremberg’s significance in 1955, ten 
years after the Trial opened and only one year after Jackson’s death. Although his 
account was largely hagiographical—focusing almost exclusively on Jackson’s laudable 
role in orchestrating the proceedings—Taylor concluded that Nuremberg had been “the 
most intense and meaningful application of international law in recorded history.” 
Unfortunately, writing at the height of the Cold War, he lamented that American 
anxieties about the U.N. and international engagement had damaged “the memory of 
Nuremberg.” He believed that the American desire to retreat from the community of 
nations was misguided. If Americans had learned anything from Nuremberg, it should 
have been that international engagement and international law have benefits that go well 
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beyond the interests of national security. The purpose of internationalism, according to 
Taylor, “is to keep the peace by making aggression an unpromising adventure.”713  
The memory of Nuremberg changed dramatically during the Vietnam War, in part 
because of the My Lai Massacre on March 16, 1968, when U.S. soldiers raped most of 
the women there and killed 504 civilians, 210 of whom were younger than the age of 
12.714 The massacre became public knowledge over the next year, as a U.S. Army 
investigation charged several military officials with war crimes. Only one soldier, Lt. 
William Calley, was found guilty, though, and even he served very little jail time before 
receiving an official pardon.  
Taylor was already disillusioned with the Vietnam War before the massacre 
occurred, but he was outraged after learning that American soldiers committed atrocities 
in My Lai and then got away with it. Thus, in 1970, Taylor turned to his typewriter to 
vent his frustrations and published Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy. In 
his mind, the American soldiers who murdered Vietnamese civilians at My Lai were just 
as guilty as Nazis who killed Jews during the Holocaust. Both groups of perpetrators 
were war criminals and needed to be brought to justice. Nuremberg served that purpose 
for the latter, but no such trial took place for the former. This irony was not lost on the 
North Vietnamese, who had threatened to put captured American pilots on trial for war 
crimes because of the precedent Nuremberg had set some twenty years earlier.715 From 
Taylor’s point of view, if American soldiers could commit war crimes without facing 
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justice, then that undermined Nuremberg’s efforts to hold individuals responsible “for 
participation in the planning and waging of ‘a war of aggression.’”716 The problem, as 
Taylor saw it, was that Americans were unwilling to apply these standards to themselves 
and had thus “failed … to learn the lessons we undertook to teach at Nuremberg, and that 
failure is today’s American tragedy.”717  
The Vietnam War forced Taylor to reclaim the meaning of the Nuremberg Trial 
from members of the U.S. government who argued that it provided justification for 
invading Vietnam. Such individuals believed that the spread of communism throughout 
Asia was a threat to international peace and security and had to be stopped. Taylor did 
not support communism, but he could not agree with the government’s rationale and 
neither could young American military recruits who believed that “under the Nuremberg 
principles they were legally bound not to participate in what they regarded as the United 
States’ aggressive war.”718 Taylor argued that Nuremberg’s legacy was under siege, and 
that two Nurembergs had formed in the public conscience: “’Nuremberg’ is both what 
actually happened there and what people think happened, and the second is more 
important than the first … it is not the bare record but the ethos of Nuremberg with which 
we must reckon today.”719 With the passage of time, Americans were forgetting why 
Nuremberg mattered, and it was up to Taylor to correct the record. 
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One of the reasons Taylor felt obligated to address this misappropriation of 
Nuremberg’s legacy was that he was one of the only chief Nuremberg prosecutors still 
alive. His mentor, Jackson, had died in 1954. Taylor recognized that he had the requisite 
experience and authority to assess Nuremberg’s significance, and the cover to his 1970 
book highlighted this fact, making clear that Taylor had served as “U.S. Chief Counsel at 
Nuremberg” (see Figure 14). Unlike Jackson, who had been reluctant to inject himself 
into public conversations after returning to the Supreme Court, Taylor felt no such 
restrictions, having opened a private practice in New York City and later accepting an 
academic position at Columbia Law School. This allowed Taylor to defend 
Nuremberg’s—and Jackson’s—legacy, and for the rest of his life, he never stopped 
claiming that Nuremberg had set a precedent that aggressive war is an international 
crime. His death in 1998, at the age of 90, meant that others would have to explain how 
Nuremberg should best be remembered.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, practically all of the IMT’s and the NMT’s American 
participants viewed Nuremberg as advancing international law by holding individuals 
responsible for waging aggressive war. Whenever these men would come together to 
reflect on the Trial, they would affirm that it demonstrated the effectiveness of 
multilateralism and the rule of law in establishing “a structure for peace and security in 
the world….”720 Most hoped that a permanent international criminal court based on the 
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Nuremberg model would come into existence, which finally happened in 2002.721 
However, they occasionally described the proceedings as advancing awareness of the 
Holocaust or promoting international human rights law. Walter Rockler, for example, 
who, in his own words, “arrived at Nuremberg in 1947, probably the youngest, the last, 
and the least significant lawyer there,” concluded that Nuremberg created “an 
indisputable historical record of the Nazi regime’s atrocities… including what has come 
to be called the Holocaust.”722 Another participant, Whitney Harris, declared that it was 
because of Nuremberg that the world became aware of the Holocaust and recognized 
genocide as an international crime.723 Even Taylor stated before he died that his 
Nuremberg experiences allowed him to grasp the magnitude of the Nazis’ Final 
Solution.724  
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Figure 14. Cover of Nuremberg and Vietnam by Telford Taylor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The range of interpretations of the Nuremberg Trial over the past seventy-five 
years has been just as diverse among participants as it has been among academics. 
Political scientist  Gary Jonathan Bass states, “One of the great ironies of Nuremberg’s 
legacy is that the tribunal is remembered as a product of Allied horror at the Holocaust, 
when in fact America and Britain … actually focused far more on the criminality of Nazi 
aggression…”725 Law scholar Anne Bayefsky, on the other hand, declares that, “The 
message of Nuremberg was unqualified universality of human rights, equality of the Jew, 
the responsibility to prevent genocide, and the paramountcy of turning human rights 
standards from hollow phrases to political imperatives.”726 In fact, any time an historic 
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event in international law or multilateralism takes place, Nuremberg receives fresh 
analyses. For instance, during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign when the issue of 
waterboarding and other forms of torture often disguised as interrogation techniques 
came up, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen responded by invoking the 
memory of Nuremberg, saying that the U.S. must respect and uphold international law 
because “there’s something called Nuremberg that we have to be concerned about...”727 
While it is obvious that Nuremberg has meant different things to different people, 
several aspects of the Trial are incontrovertible. Nuremberg was about aggression, but it 
was also about “Crimes against Humanity” and the Nazis’ Final Solution against the 
Jews. Robert Jackson’s opening statement demonstrates this, as does the fact that Francis 
Biddle and John Parker, the American judges, were more likely to return a guilty verdict 
for defendants charged with “Crimes against Humanity.” Rather than remembering 
Nuremberg as a trial of aggression or atrocity, scholars would do well to recognize the 
nuances of both. The same can be said for the Trial’s role in advancing human rights 
ideas and institutions. Contrary to what some scholars have argued, a human rights 
moment did emerge in the 1940s. The Republican backlash and anti-communist hysteria 
that ensued confirm this, as well as Jackson, Biddle, and Parker’s attempts to defend 
                                                 
727 “Flashback: I will do whatever it takes, Trump says,” USA Today, February 15, 2016, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/15/donald-trump-torture-enhanced-interrogation-
techniques-editorials-debates/80418458/, accessed on April 22, 2016; Felicia Schwartz, “Donald Trump 
Calls for Use of Torture, Resumption of Waterboarding,” Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2016, available 
at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/02/17/donald-trump-calls-for-use-of-torture-resumption-of-
waterboarding/, accessed on April 22, 2016; Nick Gass, “Former Defense Secretary Warns of ‘Nuremberg’ 
Trials under Trump Presidency,” Politico, March 3, 2016, available from 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/2016/03/william-cohen-donald-
trump-2016-220206, accessed on April 22, 2016. 
350 
Nuremberg’s significance after they returned home. While it may be more convenient to 
argue that the modern human rights regime emerged in the 1970s when the prevalence of 
human rights NGOs and governmental policies in favor of human rights exploded, this 
overlooks the struggle for human rights and internationalism that took place in the 1940s. 
Any historian of human rights must focus on the nuances, and one of the most effective 
ways to observe and measure these subtleties is through the lives of the American 
participants. 
Of the three characters at the center of this study, scholars and the public 
remember Jackson the most. This is no doubt a result of the prominent positions he held 
throughout his lifetime, from his service in the Roosevelt administration to the Supreme 
Court to the Nuremberg Trial, as well as his talents for writing lucid legal opinions. 
Within academic circles, the work of the Robert H. Jackson Center in New York, whose 
mission is to “advance public awareness and appreciation of the principles of justice and 
the rule of law as embodied in the achievements and legacy of Robert H. Jackson, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice and Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg,” has also perpetuated 
Jackson’s status as a pivotal American figure.728 In the realm of popular culture, 
Jackson’s legacy benefited from Alec Baldwin’s portrayal of him in the 2000 television 
mini-series Nuremberg. Jackson may not be a household name because of his 
contributions to American law and human rights, but at the very least he has not been 
largely forgotten. The same cannot be said for John Parker and Francis Biddle. 
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After Parker’s death, the American Bar Association (ABA) highlighted the 
Southern jurist’s service at Nuremberg and his commitment to fundamental human rights: 
“He brought to that experiment in international justice the American concept for due 
process and respect for individual rights.”729 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl 
Warren, also memorialized the late judge, emphasizing “the broad range of Judge 
Parker’s professional interest” and “his abiding passion to enlarge the rule of law.”730 
However, for all the glowing words friends and colleagues shared about Parker, Judge 
Harold Medina of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck a more somber tone:  
 
Will the fame of John Johnston Parker stand the test of time? His 
writings do not have the piquancy of style, that pepper and salt and 
pungent turn of phrase that so helped to spread the fame of [Justice 
Oliver Wendell] Holmes and [Justice Benjamin] Cardozo and [Judge] 
Learned Hand. 
 
 
While Medina believed later generations would benefit from Parker’s “spirt,” “idealism,” 
and “love of freedom,” he felt they would not appreciate Parker’s contributions to the 
legal profession. Medina’s prognostication has been confirmed, as Parker is not famous. 
Within Parker’s home state, an award from the North Carolina Bar Association and a 
dormitory on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill bear his 
namesake, but his contributions to domestic and international law have been largely 
overlooked, and his role in the IMT mostly forgotten. A highway marker in his 
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hometown of Monroe is the only public display of his service at Nuremberg  (see   
Figure 15). 
Biddle’s wife, Katherine, honored her husband’s memory by establishing the 
Francis Biddle Memorial Lecture Series at Harvard Law School. For the law school’s 
inaugural lecture, the Harvard Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Law Review published 
remembrances from Biddle’s peers. They all described him as a man of great courage and 
integrity, a defender of individual freedom and civil rights who stood up to the President 
when Roosevelt ordered the internment of Japanese Americans. They also noted his 
service at Nuremberg as a judge committed to due process and the law, even when 
Jackson pressured him to do otherwise. Biddle even received praise from Judge William 
Hastie, the same African-American jurist he had suspected of having communist 
sympathies in the early 1950s, who described Biddle as a man who “believed so deeply in 
the nurture of human freedom in a democratic society and contributed so much of his 
time and talent to that cause….”731 To this day, Harvard Law continues to invite lecturers 
to speak on civil liberties and civil rights as part of the Francis Biddle Memorial Lecture 
Series.  
Even within academic circles, though, Biddle remains an overlooked figure. He is 
not the subject of any book-length biography, and he has never broken through into 
popular culture, at least not in the same way that Jackson has. The closest Biddle ever 
came was in 2004 with the play Trying, based on his personal assistant’s observations of 
                                                 
731 William H. Hastie, “Free Speech: Contrasting Constitutional Concepts and Their 
Consequences,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 9 (1974), 429. 
353 
his last year of life. Biddle’s journey to obscurity is somewhat surprising given the fact 
that he was an important figure in the Roosevelt administration and was the American 
judge at the Nuremberg Trial. Biddle also left behind a diverse record of publications, 
from a novel to a book on political theory and internationalism to two autobiographies, so 
it is not as if scholars lack source material from which to draw.  
Many studies of Nuremberg and human rights emphasize the role of organizations 
and institutions in advancing human rights causes. However, focusing on individuals 
provides a closer look and more effective measurement of the impact the experience of 
Nuremberg had on those who participated in it, and how the Trial affected their thinking 
about human rights issues afterward. Jackson, Biddle, and Parker became carriers of 
human rights ideas that permeated the air in war-torn Nuremberg. The Trial was a 
crucible in which their views on individual rights and international law became more 
refined, and they transported these ideas back to the U.S. when they defended the Trial in 
public forums and gatherings. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the Nuremberg Trial 
advanced international human rights law in the postwar period. 
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Figure 15. North Carolina Highway Marker for John Parker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, as this study has demonstrated, Jackson, Biddle, and Parker sometimes 
failed to apply these universal concepts in their own backyard. Jackson stumbled on the 
issue of individual rights for American communists, while Parker faltered on civil rights. 
Although Biddle was the most consistent advocate of all three, he believed the nation was 
the best vehicle for promoting human rights around the world, as evidenced by his book’s 
title that the U.S. was The World’s Best Hope. This does not mean, however, that these 
men were only appearing to endorse human rights. Their advocacy was genuine; they 
simply suffered from blind spots. Every generation of human rights thinkers will 
undoubtedly overlook some aspect of their society that their descendants will later decry 
violated human rights. These blind spots are unavoidable, as there can be no way to 
predict how subsequent generations will judge one’s own time. It is also simply not 
possible to remove every obstruction that might be blocking one’s view of the world, 
especially since some obstructions are only possible to detect after the fact. Such was the 
case with these American participants. 
Taken from the North Carolina Highway 
Historical Marker website 
(http://www.ncmarkers.com/marker_photo.a
spx?sf=a&id=L-90) 
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As this project demonstrates, Nuremberg was full of paradox. First, the American 
participants at the center of this study became stronger human rights advocates after the 
Trial, but their efforts extended mostly to the international arena, not the domestic sphere. 
In other words, it was easier to call for advances in international human rights law in far-
away regions than it was at home. And second, the fear of the threat of communism was 
so great during the Cold War that it presented a crisis which seemed to justify suspending 
human rights in order to fight it. Jackson, Biddle, and Parker were not immune to this 
anxiety, which only demonstrates the power of the perceived threat. 
A third Nuremberg paradox emerges regarding historical memory and how 
scholars and the public should remember the Trial. Nuremberg participants and 
academics alike have argued that the proceedings were about aggression over atrocities, 
or vice versa. This either/or debate is a false dichotomy, though, as Nuremberg included 
both. Scholarly attempts to historicize human rights tend to overlook or oversimplify the 
Nuremberg Trial’s role in developing international human rights law, but there can be no 
doubt that the Trial laid the groundwork for a human rights revolution.  
This reluctance to focus on Nuremberg in the overarching history of human rights 
is a reflection of the legal and moral failures of U.S. leadership in our own time. To date, 
the U.S. government has not signed the Rome Treaty and become party to the ICC—
Nuremberg’s legal descendant—and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent “war 
on terror” have created an anxiety-ridden situation similar to the anti-communist hysteria 
of the postwar world. In the twenty-first century, America has retreated from the kind of 
international engagement that made a human rights institution like Nuremberg possible, 
356 
so it is not surprising that scholars would downplay or ignore the Trial’s role in the 
development of international human rights law. When a global power like the U.S. 
refuses to adhere to the very human rights principles it helped create, or when it commits 
similar war crimes for which it prosecuted Germans after World War II, then 
Nuremberg’s role in human rights history seems shallow at best.  
If the U.S. became party to the ICC, it would demonstrate to the rest of the world 
its commitment to international law and human rights. However, if the U.S. continues to 
allow anxieties over terrorism to consume it and cause it to retreat from the community of 
nations, then it will fail to remember the lessons of Nuremberg: that international 
cooperation and international law are the keys to ensuring global peace and security by 
enforcing the principles of universal human rights. Perhaps Biddle was right all along, 
though for different reasons than he originally intended in the postwar era. In this hour of 
great uncertainty, when global tensions seem high, the U.S. may very well be the world’s 
best hope; not for its leadership, but instead for fully committing to the principles it once 
held dear. 
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